莫瑞〈臺灣防衛戰略再檢討〉一文所揭示的「豪豬戰略」，被指 是為政治需要而扭曲軍事專業，但從所出現的四項主要批評論點來 看，事實卻可能正好相反。首先，戰爭中軍事手段與政治目的有著密 切的連結，隨著兩岸政治情勢的轉變，臺灣遭遇威嚇的危險性已經低 於占領；其次，積極反制飛彈威脅執行上有其困難；再者，空優並非 絕對必要，「豪豬戰略」亦非島內殲敵，現行資源分配更無益於空優 的確保；最後，對嚇阻的強烈期待，未免是戰略守勢下戰術積極的過 度解釋。意即，莫瑞的見解大致均屬正確，對「豪豬戰略」的反對， 其實也是出於各種自覺或不自覺的政治判斷。

“Porcupine Strategy,” proposed by Murray’s article “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” is condemned as sacrificing military professions for political considerations. Nonetheless, the contrary is true. Military tools are linked to the political objectives. Under the current political climate, invasion is more threatening than coercion; countering the missile threat aggressively is also infeasible and unacceptable. In addition, air superiority is important but not requisite to a successful defense; “Porcupine Strategy” does not equal to inland battles; current strategy is not contributive to air defense; and the strong desire of deterrence is an over-extension of active tactics. In facts, either conscious or unconscious, critiques of “Porcupine Strategy” are largely bureaucratic, reflecting the parochial interests of certain groups.

豪豬戰略;國防政策;嚇阻;軍備整建;部門利益

Porcupine Strategy; Defense Policy; Deterrence; Arms Acquisition; Parochial Interests