質詢權源自內閣制國家，是踐行「國會中心」與「行政權向立法權負責」等憲政原則的關鍵機制，在半總統制國家同樣重要。我國質詢制度除了來自憲法，規定立法委員有向行政院院長及行政院各部會首長質詢之權，《立法院職權行使法》也詳盡規範質詢進行的細節。2024年6月，立法院修正《立法院職權行使法》，明訂官員不得反質詢、拒絕答覆、虛偽陳述等，並附帶罰則，被憲法法庭宣告部分條文違憲，在臺灣掀起不小的憲政爭議。本文以質詢權的憲政意義為基礎，檢視制度意涵與歷史演進，並比較內閣制與半總統制國家的質詢規定及運作，依此再檢視此次修法爭議及憲法法庭之主張，並提出對我國質詢制度的改革建言。本文認為，質詢在憲政意義外，也因為國會議員向行政官員問責，使之成為向選民揭露行政行為的重要手段，而與展演技巧、民意監督等政治性意義不可分，因此，立法院修法限縮行政部門在詢答過程的角色，也是限縮了質詢本應發揮的功能。另外，對於半總統制國家而言，行政機關與立法機關分具民意正當性，立法院擴張質詢權而對行政權產生限制，更有違反權力分立制衡之虞。

This article examines the constitutional role and political function of interpellation, with a focus on Taiwan’s recent amendments to the Law Governing the Exercise of the Powers of the Legislative Yuan. Rooted in parliamentary systems, interpellation serves as a key mechanism for legislative oversight and executive accountability—functions that remain vital in semi-presidential regimes. In 2024, Taiwan’s legislature prohibited officials from counter-questioning, refusing to answer, or making false statements during interpellations, attaching penalties to such conduct. The Constitutional Court later ruled parts of the amendment unconstitutional, triggering significant debate over institutional balance. Through a comparative analysis of interpellation in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, this article evaluates the legitimacy and implications of the amendment. It argues that interpellation is not only a constitutional tool but also a political practice central to democratic accountability. Curtailing executive participation in interpellation may impair its performative and communicative functions, while also destabilizing the separation of powers in a dual-legitimacy system.

質詢、國會、半總統制、民意政治、責任政治

interpellation, legislature, semi-presidentialism, populist politics, responsible government