1946年，即將於次年脫離英國殖民統治的印度，於英、美支持下，成為盟國 對日占領機構「遠東委員會」成員國，並透過「大英國協」機制，參與議定對日 處置措施與媾和進程。但印度後來卻拒絕出席1951年舊金山和會，未簽署美國主 導的對日多邊和約。1952年印度於日本恢復主權後簽署雙邊和約，與中華民國政 府同為少數個別與日本締約者。過往研究多將印度參與和議角色，簡化為大英國 協一員，對印度於和約談判過程中隨時局發展而形成的外交戰略思考，鮮少著 墨；有關印度對臺灣問題的觀點，則全然置於其與中共關係之脈絡中，而忽略臺 灣問題與亞洲冷戰變局下對日媾和整體發展之間的互動關聯，理解較為片面。 本文運用中外文多國檔案，包括尼赫魯紀念圖書館典藏、近期完成數位化的 《尼赫魯文書》（Nehru Papers），輔以日記、文集等，依時序首先探討戰後初 期印度對日和議之意向，其次探討韓戰爆發前後印度有關對日和約交涉與臺灣問 題觀點的形成，並隨韓戰戰局變化作出對策調整，最末探討印度拒絕出席舊金山 和會前後對臺灣問題的操作。回顧冷戰初期，美蘇陣營衝突在亞洲白熱化之際， 區域國家採取不結盟政策的戰略考量及應對模式，其有關臺灣問題觀點的形成與 運用，對吾人思考今日時局，或能有所助益。

In 1946, India, which was about to break away from British colonial rule the following year, became a member of the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied Powers highest policy making agency in carrying out the occupation of Japan, with the support of Great Britain and the United States. Through the Commonwealth system, it also participated in the peace negotiations and measures of settlement with Japan. However, India later refused to attend the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and did not sign the US-led multilateral peace treaty with Japan. In 1952, after Japan regained its sovereignty, India signed a bilateral peace treaty, becoming one of the few individual signatories of such treaty, along with the Republic of China. Previous studies tend to simplify India’s role in the peace negotiations to that of a member of the British Commonwealth, with little attention paid to India’s diplomatic strategies, which evolved over time during the negotiations. On the other hand, India’s views on the question of Formosa have been entirely framed within its relationship with the People’s Republic of China, thus neglecting the consequential connection between the question of Formosa and the peace negotiations with Japan amidst the changing dynamics of the Cold War in Asia. Drawing on archival materials of multinational sources, including the recently digitized Nehru Papers from the Nehru Memorial Library, supplemented by diaries and collected works, this article tries to revise the simplistic interpretation described above. The article chronologically explores India’s intentions regarding peace negotiations with Japan in the early postwar period. It then examines the formation of India’s perspectives on peace negotiations with Japan and the question of Formosa before and after the outbreak of the Korean War, and their strategic adjustments as the Korean War unfolded. Finally, it explores India’s approach to the question of Formosa before and after it declined to attend the San Francisco Peace Conference. As the US-Soviet conflict intensified in Asia during the early years of Cold War, the politics and diplomacy of neutrality shaped the stance of India, a major non-aligned country in the region, in perceiving and exploiting the question of Formosa. This new analysis may shed light on the current state of affairs.

尼赫魯; 對日和約; 臺灣問題; 冷戰; 韓戰

Jawaharlal Nehru; Peace Treaty with Japan; Question of Formosa; Cold War; Korean War