本研究以1932–1945年間蔣介石日記為核心，探討其對臺灣認識的演變及考 量重點，旨在檢驗並解構「國民政府始終堅持收復臺灣」的單一路徑民族主義敘 事。研究發現，蔣的臺灣觀隨戰局與國際局勢而動態調整，核心始終圍繞土地、 戰略與國格，而非對臺灣人的關懷。 1930年代初期，臺灣以「光復失地以雪前恥」的民族象徵進入蔣的視野；至 1934年，因臺灣被視為日本南進華南的軍事前哨，其認識開始呈現民族歷史敘事 與戰略安全考量並行的結構。1942年下半年，隨中美關係深化及注意到美國將臺 灣納入戰後亞太防禦體系，蔣認為須及早向美方確立臺灣歸屬中國的立場，並以 「共同防禦」構想爭取支持。1943年開羅會議，蔣首次在國際外交場域明確提出 臺灣應歸還中國之主張，並在談判過程中刻意避免與美國利益正面衝突，以確保 「臺灣歸還中國」一案能被納入《開羅宣言》。 1944年起，蔣著手建構接收臺灣的行政與治安體系，形成「中央直派、外來 班底」的人事布局。1945年日本投降後，他透過民族主義敘事建構收復臺灣的合 法性，而臺灣社會則展現真誠的民族情感與高度配合，形成政治敘述與社會情感 之間的落差。戰後，蔣對臺灣的定位延續其戰時視臺灣為「大中國」疆域與國防 安全體系一部分的構想，並以此作為統治臺灣的核心價值。

This study examines Chiang Kai-shek’s diaries from 1932 to 1945, tracing the evolution of his perception of Taiwan and the driving mechanisms behind it. The aim is to test and deconstruct the nationalist narrative that the Nationalist Government consistently adhered to a single path of “recovering Taiwan.” The findings reveal that Chiang’s view of Taiwan shifted dynamically in response to the course of the war and international circumstances, with his core concerns revolving around territory, strategy, and national dignity, rather than care for the Taiwanese people. In the early 1930s, Taiwan entered Chiang’s horizon as a nationalist symbol of “recovering lost territory and avenging humiliation.” By 1934, as Taiwan was regarded as Japan’s forward base for her southward expansion into South China, Chiang’s perception increasingly combined nationalist-historical discourse with strategic-security considerations. In the latter half of 1942, as Sino-American relations deepened and the United States incorporated Taiwan into its postwar Asia- Pacific defense framework, Chiang sought to establish China’s claim to Taiwan early on and appealed to U.S. support for the claim through the concept of “joint defense.” At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Chiang for the first time articulated explicity in an international diplomatic occasion that Taiwan should be returned to China, and he deliberately avoided direct conflict with U.S. interests during negotiation to ensure that the clause in Taiwan’s return could be incorporated into the Cairo Declaration. Beginning in 1944, he initiated the construction of administrative and security structures for Taiwan’s postwar takeover, resulting in a personnel arrangements characterized by “directly dispatched by the central government and outside team.’’ After Japan’s surrender in 1945, he constructed the legitimacy of Taiwan’s return to China through nationalist discourse, while Taiwanese society expressed genuine patriotic sentiment and strong cooperation with the authorities—revealing a gap between political narratives and social emotions. In the postwar period, Chiang’s perception of Taiwan continued his wartime view of the island as both a territorial domain of “Greater China” and an integral element of its national defense system. This became a core value of his rule in Taiwan.

蔣介石; 臺灣認識; 民族主義; 開羅會議; 國防安全

Chiang Kai-shek; Perception of Taiwan; Nationalism; Cairo Conference; National Defense