本文隨唐君毅之研究成果揭示朱子如何把道德抉擇之可能性奠基在人之實踐主體上，所謂操舍心，從而證立人在道德上的可承責性。處於天理與人欲間，朱子之操舍心乃被理解為一道德抉擇之實踐主體，它雖非本心，卻是一可自主意於天理與人欲間作出抉擇之主體，從而使人對其行動之道德究責成為可理解。

This paper explores how Zhuxi bases the possibility of moral decision on the subject of human practice, using the scholarly work of Tang Junyi as a guide for understanding Zhuxi’s apporach to morality. This subject of human practice is one that can cultivate the heart-mind, grounding morality itself in the human capacity for understanding and accepting responsibility for their actions. Zhuxi’s understands the heart-mind as residing between moral law and human desire, and the subject of practice is one with the capacity to cultivate that hear-mind, generating the capacity for moral choice. He frames this subject not in terms of the originary heart (benxin), but in terms of a being with the capacity for moral choice, one who is attuned to both the principle of universe (tianli) as well as the drives of human desire. In this way, the moral responsibility of diverse actions become legible.

操舍心; 意識於天理人欲間; 二心之統一; 道德抉擇

heart-mind for moral decision; consciousness between moral law and human desire; unity between the originary heart-mind and the human heart-mind; moral decision