本文探討非GAAP 盈餘監管制度之改變是否影響企業透過投機性特別損益之認列來進行盈餘管理。美國證管會 (SEC) 於2010 年發布新的解釋函令（Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations，以下簡稱為C&DIs），放寬之前Regulation G 對非GAAP 盈餘調節過程中其他項目的排除限制，給予公司在計算非GAAP 盈餘時擁有更大彈性。本文以此法規改變為背景，利用差異中之差異法進行分析，研究發現：相較於未報導非GAAP 盈餘之公司，有揭露非GAAP 盈餘之公司在2010 年之後，顯著減少認列投機性特別損益項目，除此之外，也減少了利用投機性特別損益之認列來達成分析師盈餘預測；此實證結果在各種穩健性測試下皆得到相同結論。進一步分析發現，投機性特別損益認列之減少，主要來自於GAAP 盈餘為負之公司。本研究結果為過去文獻提供補充性證據，支持放寬對非GAAP 盈餘的揭露限制，可以降低公司從事盈餘管理的誘因。  

This study investigates whether the change in the U.S. SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP reporting in 2010 affects firms’ earnings management through the recognition of opportunistic special items. The SEC released Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (hereafter C&DIs) in 2010 to relax the exclusion restrictions imposed by an earlier regulation (i.e., Regulation G) and to give companies more flexibility in excluding other items in the calculation of non-GAAP earnings. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, relative to firms that do not report non-GAAP earnings, firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings reduce the recognition of opportunistic special items after the implementation of C&DIs. We also find that the incidence of using opportunistic special items to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts by non-GAAP firms significantly decreases in the post-C&DIs period. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative research design. An additional analysis suggests that the reduction in the recognition of opportunistic special items is more pronounced in firms that report a loss under GAAP. Our findings complement prior research suggesting that a less stringent regulation on non-GAAP earnings disclosures will reduce firms’ incentives to pursue aggressive earnings management. 

非 GAAP 盈餘; 經常性項目; 特別損益項目; 盈餘管理; 解釋函令

non-GAAP reporting; recurring items; special items; earnings management; compliance and disclosure interpretations