研究目的

本研究旨在運用心理學者有關道德楷模的研究結果，以及 A. M. Flescher 與 B. Williams 的觀點，評論 J. O. Urmson 針對道德聖人與道德英雄「故做謙虛」評斷的適當性，再據以提出對我國品德教育的蘊義。

研究設計／方法／取徑

本文採用文獻分析與理論分析，綜整道德楷模的重要說法，據以檢證 Urmson「故做謙虛」評論的適當性。

研究發現或結論

研究發現道德楷模的道德心理有兩大特點。一是感到「非做不可，不做會良心不安」，此即 Williams「實踐必要性」與「道德不能」捕捉的心理現象。二是經常表示「我還可以做且應做得更多」，這與他們對於道德理想的高度認同感，繼而感到強烈的個人責任感有關。據此，本文主張道德英雄或聖人是真心相信自己有義務要做他所做的行為，而非如 Urmson 所言是「假裝」低估自己所為的價值。筆者借用 Flescher 的分析指出，隨著個人變得愈是有德，其主觀義務感將逐步提升，此即「義務與德行的共變」。道德楷模愈清楚自己是「比上不足」，其感於自己未臻理想，因此致力於追求 Fuller 所稱之「抱負性道德」。

研究原創性／價值

本研究價值有二。一方面闡明道德楷模主觀的道德心理，揭示其道德義務感實與德行發展呈現共變關係，以此駁斥 Urmson「故做謙虛」的評斷。另一方面闡明「抱負性道德」充分顯現在道德主體對於道德理想的高度認同感，感於自己比「上」不足，驅使其持續致力於理想的追求。

教育政策建議或實務意涵

這對品德教育的啟示包括：首先，學生品德發展軌跡與現下狀態的掌握，有賴親師生三方合作，尤其是學生持續的自我省察。其次，鑑於道德認同係一發展歷程，將「品德核心價值」納為跨教育階段共通的學習主題是於理有據的，惟需指明不同階段的任務究屬「局部德行」的陶養或「全面德行」的轉換。最後，為提升個人的道德認同感，道德楷模的生動敘事將有助於激發受教者省察自己與善的距離，進而產生有為者亦若是的意念。

Purpose

This paper draws on psychological research findings regarding moral exemplars and the related notions of A. M. Flescher and B. Williams to investigate the adequacy of J. O. Urmson’s “false modesty” comment on moral saints and heroes. By scrutinizing these perspectives, some crucial implications for character and moral education are discovered.

Design/methodology/approach

Documentary and theoretical analysis are used to distill certain critical perspectives of moral exemplars with the aim of scrutinizing the adequacy of Urmson’s “false modesty” comment.

Findings/results

Moral exemplars’ psychology is discovered to be characterized by two features. First, these moral exemplars frequently state “I have to do this or I would feel uneasy,” which is captured by Williams' concepts of practical necessity and moral incapacity. Second, they often remark “I could do more and I should (have) do(ne) more,” which Damon and Colby relate to a strong identification with moral ideals. The author contends that moral saints and heroes sincerely feel obliged to do what they have done, contradicting Urmson’s “false modesty” comment that they only pretend to have a low opinion of their accomplishments. Drawing on Flescher’s analysis, the author concludes that as an individual matures morally, their subjective sense of duty expands, a phenomenon termed the “covariance of duty with virtue.” Their true modesty comes from a clear awareness that they still fall short of the moral ideal, characterizing L. L. Fuller’s “morality of aspiration.”

Originality/value

The originality of this paper lies in its attempt to bridge the conversation among speculative philosophers and empirical psychologists on morality. It reveals that an individual’s subjective sense of duty covaries with their state of virtue, refuting Urmson’s comment. Furthermore, the morality of aspiration is illustrated through the agent's strong identification with moral ideals, motivating a continuous pursuit of self-improvement.

Implications for Policy/Practice

Three major educational implications are drawn. First, parents, teachers, and students must understand the developmental trajectory of a student’s moral character, specifically the faithfulness in facing their own character status. Second, as moral identity is a process, core values should be common learning topics across educational stages, though tasks must differ based on whether they involve inculcating local virtues or converting them into global ones. Third, using rich narratives of moral exemplars helps enhance students' moral identification, providing an opportunity for reflection and motivation to emulate these ideals.

品德教育、超義務、義務、道德楷模、德行

moral and character education, moral exemplar, obligation, supererogation, virtue