本文檢視當代英國政治思想史家史金納近年來所建構的「修正共和主義」。他反對學界認為共和自由觀為一種積極自由的通說，主張共和自由為強調個人行動不受干涉的消極自由；並以馬基維利思想之重新詮釋為本，嘗試將共和自由與積極自由加以區隔。史金納指出，相較於自由主義過分強調個人權利的觀點，共和傳統所注重的公民德行理想，能夠兼顧自由制度之維繫的根本課題。但他認為德行必須通過強制法律加以形塑，並非如一般所論在民主參與過程中培育發展，這導致了當代共和論述以德行與法律為核心的兩種典範之競爭。本文對史金納的理論作了詳盡的脈絡與義理分析，由柏林對於積極自由以及政治自由之批判出發，探討史金納修正共和主義如何針對柏林的批判，提出理論與歷史的理據以重構政治自由論述；最後，檢討史金納以法律為核心的的修正共和主義所蘊含的理論問題。

This paper examines Quentin Skinner’s revisionist project of reconciling republican liberty and negative freedom. His conceptualization is analyzed in the contexts of both contemporary political theory as well as a historiographical interpretation of Machiavelli. I argue that, in terms of political theory, Skinner’s project does not establish the conceptual connection between negative freedom and self-government as demanded by Isaiah Berlin and other critics of republicanism. In historiography, Skinner advances two claims: first, that Machiavelli’s idea of liberty is negative freedom, and second, that republican liberty though negative in nature can somehow achieve common good. I demonstrate that these two claims are mutually exclusive and cannot be sustained simultaneously. Consequently, I contend that Skinner’s revisionist project does not achieve its goal of providing a valid synthesis of republican discourse and negative freedom. Skinner’s revisionist attempt to recast republican liberty as negative freedom leads to a paradigm competition in contemporary republicanism, illustrated in Philip Pettit’s philosophical theory of republicanism and Maurizio Viroli’s interpretation of Machiavelli. Instead of civic virtue, juristic discourse is becoming the emerging paradigm in republicanism. This change is also examined in this paper.

共和主義;自由;法律;史金納

republicanism; liberty; law; Quentin Skinner