目前學界對於1995-96年間台海危機的研究，均是立基於所謂的預期效用理論（expected utility theory）上，也就是假設國家是理性行為者，其目的是追求利益最大化。然而，台灣對於美中兩國的利益顯然不對稱，美國在台海危機中實施軍事干預絕非利益最大化的表現。此外，預期效用理論乃是針對長時間一般決策過程的歸納，而在短暫的危機決策過程中有其解釋不足之處。為此，新古典現實主義者戴傑飛（Jeffrey W. Taliaferro）提出了風險平衡（balance of risk）理論，試圖解釋何以強權會在邊陲地帶進行具風險性的軍事及外交干預，而這些邊陲地帶通常都不涉及強權的核心利益，顯示出強權的行為並非完全依照理性原則，故此，本研究便以風險平衡理論來檢視美國在1995-96年間的軍事干預行為，冀能提供較為完整的解釋。

Most 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis studies developed thus far are based on the expected utility theory. Its axiom is that the state is like a rational actor seeking to maximize profit. Taiwan, however, is an asymmetric interest between the U.S. and China. The military intervention of the U.S. to the Taiwan Strait during the 1995-96 is not the best means towards profit maximization. More importantly, the expected utility theory is used to understand decision-making process over a long period of time; it fail to explain the decision-making process within a short period of time. Thus, neoclassical realist Jeffrey W. Taliaferro developed the Balance of Risk theory explain why the great powers initiate risky military or diplomatic commitments in the peripherial regions. These peripheral regions usually do not factor into the core interests of the great powers. This goes to show how the action of the great powers do not always accord with the rational principle. Hence, this study is to review the U.S. military intervention during 1995-96 using Taliaferro’s theory to provide better perspectives.

風險平衡;美中關係;展望理論;預期效用理論;新古典現實主義

balance of risk;U.S.-PRC relationsexpected utility theory;neoclassic realism