促進民間參與公共建設法賦予民間機構從事開發交通建設所需用地，藉以提高交通建設之財務自償能力。回顧目前國內所推動之高速鐵路及捷運建設BOT案，均藉由土地開發收入以挹注建設成本，惟土地開發收入取決於開發規模及代理人努力效果等因素，在政府與民間機構存在對土地市場價值資訊不對稱下，恐衍生委託代理問題。本文嘗試以代理理論作為民間參與捷運場站土地開發制度之立論基礎，探究法制代理結構下之變量關係，進而建構政府與民間機構之委託代理模型。本文模擬案例發現，委託代理模型具可操作性並可運用於實務界，且場站開發收入為促進民間參與捷運場站建設之關鍵。

“Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Public Infrastructure Projects” provides a mechanism for the private sector to develop the land for any public infrastructure project so as to increase the financial self-liquidating ratio. The financial concept of BOT projects in Taiwan, such as HSR and MRT, is to recoup the cost of the infrastructure project by land development revenues. However, the revenues depend on the scale of development and effect of the agent’s efforts. While the information asymmetry exists, there may arise the issues of agency. This study attempts: First, to analyze the private participation in MRT station development based on the agency theory. Second, to explore the variable relationship under the agent structure of the law. Third, to establish an agency model for both the government and private sector serves to solve agency issues. Case simulation found that the agency model is available. In addition, the MRT station development revenues will be a key for promoting the private participation in the MRT station construction.

民間參與;自償能力;委託代理;場站開發

private participation; self-liquidating ratio; principal-agent; station development