In an age when terrorism is a fact of daily life, most constitutional lawyers and students see emergency powers as the draconian but necessary power for states to deal with security threats. However, economic emergencies are equally potent as a threat to national security, and this article argues that throughout our modern era, emergency powers have also been used regularly for economic, rather than security-type emergencies. This article is in two parts. The first half discusses how many constitutions embed in themselves, regimes of exception to deal with emergencies—security and economic. The second half of the article critically considers how in Singapore, the Constitution was amended in 1991 to create an elected executive presidency with powers of veto over the purse. The author argues that while the logic behind the creation of the elected president appears convincing, its operation proves rather more complicated, especially when the President is required to act in concert with the Presidential Council of Advisors, a group of unelected officials.

Emergency Powers; Elected President; Singapore; Economic Emergency; Constitution