The term “common law” generally refers to the legal principles derived from judicial decisions and is distinguished from statutory laws enacted by legislative department. The legal systems of the United Kingdom and the United States of America are typically referred as the representatives of common law legal systems. Taiwan is categorized as a civil law country. However, the Anglo-American corporate law and securities law principles and judicial decisions have significant influence on the regulatory reform as well as court decisions. Although most areas of private law are not codified in the common law countries, there is a need for enaction in some subjects of private law, such as the corporate law and securities law, because there are strong incentives for effective supervision. Although most common law countries have enacted corporate law statutes, judicial decisions still play an important role and sometimes influence the trend of legislation and regulatory reforms. Therefore, the content and development of the common law have great influences on the amendments of corporate law. In contrast, in civil law countries, the statutory law confines the freedom of the court to exercise its discretionary power in applying and interpreting the statutory provisions.This article explores Taiwan’s experiences regarding the influences of common law on private law, particularly in the field of corporate and securities laws. This article broadly interprets the scope of common law. Part II of this article begins to discuss the influences of the statutory law of the common law countries, particularly the United States, on Taiwan’s corporate and securities law. It is followed with examining the influences of the U.S. federal and state common law on Taiwan’s corporate and securities laws in Part III. Part IV further discusses whether Taiwanese courts refer to and apply common law rules in the corporate and securities cases. Part V is conclusion.

Common Law; Business Judgment Rule; Piercing the Corporate Veil; Fraud-on-the-Market Theory; Fiduciary Duty