為了探究台灣與韓國，在政治民主化之後，所呈現的檢察獨立差異性。本文建構了檢察獨立的動態分析架構，並比較台灣與韓國，檢察體系、政治制度，以及歷年來政治結構與競爭程度的變化。本文認為檢察體系的獨立性是動態的。此外，政黨輪替並不能保證，檢察體系就會更為獨立。最後，我們認為司法檢察人員的身分與職務保障，也並非是促成檢察體系持續維持獨立的保證。然而更重要的是，一個不過度讓政治力分配，呈現高度傾斜，而強調分權制衡重要性的民主運作，才是檢察體系能否持續維持獨立的關鍵。

The purpose of this article is to explain the difference in prosecutorial independence between Taiwan and South Korea. In this article, we carry out a dynamic analysis framework of the prosecutorial independence. In terms of the prosecutorial system, political institutions, political structure, and political competition, we also mark the difference between Taiwan and South Korea, following the political democratization in the late 1980s. With a thorough analysis of the empirical data, we find that political power turnover, the prosecutor’s salary safeguard, and position protection cannot lead to prosecutorial independence. In conclusion, we think checks and balances as well as separation of power, can ensure prosecutorial independence.

權力分散理論; 保險理論; 代理人理論; 檢察獨立; 政治民主化

power fragmentation theory; insurance theory; principle-agent theory; prosecutorial independence; political democratization