哈特與拉茲集中討論法律作社會事實與理由之關係而較無關注法律行動者動機。本文主張，不考慮內心狀態的理論對法律規範性的說明將有缺失。 本文首先爬梳其理論以確認二人皆未關注行動者動機。從描述性理論的一般性判準「理論說明力」出發，本文指出二人對行動者內心狀態的探究不足將削弱其理論目標：說明社群成員法律行動。 哈特「規則內在面向」看似牽涉動機，但他拒絕討論此一概念的內心要素，最終造成其規則論空洞及爭議性。而拉茲以理由構築其權威論和行動理論，但其權威論缺乏行動者動機，使得權威論和行動理論無法融貫而產生意圖兩難困境，無法準確捕捉與說明人們的法律行動。本文釐清既有理論說明法律規範性的缺陷，以將行動者主觀動機納入討論。

H.L.A. Hart's and Joseph Raz's legal theories, which analyze the relationship between reasons and social facts, fail to emphasize agents' motivation. In this article, I claim that these theories, which do not take into account agents' mental states, are inadequate to explain the normativity of law. To bolster this claim, this article first reviews how Hart and Raz explain the normativity of law, revealing that neither of them pays attention to agents' motivation. Starting with the general criterion for descriptive theory—the explanatory power of the theory, this article points out that the lack of agents’ motivation weakens their theoretical goal in explaining the legal actions of members of a community. In Hart’s theory, the term “the internal aspect of rules” seems similar to agents’ motivation. Hart’s lack of any further discussion of it in terms of agents’ mental states eventually renders his rule-theory unclear and controversial. Raz gives an account of the “reasons” that explain the authority of law and the action theory. But Raz’s authority theory, without an account of agents’ mental states, cannot be integrated with his action theory, thus producing the paradox of intentionality. As a result, Raz’s theory cannot accurately capture and explain agents’ legal actions. This article points out the problems of these theories in explaining the normativity of law and introduces the aspect of agents’ motivation into the future discussion.

法律規範性；社會事實；理由；規則的內在面向；權威；行動理論；動機

normativity of law; social fact; reason; the internal aspect of rules; authority; action theory; motivation