本文研究朱熹與湖湘學者的兩個辯論：「觀過知仁」與「知覺為仁」，並 論證朱熹對謝良佐與湖湘諸學者的義理之理解並非無據。首先，本文檢視由 朱熹書信與相關文獻所保存下來的論辯內容，並討論朱熹之所以反對湖湘學 者以「知覺」定義「仁」的理據。朱熹認為仁不是一種高妙玄虛的知覺，仁 雖不是知覺本身，但有仁德的人必有知覺。依朱熹，仁專指心之德，即心靈 的卓越品質；有仁德的人以義理為知覺內容，而非只是知覺；知覺本身屬於 智而不是仁。進一步，本文論證：湖湘學者之所以認定知覺為仁，其理由在 於繼受了謝良佐所表述「仁」的內涵，後者遺落了程顥彰顯仁的生動明澈所 善用的類比或譬喻；相對地，謝良佐的表述幾乎接近以定義的方式呈現。是 以，即便是朱熹錯解了湖湘學者的義理，在表述方式上，其實事出有因。

This paper focuses on two famous debates concerning “humaneness” between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars. Based on the survey of literature, this paper tries to justify, at least partly, what Zhu Xi comprehends about the philosophical position of Hu Xiang School. According to Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “humaneness” specifically labels the complete virtue of mind which exemplifies excellent qualities. On the one hand, Zhu Xi objects to the claim of those Hu Xiang scholars that “humaneness” can be defined as “vivid perception”; on the other hand, he argued that perception is by nature attributed to the intellectual virtue, although the humane person certainly possesses the competence of perception. As a matter of fact, the key point of the two debates between Zhu Xi and the Hu Xiang scholars is how to treat Hsieh Liang-Tso’s interpretation of humaneness. Furthermore, this paper argues that Cheng Hao, Hsieh’s teacher, illustrated distinctively the concept of humaneness in his own analogical or metaphorical way, but Hsieh’s formulation of it is akin to definition of a certain kind. This missed link or the rhetorical nuance is the reason why the Hu Xiang scholars follow Hsieh’s approach to humaneness and Zhu Xi has to argue against their ideas of humaneness.

觀過知仁、知覺為仁、仁、朱熹、湖湘學者

Humaneness, Zhu Xi, Hu Xiang scholars, Hsieh Liang-Tso, Cheng Hao