「沒有常住自我」的無我觀，不僅是所有不同印度佛教哲學教派（包 括原始佛教）的共同存有論看法，也有其重要的宗教解脫意涵。本文的 目的就在於探索印度佛學中這個重要看法背後的理由支撐。本文作者根 據所理解和所接觸的印度佛教文獻和當代英文佛學文獻而將印度佛學 中的無我論證區分為四種：訴諸經驗與奧坎剃刀的論證、訴諸萊布尼茲 定律的論證、訴諸歸謬的堆垛論證、以及訴諸特殊組合問題的論證。作 者不但指出這些論證的可能文獻出處，也將它們與當代分析哲學中的相 關討論做出了連結。在論文的結論中，作者簡單評估了這些論證的強度， 並指出了幾個評估時應該注意的問題。

    Not only the view that there is no constant self (‘no-self’ in short) is a common view of all different schools among Indian Buddhist philosophers, but also has extremely important implications in religious liberating meanings. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons behind these various arguments that ancient Indian Buddhist philosophers offered for this important no-self view. The author looks into both the ancient Indian Buddhist literature that he can understand and some modern Buddhist literature and proposes that there are at least four different arguments for the no-self view in Indian Buddhism: the argument that appeals to observations and Occam’s razor, the argument that appeals to Leibniz’s Law, the argument that appeals to the eductio sorites, and the argument that appeals to special composition question. Not only does the author indicate the possible origins of these arguments, but also make a connection to related modern discussions in analytical philosopy that can be found. In the final part of the paper, the author briefly evaluates the strength of these arguments and reminds the readers several points that should be kept in mind when evaluating.

印度佛學、無我、萊布尼茲定律、堆垛論證、特殊組合問題。

Indian Buddhism, no-self, Leibniz’s Law, the sorties argument, special composition question