本文由政府間財政關係，詮釋中國轉型時期的重複建設和地方保 護主義問題。研究指出，分權改革形塑了地方「創收式誘因結構」， 為追求財政收益，地方政府熱衷於高稅收產業。財政包乾制時期，重 複建設集中在加工製造業，地方保護主義表現為對本地工業產品或原 物料的保護；分稅制改革後，重複建設主要表現於對經濟性基礎設施 的大量投資。這一時期的地方保護主義行為，與重複建設沒有必然的 聯繫，更多地集中於政府壟斷和汲稅方便的產業。

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the duplicate investment and local protectionism in transitional China through the reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations including revenue and expenditure, the tax system, and the budget institution give rise to the revenue-seeking incentives of local governments. Duplicate construction and local protectionism together constitute one of the principal forms of local government behavior. In order to maximize their revenues, local governments are enthusiastic about the high tax rate industries. Consequently, during the revenue-sharing system (RSS) (1978-1993), local governments invested heavily in processing and manufacturing industries in order to collect product tax. Local protectionism in this period mainly arose as local authorities protected local products from market competition by means of regulation and embargoes. By contrast, after the taxsharing system (TSS) reform, local governments invested heavily in local infrastructure so as to increase their revenues from business tax and income tax. While local protectionism has been largely alleviated since that period of time, it has not been eradicated due to the shortcomings of the TSS reform.

政府間財政關係;地方政府;創收式誘因;重複建設;地方 保護主義

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations; Local Governments; Revenue-seeking Incentive; Duplicate Construction; Local Protectionism