鄧小平、彭真及江澤民等中共高層領導人曾試圖使鄉鎮人大代表 選舉成為制約基層幹部、調動群眾積極性及落實人民廣泛實踐民主的 制度，但歷年來中共所頒布的法律、推行的制度在相當程度上背離了 此一原意，選民幾乎沒有選擇的餘地。在鄉鎮人大代表選舉中，鄉鎮 的黨政幹部非僅以縣級黨委的意志為指向，且鄉鎮黨委同時也充當了 選舉的組織者、主持者和仲裁者等多重角色，並直接操縱選舉以確保 自己偏愛的候選人當選。 基本上，造成這種現象並非中共個別領導人的意圖，而是在「以 黨領政」的制度結構上。限制黨的領導權是中國大陸制度創新的前 提，如果中共仍維持現行「堅持黨的領導」的運作模式，那麼，任何 制度創新都可能因此破產。

Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Jiang Zemin and other Chinese leaders attempted to make the elections of people’s congress at the township/ town level a system of check and balance vis-a-vis basic-level cadres, as well as mobilizing people’s initiatives and implementing democracy at the grassroots level. However, the actual system and laws promulgated have been against the above objectives, and voters are hardly given any meaningful choice. In the elections of people’s congress at the township/ town level, cadres of township/ town Party and government organs have to toe the line of the county-level Party committees. Party committees at the township/ town level serve as organizers and adjudicators in the elections, and directly control them so as to guarantee the election of those candidates preferred by the Party. The root cause of such a phenomenon is due to the fact that Party supremely rules over the state machinery. If the Chinese Communist Party insists on “leadership of the Party” and maintains the present leadership model, then any systemic innovations advocated by the Chinese government will probably bankrupt. Hence, limiting the Party’s power is the pre-requisite for China’s systemic innovations.

意圖;制度設計;不受制約的領導權;利益表達;制度創新

intention; system design; uncheck leadership; interest articulation; systemic innovation