本文藉由工會與央行談判，來研究時序不一致的議題。本文發 現央行官員對通膨的偏好權數提高，造成社會福利水準的變化無法 確定。然而，工會對通膨的關心程度提高，以及央行的談判力量增 加，社會福利水準卻會提升。本文也發現通膨與產出波動彼此無抵 換關係。再者，央行官員對通膨的趨避程度無法引起通膨與產出波 動變化。

This paper investigates the time inconsistency issues by considering a bargaining process between a union and a central banker. It is found that an increase in the weight assigned to inflation by the central banker may improve or worsen the social welfare. However, the social welfare is certainly enhanced if (i) the union raises its concern about inflation; or (ii) the bargaining power of the central banker increases. It is also found that there is no policy trade-off between the inflation and output stability. Moreover, we find that the inflation aversion of the central banker plays no role in the inflation or output fluctuations.

談判;通膨;貨幣政策

Bargaining; Inflation; Monetary Policy