本文探討網路與實體廠商競爭下的產業內授權行為。我們得到下列幾項結論：第一、在只考慮獨家授權下，若單位運輸費率相對等待成本大（小）時，授權廠商以固定權利金授權網路（實體）廠商。第二、在只考慮非排他授權（授權兩家廠商）下，單位權利金授權、混合授權與固定權利金授權皆可能發生。第三、對授權廠商來說，授權兩家廠商原則上優於授權一家廠商。但當授權廠商邊際成本夠高，且等待成本相對運輸成本夠大時，授權廠商單獨授權實體廠商下的總利潤會高於授權兩家廠商下的總利潤。

We combine the barbell model in Liang et al. (2006) and the characteristic of the online firm in Guo and Lai (2014, 2017) to analyze the intra-industry licensing strategy under real and virtual competition. We obtain the following interesting results. First, given exclusive licensing, the licensor will choose fixedfee licensing to the online (physical) firm, if the transport rate relative to the online firm's waiting cost is large (small). Second, given non-exclusive licensing, all of the royalty, mixed, and fixed-fee licensing can occur, depending upon two key factors, the licensor's marginal cost and the differential of the waiting cost and transport rate. Third, non-exclusive licensing is superior to exclusive licensing, except in the case where the exclusive fixed-fee licensing to the physical firm becomes optimal when both the licensor’s marginal cost and the waiting cost relative to the transport rate are large.

產業內授權; 啞鈴模型; 網路廠商; 實體廠商

Intra-industry licensing strategy; barbell model; online firm; physical firm