本研究利用賽局理論分析法以了解在寡占市場中，相對於製造商居於領導地位之獨家經銷商或共同經銷商，對其供貨之製造商收取上架費後所產生的經濟效果。本研究之主要目的在於建構一適於台灣市場現況的上架費理論模型，並對公平交易委員會的政策考量有所助益。研究結果發現，在本研究之模型假設條件下，就消費大眾以及整體社會福利水準之觀點而言，經銷商向其供貨製造商收取上架費後有利無害，因此公平交易委員會似無過度關切限制的必要。

In this paper I use a game theoretical model to analyze the economic effects for the situation in which the retailers ask their upstream suppliers to pay the slotting allowances (also known as the shelf space rental fees) to obtain retailer patronage. The retailers are modeled as the Stackelberg leaders, and the upstream suppliers fpllowers, to characterize the current market situation in Taiwan. It is shown that under certain assumptions the slotting allowances should do no damage to the consumers' welfare and social welfare. These findings provide policy implications for the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan.

上架費; 通路競爭; 賽局理論分析

Slotting allowance; Channel competition; Game theoretical analysis