本研究結合實質盈餘管理誘因及公司治理二脈文獻，探討董事會特性是否影響管理者因 為門檻壓力而從事實質盈餘管理。以 2003 年至 2006 年美國上市公司為樣本，本研究實 證結果發現績效門檻 ( 包括零盈餘、前期盈餘及分析師盈餘預測三項績效門檻 ) 會誘發 管理者從事實質盈餘管理。此外，當董事會的成員具備較高的獨立性或專業性時，可抑 制績效門檻誘因所導致的實質盈餘管理幅度。本研究之實證結果符合以下觀點：董事會 治理對於抑制實質盈餘管理，係扮演關鍵角色。

This study combines the real-earnings-management literature and the corporate-governance literature to examine how board characteristics affect real earnings management induced by benchmark meeting/beating incentives. Using a sample of U.S. listed companies over the period of 2003-2006, we find that managers are more likely to exercise real earnings management in order to avoid negative earnings, sustain prior year’s earnings or meet/beat analysts’ consensus earnings forecast. With regard to the role of board characteristics, our results indicate that boards with higher independence and professionalism can effectively constrain earnings-thresholds-induced real earnings management. Our overall findings are consistent with the notion that board governance plays a vital role in restraining real earnings management.

董事會特性; 實質盈餘管理; 門檻誘因

board characteristics; real earnings management; threshold incentives