本研究旨在探討我國上市公司董事薪酬的影響因素，使用新制董事薪酬揭露準則，將董 事薪酬結構區分為非誘因性薪酬 ( 董事報酬與董事業務執行費 ) 與誘因性薪酬 ( 董事酬 勞與紅利 ) 及總薪酬三類，以 2005 年及 2007 年在臺灣證券交易所掛牌上市公司為研究 樣本，採用複迴歸分析檢測董事薪酬的影響因子。研究結果發現董事薪酬多寡會受產業 相對績效所影響，代表公司會將競爭者或產業的績效水準納入考量；董事會的內部監督 效果可以有效降低代理衝突，此時公司會減少董事薪酬水準以避免無效率之情形；外部 監控效果與董事薪酬則扮演互補的治理角色，當主動機構投資人持股率越高，其董事薪 酬水準也相對較高；最後，當公司未來成長機會越高時，股東可藉由議定較高之董事酬 勞比例來激勵董事做出有利於公司未來成長的監督行為。

This study investigates variables that influence director compensation of listed Taiwanese companies using the new disclosure rule for director compensation. We divided the compensation from its structure into three types: non-incentive compensation, incentive compensation, and total compensation. This study collected the research samples of companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 until 2007. Using multiple regression analysis, we investigated the variables, which influenced the director compensation. Our results show that the amount of director compensation is influenced by the relative performance of the industry. These companies considered performance level of competitors or the whole industry. The monitoring effect of inside directors can reduce agency conflicts. The company will lower the levels of director compensation to avoid the inefficiency of its directors. It should also be noted that the outside monitoring effect and director compensation are complementary to each other in governing the company and the board of directors. If the active institutional investors of a company have a high percentage of ownership, the levels of director compensation would be relatively high. When the company has a high level of future growth, then the shareholders will encourage directors to monitor the company vigorously and contribute to future developments of the company by an increased director compensation.

次要代理成本; 董事薪酬; 代理衝突

secondary agency cost; director compensation; agency conflict