

“Enlisted Participation” in China’s Public Governance: An Institutional Arrangement of the “Authoritarian Resilience”

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Abstract

Scholars of Chinese politics are debating the prospect of China’s authoritarian development. One group of scholars has characterized the CCP regime as a resilient authoritarianism. Others cast doubts on the effectiveness of those “resilient institutions.” This article finds such a debate lacks theoretical framework and the arguments too ad hoc. This article raises a more theoretically based analytical concept – “enlisted participation.” Adapted (but different) from the Leninist-style concept of “enlisted involvement” developed by Philip Roeder, this article raises a new concept of “enlisted participation,” which can better grasp the institutional gist of “authoritarian resilience.” Concrete cases are illustrated for different categories of these institutions. This article then identifies five criteria to measure the effectiveness of these “enlisted participation” institutions. With such a framework, this article finds two major institutional strategies of “resilient authoritarianism”: the “inclusiveness-prone strategy” and the “responsiveness-prone strategy.”

Keywords: authoritarian resilience, enlisted participation, enlisted involvement, public governance

I. Introduction

An economically successful but undemocratic China poses tremendous intellectual challenge for students of comparative politics and China Studies. As David Shambaugh argued, the CCP regime has stepped into a new stage of governing an industrialized society (Shambaugh 2008, 6), but it has not followed the same democratization path of other industrialized countries in East Asia. It seems that it has reached a stage of a prolonged authoritarian development. Scholars are still debating the nature and the direction of the prospect of such a prolonged authoritarian development.

The debate can be best represented by a series discussion in a 2004 volume of the *Journal of Democracy*. Andrew Nathan raised the concept of “authoritarian resilience” to describe the status of the CCP authoritarian regime (Nathan 2003, 6-17). Many scholars added to the debate by presenting different opinions. The argument for the authoritarian resilience of the CCP regime contends that the reform measures adopted by the regime will neither lead China to democracy nor to collapse, but most likely prolong its authoritarian rule more effectively. The criticizing opinions highlight the underlying problems and traps created by the current CCP regime’s developmental strategy, and the ineffectiveness of the institutions the resilient authoritarian regime sets up to absorb social pressure. This article contends that the analytic focus of the debate around the “authoritarian resilience” needs to be further clarified. Different opinions on authoritarian resilience not only emphasize different categories of institutions but also hold different evaluations on their effects. Without a consistent theoretical framework, “authoritarian resilience” could become more like a descriptive term than an analytical concept, and the debate a futile one. The task left to us, then, is to develop a theory-embedded framework to distinguish which institutions are serving authoritarian resilience and how to measure their effectiveness.

This article raises a new concept of “enlisted participation” to fulfill this task. It situates these newly developed institutions *between* “enlisted involvement,” a concept raised by Philip Roeder for Leninist-style participatory institutions, *and* the “democratic participation” as understood in ordinary democratic regimes. ① With such a concept, this article first analyzes the nature of these “enlisted participation” institutions and their categories; it then illustrates concrete institutions for each category. The paper then identifies five dimensions of institutional effectiveness and also defines the criteria to measure these “enlisted

註① For example, Verba, Nie, and Kim defined “political participation” as those legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions that they take” (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978, 1).

participation” institutions accordingly. Lastly, this article uses this framework to examine the contending arguments presented in the debate over “authoritarian resilience.” This framework also helps us to identify two major institutional strategies of “resilient authoritarianism” and their possible limitations.

II. Debating China’s Authoritarianism: Resilience and Critiques

Resilience: Adaptation, Reforms and Legitimacy

It is undeniable that the CCP regime has adopted many new political reforms to strengthen its ruling capacity and legitimacy, such as allowing competitive elections at the grassroots level, rationalizing administrative structure, strengthening party and administrative supervision, or even allowing citizens to be involved in certain participatory channels to influence policy making and nomination of local leading officials. The adaptive, flexible, and even responsive nature of these reforms has changed the evaluation of Western scholars on the sustainability, stability, or even legitimacy of the CCP regime. Andrew Nathan (2003, 6-17) has characterized the CCP regime as achieving “authoritarian resilience,” which he believed will not democratize the CCP nor will it grant the regime immune from challenges for its survival. Regarding how the regime enhances its legitimacy by institutionalizing more channels for input, Nathan (2003, 15) identified four major institutions in addition to the much mentioned competitive village election as tribunes of the people: the “Administrative Litigation Law,” the “letters-and-visits” (*xinfang*), the People’s Congress and United Front, and the media as tribunes of the people.

Bruce Dickson also detected that the CCP regime has been adaptive in creating new inclusive institutions such as *co-optional* and *corporatist* arrangements for new economic and social elites while maintaining exclusive measures for unsanctioned social elements so that the political monopoly of its Leninist Party-State can endure (Dickson 1997, 22-23; Dickson 2004, 141-158). David Shambaugh (2008, 9) believed that, although the CCP regime is experiencing both “atrophy” and adopting “adaptation” at the same time, the CCP regime has thus far been fairly effective in its adaptation to cope with the challenges of atrophy. Eventually, it will evolve incrementally into a new kind of party-state, the “eclectic state” (Shambaugh 2008, 181). Susan Shirk found that the CCP regime has been surprisingly resilient in making use of these measures to stall the threat from public unrest, and may be capable of surviving for years to come as long as the economy continues to grow (Shirk 2007, 68).

Dali Yang raised a similar view but from the “governance” perspective. He observed

that the CCP regime has made a wide range of governance reforms including administrative rationalization, divestiture of businesses operated by the military, and the building of anticorruption mechanisms, to strengthen the capacity to cope with unruly markets, curb corruption, and bring about a regulated economic order (Yang 2004). And, as Stephen White has pointed out, those communist regimes that adopted consultative or “feedback” capacities for their systems tend to allow their leaderships to reduce the risk of popular discontent and earn legitimacy (White 1986, 462-82).

Critiques: Predatory State, Public Unrest, and Legitimacy Crisis

However, on the other hand, waves of protests and mass violence have also been reported to be on the increase in recent years. Confrontations between ordinary citizens and local government and officials have become more frequent. Large scale and extremely violent confrontations between citizens and local government officials such as those in Tibet, Guizhou, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia in recent years are particularly alarming for the authoritarian rule of the CCP regime. In a Party document from 2004, it was stated that the CCP’s position as a ruling party acquired in the past revolution should not be taken for granted, nor should the Party assume it will be able to maintain it forever (Xinhua News Agency 2004).

Pei Minxin argued that China’s “developmental autocracy” has stepped into a process of “trapped transition” in which the gradualism of economic reforms cannot transcend the state monopoly and the corruption and rent dissipation incurred by it (Pei 2006). Such a flawed development in turn leads to a “predatory local state” and mounting governance deficits and state incapacitation. Many Chinese scholars such as Xiao Gongqin have raised the argument that there has been a tendency of “sultanization” of China’s local governments and officials, under which local officials without effective checks wield their power arbitrarily or even become connected with local gangsters to make violent threats in order to protect their personal interests (Xiao n.d.). Such a “predatory and sultanistic” local authority has become the hotbed of rampant corruption within the regime.

On “state incapacitation,” Pei mentioned the “erosion of the CCP’s mobilization capacity,” “[the] CCP’s organizational decline,” “internal corruption as a result of CCP organizational decay,” and “mass disenchantment with the CCP.” These issues, according to Pei (2006, 181-205), have led to rising tension between state and society, and such an anachronism of the closed political system has lagged behind economic development and will exhaust its vitality (Pei 2006, 206-07). Similar observations have been raised by many other scholars. On the subject of rising state-society tension, Susan Shirk (2007) depicted

China as a “fragile superpower” that suffers from the threat of its domestic weakness while enjoying an external superpower image. One of the major threats of its domestic weakness, according to Shirk (2007, 35-78), comes from worries about large-scale social unrest. ②

This worry over rising social unrest has been diagnosed by many scholars as a result of the lack of participation institutions for citizens to express and articulate their voices and interests. Bruce J. Dickson (2003, 33-34) criticized that the CCP regime’s adaptation contains self-contradictory tendencies, since a Leninist regime is incompatible with the idea of an autonomous civil society, and thus cannot create political institutions to accommodate political participation from such a civil society without threatening its own political monopoly. However, as civil society is not allowed to express itself in the form of association and assembly, mass protests tend to escalate to larger scale confrontation with the government. Likewise, for David Shambaugh (2008, 7-8), although the CCP has been adaptive, it also suffers from a lot of “atrophies,” most notably the Party’s ossified organization to offer bottom-up channels of societal input. Bruce Gilley, who criticized Nathan’s “authoritarian resilience” as limited, argues that the “village election” and the “local people’s congress,” while they may have created some effects for local governance, still face “normative incoherence” in their lack of autonomy from the control of the Party, and the “letters-and-visits” institution is also under the selective supervision of the Party itself (Gilley 2003, 22-23). ③

Summarizing and Re-focusing the Debate

In short, the resilience arguments hold that the CCP regime has created many resilient institutions and reform measures to cope with the challenges in governance. These resilient institutions include elite succession institutionalization, village elections, letters-and-visits, forums such as the People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference, media as the people’s tribune, anti-corruption mechanisms, and other administrative and regulative measures. They argue that the central leaders of the regime are not only fully aware of these problems, but also confident and active in designing new institutions to cope with them. These reforms, according to such arguments, have given the CCP authoritarian regime new vitality not only to survive but also to reassert its legitimacy. However, no scholar with such a perspective sees signs of the regime moving toward democratization.

Challengers to this view, in contrast, raise evidence to show the mounting problems in the development process under such a regime. They raise the following problems such as a

註② Another two worries of domestic threats are leadership splits and the loyalty of the military to the Party.

註③ We should also take notice that Nathan himself is not unaware that the lack of legitimacy of the authoritarian regime is one of its eternal problems. See Andrew Nathan (2009, 37-40).

“predatory local state,” “party organizational decline,” “rising tension between state and society” (increasing violent unrest), and “the lack of participation institutions.” The first three phenomena are less frequently mentioned in the resilience arguments. However, whether there are effective “participation institutions” seems to have been raised by both sides, although they disagree with each other on which institutions to look at and on how to evaluate the effects of these “participation institutions.”

This article holds that many of the institutions mentioned in the debate are old Leninist ones and no explanation was given as to why they can revive the lost function or generate new functions. Actually, there are more newly created institutions by the CCP regime that intend to accommodate the participating pressure from the society. The scope of the institutions under the debate, this article points out, thus needs to be broadened. Furthermore, even there are new institutions established to bring about authoritarian resilience, no logic was provided to explain the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of these institutions either. The central problem remains that the arguments of both sides of the debate are not theory-based, and thus are difficult to generate verifiable propositions.

In recent years, there are another group of literatures emphasizing the possibilities of a pro-active civil society or societal actors in China in participating the public governance and its implication for changing the state (Mertha 2009, 995-1012; Ho and Edmonds 2008; Hsing and Lee 2010). Although the arguments of these literatures did not intend to underestimate the resilience or the significance of the authoritarian state of CCP, they do, however, neglect the pro-active efforts of the state to create new institutions to absorb, divert, or address the participating pressure generated by the pro-active Chinese society, if not the lasting dominance of the state. ④ This over-emphasis on the societal change in Chinese politics in recent years requires a balance of analysis on the new institutional changes on the part of the state.

To fill the gap for the “authoritarian resilience” debate and to strike a balance vis-à-vis the recent trend of over-emphasis on the society, this article develops a new concept, “enlisted participation,” to capture the nature of the newly developed participatory institutions of the CCP’s resilient authoritarianism in recent years. This concept is adapted (but also different) from Philip Roeder’s concept of “enlisted involvement,” which describes citizens’ political semi-participatory activities under a Leninist regime. The “enlisted participation,” however, carries more democratic elements than the “enlisted involvement” while still being subject to the control of authoritarianism in comparison with genuine “democratic participation.”

註④ For the later critique to this group of society-centered literatures, see Gilly (2011, 517-33).

III. “Enlisted Involvement” under a Leninist Regime

“Enlisted Involvement” Leninist Style

In an American Political Science Review article published in 1989, Philip Roeder pointed out that the nature of “institutionalization” in the communist regime is not about “political participation” as Huntington argued, but rather “involvement in coproduction” (Roeder 1989, 861). Roeder made an important theoretical distinction between “political participation” and “involvement in coproduction.” “Coproduction” refers to the joint production of public goods and services by the governmental bureaucracy and citizen volunteers. Although nominally it is also voluntary on the part of the citizens, Roeder finds that the citizens’ involvement is different from “political participation” at least in the following three aspects: (1) “Involvement in coproduction” cannot influence decisions, but can only help to implement already made decisions (structural position); (2) It usually is not performed in the form of election, voluntary association, or lobbying, but in the form of volunteer militia or public work for the government (activity form); (3) Even when these involvements may take the form of participation such as an election, the purpose actually still focuses on carrying out the “coproduction” function (functional purpose) (Roeder 1989, 861-862). Furthermore, such “involvements in coproduction” are “enlisted” to perform functions such as administrative assistance, policing and monitoring, economic production, service delivery, and military preparedness (Roeder 1989, 861-862).

In this article, for later analytical needs, “enlisted involvement” is differentiated from “political participation” in the following respects. First, the “structural position” of the “enlisted involvement” takes place at “policy implementation” stage rather than that of “decision making” or “policy input.” Second, the “activity form” or “institutional locus” of the “enlisted involvement” usually is working as semi-staffed administrative status or through “transmission belt” organizations such as trade unions, residence committees, and public organizations, or work units^⑤ rather than voluntary civic grouping or voluntary mobilization. Third, the “functional purpose” of the “enlisted involvement” is “coproduction of public services” rather than interest articulation or opinion expression. Fourth, regarding “power direction,” when those citizens of “enlisted involvement” work with the state, they help the state to set a good model for other citizens, rather than help the society to tame the

註⑤ Andrew Walder and Tianjian Shi have emphasized the significance of work unit as a locus of “political participation” under the socialist political context in China. See Walder (1986, 1-27) and Shi (1997, 13-15, 46-51).

state officials or bureaucracy. Fifth, on the nature of “citizen voluntarism,” the “enlisted involvement” is enlisted by the regime rather than initiated by the citizens. It is the regime that decides who, where, when, and how the “socialist citizens” should be “enlisted” to participate in which policy implementation, rather than the citizens taking the initiative themselves to decide these contents.

Problems and Limitations of “Enlisted Involvement”

However, the Leninist regime still worries about the potential development from “enlisted involvement” to “political participation.” According to Roeder, the Communist Party in such a regime assiduously prevents the development of such “political participation” by removing decision making from the enlisted involvement (mostly by reserving the central decision within the Party), by giving the bureaucracy and Party the upper hand, by ensuring the Party tightly controls the nomination process in elections, and guaranteeing the Party enjoys the majority after the election. After preventing the “enlisted involvement” from developing into “political participation,” the regime still opens few participatory channels as “safety valves,” such as individual contact or appeal, or particularized benefit (Roeder 1989, 864). The combination of the “enlisted involvement” and “safety valve participation” plays a pivotal role in helping the Leninist regime to maintain stability, according to Roeder (Roeder 1989, 864-865).

Roeder also observed that the “enlisted involvement” as a mode of political mobilization was in decline in the former Soviet Union (Roeder 1989, 866-870). Actually, those literatures emphasizing the problems of the China’s “authoritarianism” in the debate also have similar observations on the CCP regime’s weakening capability of political mobilization or party penetration. For Minxin Pei, it is the weak penetration of the party into the grassroots society or the new social sectors; for Shambaugh, it is the ossified party organizations; for Bruce Gilley, it is the incoherent institutional norms.

Furthermore, China, as Shambaugh pointed out, has *surpassed* the period of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist regimes, and stepped into a new industrializing society. The task is no longer to set a good example of “socialist citizens” for other citizens by “enlisting” them but to generate “public goods” to satisfy the needs of the increasingly pluralized social interests. The task, rather, as pointed out by the “criticizing camp” scholars of “authoritarian resilience,” is how to open channels for citizens to participate and how to curb the “predatory local state” without sacrificing the political domination and monopoly of the Party-State. To respond to such a need, the CCP regime must develop institutions *beyond* the “enlisted involvement,” and so should the focus of our analysis. This is the theoretical ground based on which a new concept such as “enlisted participation” should be raised.

IV. “Enlisted Participation” under “Authoritarian Resilience”

Defining “Enlisted Participation”

The new strategy, different from “enlisted involvement,” developed by the CCP regime that this article observes is “enlisted participation.” Here, “enlisted participation” refers to a type of citizens’ political participatory activities in political processes under an authoritarian regime that is situated between “enlisted involvement” and full-fledged “democratic participation.” The “enlisted participation” of the citizens in politics under an authoritarian regime is “enlisted” by the regime to help improve its governing ability and its legitimacy, but with a greater degree of political input and citizens’ voluntarism, in a more legally institutionalized institutional locus, and with its power direction more from the people toward the government than “enlisted involvement.” However, its basic agenda and final decisive power of the public governance issue still lies under the control of the regime. The participation is still more based on individuals similar to the one under the “enlisted involvement” than on groups under the “democratic political participation.”^⑥ However, the “enlisted participation” by these individuals are different from the individual “participation” to influence the policy outcome for seeking personal or particularistic purpose through a patron-clientelist context observed by Tianjian Shi (1997, 22-23) either. “Enlisted participation” are more directed toward public purposes than private interests.

These “enlisted participation” institutions include at least the following four categories. First, in elections, citizens’ participation is enlisted in the nomination process of the semi-open local elections for leading cadres or officials mostly at the township level, and occasionally at the county level. Second, in policy input, expert citizens are enlisted to give criticisms, opinions, and suggestions in the process of policy making or legislation. Ordinary citizens are given the chance to express criticisms and opinions on the drafts of legislation or administrative regulations. Third, in supervision, enlisted citizens assume semi-official or part-time public posts to help supervise the local officials or bureaucrats in the administrative branch as well as those in the judicial branch. Masses are given the opportunity to report instances of corruption or malfeasance by officials. They may also apply for observer status in the plenary session of the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress. Fourth, in policy feedback, an enlisted survey allows citizens to appraise the performance of local officials. Table 1 shows the definitional differences between “enlisted involvement,” “enlisted participation,” and “democratic participation.”

註⑥ For an observation on more encouraging individual than group participation, see Chou (2009, 19-20).

Table 1 A Comparison of “Enlisted Involvement,” “Enlisted Participation,” and “Democratic Participation”

Participation forms	Structural position	Institutional locus	Function	Power direction	Citizen voluntarism	Purpose
Enlisted involvement	Policy implementation	Non-salary administrative posts (Voluntary public work; voluntary militia; policing or supervision among citizens); Transmission belt organizations (trade unions; residence committees; public organizations)	Coproducts to provide public services	Citizens of enlisted involvement help the government to govern and transform society.	Citizens voluntarily accept the political socialization by helping the regime to implement its will.	Expressing support for the regime; seeking personal interests through patron-clientel relationships
Enlisted participation	Electoral nomination; Input to policy making; Feedback (supervision)	Nomination of electorate in semi-open elections; Expert consultation in policy making; Public hearing sessions; Enlisted supervision of officials; Citizen observer in People's Congress	Express citizens' preferences, opinions, or knowledge to influence government's policy and nomination; to check the power of the officials or leading cadres; to improve government performance.	Citizens partially check the power of local government officials; they partially influence the nomination and policy agenda.	Citizens voluntarily help the central or higher-level government to monitor and check local officials; they voluntarily help generate policy input and feedback.	For public purposes or group interests
Political participation	Competitive nomination; Input to policy making; Policy implementation; Feedback	Administrative Litigation; Associational and assembling participation; Formal political institutions; voluntary interest groups; political parties	Citizens influence the function of the government and make it accountable to them.	Citizens are able to set the policy agenda, generate policy input, monitor policy implementation, and create policy feedback.	Citizens voluntarily organize and express themselves to influence the government and make it accountable to them.	For public purposes or group interests

Source: Created by the author.

Institutions of “Enlisted Participation”

The institutions of “enlisted participation” developed by the CCP regime in recent years include those in at least the following four categories: “election nomination,” “policy input,” “supervision,” and “policy feedback.” Some of these institutions may enlist “political or social elites” to participate, whereas some others enlist the ordinary masses to participate. Table 2 summarizes the existing institutions that provide “enlisted involvement,” “enlisted participation,” and “democratic participation” under the current CCP regime. In the rest of this section, this article will use institution cases of each category to illustrate the nature of “enlisted participation.”

Election Nomination in the Township Election Experiments

In village elections, the nomination of the competitive candidates has mostly been an open process, either for any villager, or for any volunteer candidates themselves. However, in the experimental election for township governor or township party secretary, or in the county level or other level of competitive election, the nomination has included but not been left solely to ordinary citizens. In many cases of the direct elections for township governors, ordinary citizens (voters) were allowed either to nominate “preliminary candidates” or the voluntary and qualified persons to enroll themselves as “preliminary candidates.” ⑦ In the process of nominating the “formal candidates,” they adopted a kind of “electorate college” composed of local elites including people’s representatives, village representatives, local party members, local government officials and party cadres. ⑧ However, it is worth noting that in many cases the final result of the nomination of the formal candidates was decided by a higher level (county) party committee, and in one case the candidate nominated by the party was even the guaranteed candidate. ⑨ In short, in these direct election experiments for township governor, ordinary citizens are enlisted to nominate the preliminary candidates, the local political and social elites are enlisted to participate in nominating the formal candidates, but the final decision usually is left to the higher level party committee.

註⑦ For example, the 1998 Nancheng Town case, the 1998 Buyun Town case, the 1998 Nanbu County case in Sichuan. See Li (2007); Shi (2000, 384-410, 444-46); Huang and Zou (2003, 248-61).

註⑧ Ibid.

註⑨ For example, in Buyun the official-nominated candidate was guaranteed as a formal candidate. See Shi Weimin (2000, 428-453). Other cases in which the final decision on the formal candidates was made by higher level party committee include the 1998 Baoshi Town in Sichuan and 1999 Xincai in Henan. See Shi (2000, 384-410); Huang and Zou (2003, 296-305).

Table 2 Institutions of “Enlisted Involvement,” “Enlisted Participation,” and “Democratic Participation” under the CCP regime

Categories Participation forms		Election	Policy input	Supervision	Policy feedback
Enlisted participation	Enlisted involvement	Ritual nomination in controlled election	People’s Political Consultative Conference	Residence committee	Letter and visit petition (Xinfang)
	Elite	Nomination in semi-open election (township party secretary election)	Expert consultation in policy making	People’s Supervisor; Social Supervisor; Citizen observer	Intra-party democratic appraisal
	Mass	Nomination in semi-open election (township governor direct election)	Public hearings; Enlisted opinions for legislation or administrative regulations	Mass corruption report	Mass appraisal of local officials
Democratic participation		Nomination in village election	Internet public debate	Internet exposure	Administrative Litigation; Collective demonstration; Collective protest; Internet report; Free expression

Source: Created by the author.

In the township party secretary elections that allow citizens or local elites to be involved in the nomination, however, citizens were given less of a chance to participate in the nomination process. In the case of Pingchang County, Sichuan Province, for example, the nominating “electorate college” includes a non-party-member mass accounting for less than 30% of the total number of the college (Study Times 2006). In the case of Xindu District of Chengdu, Sichuan, a nomination college is composed of a group of 244 local elites, including all the town government employees, village (community) party secretaries, village small group heads, enterprise representatives, representatives of county government extended offices, party representatives in the town, people’s representatives, CPPCC representatives, democratic party and non-party representatives (Liu 2006). In Caiji Town of Jiangsu Province, all party members of all districts participate in the first-round nomination session, and the party members of the Towns participate in the second-round. In the latter two cases, various ranges of local political and social elites are enlisted to participate in the nomination (Zhoushan Party Construction Net 2006). However, it is notable that the cases of Pingchang and Caiji left the final nomination of the “formal candidates” to the Party Committee at a higher (i.e. precinct) level. In Pingchang, another nomination college contains less than 30% of non-party member local elites including civil servants from the township government, village committee head and members, representatives of individual entrepreneurs, representatives of county-extension organs in the township, and representatives of ordinary villagers (Study Times 2006).

In short, in the cases of township party secretary elections, the included range of participants and their decisive power of the “enlisted participation” were more limited than in the cases of township governor elections. But, they share some commonalities. Citizens and local elites are allowed to participate in the nomination process, although their participation does not create deterministic results. Their participation, however, is not to serve a pre-determined result either.

Policy Input

According to “The Implementation Guideline for the Comprehensive Promotion of Administration in accordance with Law” promulgated by the State Council in 2004, for those instances of decision making on important issues concerning national or regional economic and social development and those issues requiring more professional opinions, the government should enlist experts to conduct necessity and feasibility assessments in advance. For those issues requiring decision making that are related to a wide range of social sectors or pertinent to the close interests of the people and masses, the government should publicize the issue to the society, or listen to a wide range of opinions through holding a public forum,

public hearing, or public debate session (Xinhau Net 2004). In a follow-up Party document, the “Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee Decision on Enhancing the Party’s Ability to Govern,” similar opinions have been expressed to enlarge people’s participation in decision making on issues related to people’s immediate interests, and to enlist experts and scholars for more scientific and professional decision making on issues requiring specialized and technical knowledge (Xinhua News Agency 2004). In April 2008, the first formal legal document regulating administrative procedure in China, the “Administrative Procedure Regulation of Hunan Province,” was promulgated. According to this document, it is the right of the citizens to be able to participate in administrative procedures such as administrative decision, administrative enforcement, administrative public hearing, administrative guidance, and administrative supervision or surveillance (Bai and Liu 2008). According to these guidelines, many institutions allowing citizens to influence policy input have been established, including:

(1) Expert Consultation in Policy Making

In many provinces, the government has established the institution to consult experts and for them to provide policy reports. For example, Heilongjiang Provincial Government has established the “Institution of Expert Consultation and Argumentation for Vital Policy Decisions” (*Heilongjiang Zhengbao* 2006, 13-16). According to this institution, the government can consult experts on vital policies (relevant to general economic and social development, close interests of the people, public security incident solutions, and other policy issues requiring professional, technical, and legal opinions). The consulted experts shall be able to conduct research and need to provide policy reports with specific policy recommendations.

An article in the Central Party School Paper, *Study Times* (*Xuexi Shibao*), warned that the current practice of expert consultation still suffers from many problems, such as the expert potentially becoming the surrogate of interest groups or the government itself, or the experts providing biased or prejudiced opinions due to their own value preferences or limited knowledge. The author advocates that the consultation reports or opinions of the experts be made public as long as there is no legal concern. The paper also emphasizes that there should be a balance between the roles of the consulted experts in providing their expertise and that of the public who participate as well-informed citizens. That is, the consulted experts should be further “empowered” by improving the existing institution rather than being marginalized in the process of policy making (He 2008). In other words, according to this article, the “participatory” element of this institution needs to be further strengthened.

(2) Public Hearing

The institution of public hearings has also been promoted in many government and Party documents for both legislative and administrative branches in China. In the legislative branch, according to the “Legislative Law” (Article 34 and 58), for legislation of a bill or administrative law, a public session such as a public hearing can be held to enlist public opinion. Accordingly, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress held the first public hearing before passing the amendment bill of the “Comprehensive Individual Income Tax Law” (People’s Net 2008b). Before the first legislative public hearing in the National People’s Congress, many local people’s congresses had already held many legislative public hearings.

The public hearing is more common in the administrative branch in China. As mentioned earlier, many important documents issued by Central Government or the Party have mentioned the importance of holding public hearings before reaching vital policy decisions. In a document promulgated by the State Council to the local county-level governments, “State Council’s Decisions on Strengthening City and County Government’s Administration in Accordance with Law,” it is stipulated that before the promulgation of laws and regulations, and vital decisions relevant to public interests and people’s close interests are made, they should all go through the process of a “public hearing”. The document even stipulates in detail the guiding principle of how to conduct the “public hearing” process (State Council 2008).

An important case of a public hearing that affected decision making is the case over building a chemical plant in Xiamen. Two public hearings were held according to the administrative procedure since many local residents protested and objected to restarting the construction of a chemical plant that would produce the toxic chemical paraxylene (PX). After the two public hearings held in December 2007, 91 from the 107 members of the public selected by lottery objected to the original plan made by the Xiamen Municipal Government (Xinhua News Agency 2007). The construction policy proposal was therefore eventually withdrawn by the Xiamen Municipal Government.

Another relatively less successful case is the public hearing over “roaming fees for mobile phones” held early 2008. In meeting the rising protests on the high roaming fees for mobile phones, the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Information and Industry held a public hearing together on January 22, 2008 (Xinhua Net 2008e). This public hearing enlisted 20 participants from four categories: consumer representatives, business representatives, academic representatives, and government representatives, with five persons from each group. This public hearing, however, has been severely criticized for its many shortcomings. First of all, the number of consumer

representatives was criticized as being too limited (Xinhua Net 2008e). Second, the selection of the five representatives was not transparent (Xinhau Net 2008e). Third, the calculation of the cost of the roaming fees was not transparent (Xinhau Net 2008a). Fourth, the topic of the hearing was about “the upper limit of the roaming fee.” Critics challenged that the topic should instead have been “whether roaming should be free.” (Xinhau Net 2008e). All of these shortcomings resulted from the host government bureaus’ decision on how to arrange the public hearing. Although the State Council has already promulgated the “Regulation of the Public Hearing on Government Regulated Price” (*Zhengfu Jiage Tingzheng Banfa*), this regulation has not set clear-cut standards for these institutional uncertainties, which in turn leaves these issues to the decision of the host government bureau. In this case, the public hearing as an institution was implemented selectively to serve the pre-set agenda and purpose of the government.

(3) Enlisted Opinions for Legislation or Administrative Regulation before Promulgation

The third widespread practice is to publicize the proposal of legislation, administrative regulation, or vital policy proposal before formal promulgation to the public and enlist opinions. This has also been regulated in the previously mentioned important documents issued by the Central Government and the Party. One conspicuous case is the legislative process of the “Property Law.” Famous scholars from the left ideological camp, including Professor Gong Xiantian from Beijing University, publicly criticized the draft of the law on media, and invited a heated wave of debate. The debate was so contentious that the legislation of the law was delayed from the original agenda in the Plenary Session of 2005 of the National People’s Congress (Sina Net 2006). The “Labor Contract Law” draft was also made public to enlist opinions from March 20 to April 20, 2006. There were as many as 191,849 pieces of opinions expressed through various channels about the draft, and it was one of the cases that has enlisted most opinions, (Xinhua Net 2008b). A report from Xinhau News Agency claimed that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has decided that in principle all legislation should be made public to the people before legislation (Xinhua Net 2008d).

Furthermore, in some places, public opinions are not only enlisted to comment on the draft of the law but also on the legislative agenda. Such reform experiments, of which the first case started in Anhui in 2005, allow citizens’ participation in the legislative process to move to an earlier stage, and have become known as “open-door legislation” (Song and Cai 2005). However, critics also challenge that currently the norm is still that only when a governmental legislative branch, namely, the Standing Committee of People’s Congress,

feels like it to occasionally “open the door” to enlist public opinion on the legislative agenda, can the public have the chance to participate (Wang 2007).

Supervision

The third category of “enlisted participation” is “supervision.” Different from “enlisted involvement” and similar to “democratic participation,” “supervision” in “enlisted participation” refers to citizens’ political participation to supervise and check the government officials, rather than helping government to supervise other citizens. However, many of these “enlisted participation” institutions may carry some shades of “enlisted involvement” in terms of their titles or core concepts. This article separates these institutions into two categories: “Enlisted Citizen Supervisor” and “Enlisted Mass Supervision.”

(1) “Enlisted Citizen Supervisor”

The first category is “Enlisted Citizen Supervisor.” Specific qualified citizens (sometimes staff from alternative government bureaus or members of semi-official social groups) are selected through an official (sometimes competitive) procedure to hold the post of supervisor, usually in limited number, that carries the power of investigation and subsequent report to a higher authority about any malfeasance, corruption, or illegal deeds, or any suspect cases related to the governmental officials. They may also be enlisted to work together with the officials in reaching decisions, issuing verdicts, or enforcing laws. When they are enlisted to do so, they may share certain veto power, or power to disagree. The latter practice still carries certain characteristics of “enlisted involvement” in that they cooperate with the government officials on the one hand, but on the other hand it is more than “enlisted involvement” with respect to its powers of veto, disagreement, or reservation.

There are several institutions developed under the CCP authoritarian regime that can be categorized as “Enlisted Citizen Supervisor”: (a) “People’s Supervisor” in the People’s Procuratorate; (b) “Court appraisal committee” (*Tingting Pingyi Weiyuan*); and (c) “Social Supervisor.”

For example, the “People’s Supervisor” (*Renmin Jianduyuan*) in the People’s Procuratorate was established in 2003 by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and was ratified by the Standing Committee of the NPC. According to this institution, the “People’s Supervisors” are selected through the following process: first, they are democratically recommended by government offices, social organizations, enterprises, or public facilities and institutions; second, if they themselves agree, the party organizational department will survey these candidates and then ratify the selection. After they become formal “People’s Supervisors,” they shall supervise whether the Procuratorate carries out legal and appropriate

investigations of those cases committed by public officials. The work is to focus on investigating three categories of cases: whether the Procurator withdraws the prosecution against suspect officials, whether the Procurator files non-prosecution, and whether the suspect officials object to the arrest. More examples of inappropriate behavior of the Procuratorate were also included later into the investigation range of the “People’s Supervisor” (Xinhau Net 2007).

Many similar institutions were established in various local experiments in other governmental sectors. For example, Shanghai established the “Court appraisal committee” (*Tingting Pingyi Weiyuan*). Members of this committee are enlisted from people’s representatives, representatives of People’s Political Consultative Conference, and social elites. There were 303 social figures selected to hold the position. They are invited to appraise the performance of Procurators on the court, and their appraisal will account for 55% of the final result of the appraisal. More than 300 Procurators in Shanghai shall receive such appraisals (Liu 2008). Another example is that the Disciplinary Inspection Commission of Sichuan Province enlisted more than 300 “Social Supervisors” (*Shehui Jianduyuan*) after the earthquake in the Wenchuan area 2008 to help the government supervise the distribution and utilization of the rescue materials and resources (People’s Net 2008a). This practice has been highly praised in the media.

(2) “Enlisted Mass Supervision”

The second category is “Enlisted Mass Supervision.” Unlike the previous category, institutions belonging to this category do not enlist any specific citizens to supervise government officials. This type of institution enlists the unspecified “masses” or media in general to supervise or provide information about official malfeasance, illegality, or corruption practices to the government offices or party organs that have the power to conduct further investigation. Although institutions of this category, in comparison with the previous one, are more open to the participation of ordinary citizens, their effects, however, are less decisive or less binding. Institutions of this category can be illustrated by “public opinion supervision” (*yulun jiandu*) established by the Discipline Inspection Committee to collect information for curbing official corruption. With this institution, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission has publicized a nationwide telephone number, 12388, for citizens to report corruption cases this year (Xinhau Net 2008f). There is also a website that allows citizens to file reports online. ⑩ Such a system allows all citizens to have easy access to make a report. However, after citizens have reported a case, there is no accountability

註 ⑩ <<http://www.12388.gov.cn/>>.

mechanism to provide feedback to the reporting citizen about their case from either the Discipline Inspection Commission or the Supervision Administration. Citizens are only enlisted to help and join the DIC and Supervision Administration to curb corruption. Except for the power direction that is expressed in citizens’ participation to check the officials, this institution still carries strong characteristics of “enlisted involvement.”

Policy Feedback

The last category of “enlisted participation” is “policy feedback.” The “mass appraisal of officials’ performance” is a good example to illustrate the nature of the “enlisted participation.” In Xuzhou City of Jiangsu, two local officials were dismissed from their offices because their performances were appraised by the public to be unsatisfactory. In this case, mass opinions were collected to appraise the work performance of the local officials by the local Party Organization Department. The result of the mass appraisal then becomes the evidence according to which the Party Committee decides whether certain officials should be dismissed from their positions. The two dismissed officials were appraised as having performed unsatisfactorily for two consecutive years, and thus were forced to step down by the Party Committee (Xinhua Net 2008c). The case of Xuzhou to dismiss officials due to the result of “mass appraisal” has invited discussion in the media. Most opinions are positive about the democratic implications of the institution. Some, however, also criticized the fact that these ill-performing officials were eventually dismissed after the masses expressed their dissatisfaction through “mass appraisal” also reflects the fact that formal institutions such as Peoples’ Congresses and other state or party supervision institutions must not be functioning adequately enough to have discovered the problems earlier (Huashang Net 2008). This shows how the “enlisted participation” institutions can compensate for the already ossified Leninist institutions in addressing the public dissatisfaction.

In Sichuan, the Provincial Party Committee enlisted 160 political and social elites, including the leaders of provincial government departments, the leaders of state-owned enterprises, the leaders of local universities, and other scholars and experts, to participate in the appraisal meeting for the work of the Provincial Party Committee. However, the nature of this “appraisal” is different from the Jiangsu case, as in the latter the appraisal participants only provided opinions and suggestions for the “Report on Practicing and Realizing the Concept of Scientific Development” prepared by the Provincial Party Committee (People’s Net 2008c). Such a “mass appraisal” does not have significant effect on the final decision on the appraised officials’ position, and is more like a consultative measure with much less decisive or binding effects.

V. Are “Enlisted Participation” Institutions Effective?

Defining the Institutional Effectiveness of the “Enlisted Participation” Institutions

How does the concept of “enlisted participation” help us to answer the question of whether “authoritarian resilience” can address the challenge of public governance faced by the regime? As discussed in the literature review, the two sides of the debate both agree that there are new institutions to accommodate the pressures for participation, but they disagree on which institutions to look at and the effectiveness of these institutions. This section proposes a framework to measure the “institutional effectiveness” of these “enlisted participation” institutions and to see to what extent they are able to address the public governance problems. Here, “institutional effectiveness” will be measured from five dimensions defined respectively as follows:

(1) “Institutional establishment”: the extent to which the institution has become a stable and established one through legalization or official document stipulation. Those institutions mandated by formal law or national-level regulations are ranked “high” in “institutional establishment;” those mandated by local or temporary regulations are ranked “medium;” those institutions with no formal mandate document are ranked “low” (Only those institutions in the very preliminary experimental stage can be ranked with a “low” degree of institutional establishment,” which no case reviewed here matches).

(2) “Institutional compatibility”: the extent to which the institution is compatible with other existing institutions or with the basic institutional principle of the party-state and the existing political structure in general. Those institutions of which the result does not contradict the will of other existing institutions (particularly the will of the party committee) are ranked “high;” those of which the result may contradict are ranked “low” (This dimension is dichotomous).

(3) “Institutional autonomy”: the extent to which the practice of these institutions is immune from the intervention and manipulation of the powerful bureaucracy or party organs. Those institutions that are immune from the bureaucratic intervention and manipulation are ranked “high;” those that are

somewhat immune are ranked “medium;” those that cannot be immune are ranked “low.”

(4) “Institutional inclusiveness”: the extent to which the agenda, the procedure, and the content of the institution can be implemented to realize a balance of the conflicting interests involved in the concerned public issue; the extent to which a wide range of interests are allowed to be articulated. Those institutions that can include a wide range of conflicting interests and allow these interests to be articulated in a balanced manner are ranked high; those that can include a certain range of different interests and allow them to be articulated are ranked “medium;” those that exclude major concerned interest (s) or do not allow them to be articulated are ranked “low.”

(5) “Institutional responsiveness”: the extent to which the effects of the participation is binding or decisive to the final result of the institution. Those institutions that can generate binding or decisive results are ranked “high;” those that can generate results with somewhat binding results are ranked “medium;” those that cannot generate binding results are ranked “low.”

Measuring and Comparing the Institutional Effectiveness of the “Enlisted Participation” Institutions

If we apply these five criteria to the “enlisted participation” institutions, we can generate a preliminary ranking for each institution for their five dimensions, as shown in Table 3. In Table 3, a comparison of the rankings of “enlisted participation” with “enlisted involvement” and “democratic participation” is presented.

Basically, two types of “enlisted participation” reflect two institutional strategies of the resilient authoritarian regime. The first is the “*participation-prone strategy*” which allows wider “inclusiveness” but limited “compatibility” and “autonomy.” This strategy is more suitable to satisfy the will of voluntary participation from the masses as well as from the social elite. High levels of inclusiveness will allow the regime to acquire information from a wide range of social sectors, while the limited institutional autonomy and compatibility minimize the political impact and also make such institutions unstable. Institutions such as township party secretary election, township governor direct election, enlisted opinion for legislation and administrative regulation, mass supervision, and mass appraisal system belong to this type.

The second strategy is the “*responsive-prone strategy*” which equips the institutions to have higher “responsiveness” (and usually also higher “compatibility”) but limited

Table 3 Institutional Credibility of Various Types of “Enlisted Participation” Institutions

Category	Institutional establishment (established or under experiment)	Institutional compatibility (free from structural contradiction)	Institutional autonomy (free from official intervention and manipulation)	Institutional inclusiveness (allow a wide range of interests to articulate)	Institutional responsiveness (binding effects of participation)
Enlisted Involvement	Medium to High	High	Low	Low to Medium	Low
Enlisted Participation 1 (participatory-prone)	Medium to High	Low to Medium	Low	Medium to High	Low to Medium
Enlisted Participation 2 (responsive-prone)	Medium to High	Medium to High	Low to Medium	Low to Medium	Medium to High
Democratic participation	Medium to High	High	High	Medium to High	Medium to High

Source: Created by the author.

“inclusiveness.” Institutions such as public hearing, expert consultation, and people’s supervision belong to this type. This strategy is more suitable to be used to co-opt those capable social elites. The high level of responsiveness of this strategy makes the included elites feel that their contributions are meaningful and respected, and thus may earn their loyalty to the regime, whereas their specialized knowledge may also help the regime to improve its public governance quality. But the limited “inclusiveness” can make such a meaningful “participation” more enlisted and more privileged, thus easier to come under the regime’s control.

Were we to compare the “enlisted participation” institutions with the “enlisted involvement” and “democratic participation” ones, we can easily find the transitional and unstable nature of the “enlisted participation” institutions. First, the degree of “institutional compatibility” of “enlisted participation” is lower than both “enlisted involvement” and “democratic participation.” In comparison with “enlisted involvement,” “enlisted participation” can generate better “inclusiveness” and “responsiveness,” but are more likely to be more “autonomous.” When compared with the “democratic participation” institutions, the “enlisted participation” ones appear to have less effectiveness in the “autonomy,” “inclusiveness,” and “responsiveness” dimensions. Furthermore, it is relatively rare for the “enlisted participation” to have high levels in both “inclusiveness” and “responsiveness” concurrently, but also rare to have low levels in both dimensions as well.

VI. Conclusion

This article raises the concept of “enlisted participation” in order to provide a better analytic tool to distinguish which institutions create China’s authoritarian resilience and how they work. This article argues that it is not the traditional Leninist “enlisted involvement” institutions, nor the rarely existent “democratic participation” institutions, but the “enlisted participation” institutions that mainly contribute to the resilience of the CCP authoritarianism. At the same time, this article does not deny the existence of the other two types of institutions in China, but it holds that they are not the most important institutions for the CCP’s authoritarian resilience.

In comparison with the “enlisted involvement” institutions, “enlisted participation” institutions allow citizens to have more impact on policy input and to help supervise local officials. Their binding effects are also greater than those of “enlisted involvement.” However, similar to the “enlisted involvement” in its “enlist” element, most of the participation is still subject to regime’s enlistment and final control. This article identifies several institution cases in each category of “election nomination,” “policy input,” “supervision,” and “policy feedback.”

After illustrating some concrete examples of institutions in these categories, this article then raises five criteria to evaluate the “effectiveness” of these “enlisted participation” institutions. Each of these institution cases are ranked on the five dimensions. The analytical results lead to the following findings: First, there are two major strategies of the resilient authoritarianism to utilize these “enlisted participation” institutions to address the demands and pressure from the society. The first is the “*inclusiveness-prone strategy*,” stressing how to satisfy the will for voluntary participation from the masses and the elite. Its “inclusiveness” is high but “responsiveness” is low. The second is the “*responsive-prone strategy*,” allowing the participation to generate high levels of binding effects and thus making the participation more meaningful for the participants, but limiting its inclusiveness and thus making the opportunity rarer and with a stronger “enlisting” tone. It is more suitable to co-opt concerned social elites. Interestingly, this study also finds that very few of the “enlisted participation” institutions have both high levels of “inclusiveness” and “responsiveness.” This is how these institutions create the “resilience” while still remaining “authoritarian.”

Second, the major arguments of the “criticizing camp” in the debate are partially verified. The “enlisted participation” institutions are incompatible with existing authoritarian institutions only when they become extremely effective — that is, with high autonomy, high inclusiveness, and high responsiveness, approaching the “democratic participation” institutions. But another part of their arguments is proved to be quite correct, that is, most “enlisted participation” institutions are still subject to the intervention and maneuvering from the authoritarian rulers.

The “enlisted participation” institutions are able to address the social participatory pressure only selectively instead of comprehensively. Selective “inclusiveness” or “responsiveness” can help the regime to partially satisfy the participatory demands from the society without losing control over these institutions. They are obviously more effective than the Leninist “enlisted involvement” institutions, but their effectiveness is unstable given the low institutional autonomy. If these institutions become too much like those befitting “democratic participation,” they may very well be suspended or under-implemented by the regime, as happens in the “roaming fee public hearing.” For resilient authoritarianism, the “enlisted participation” can best serve its purpose when its institutional effectiveness remains selective, partial, non-comprehensive, and subject to the its maneuvering. However, as the social demands for participation grow stronger, whether such partial effectiveness of the “enlisted participation” institutions can manage such increasing pressure will no doubt come into question.

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中國的公共治理中的「徵召式參與」： 「威權韌性」的一種制度安排

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摘 要

中國研究的學者們對於中國威權政體的前景爭論不休，某些學者認為中共政權是一種韌性威權，另外一些學者質疑前者所說「韌性制度」的有效性。本文認為上述中國研究學者之間的辯論缺乏理論架構，其證據缺乏通則性。本文嘗試提出一個更有理論意涵的概念——「徵召式參與」。此概念是從菲利普·羅德所提出在列寧式政權下的「徵召式參涉」衍生而來，但與該概念有本質上的不同。本文認為「徵召式參與」能夠更精準地掌握當前中共政治制度下的政治參與的制度特徵。本文以具體的制度作為案例，來分析「徵召式參與」的不同類型。文末並以五種制度化標準來衡量辨析「徵召式參與」與列寧體制下的「徵召式參涉」及民主體制下的一般「政治參與」的不同，並指出「徵召式參與」下的「包容策略」與「回應策略」，可以視為韌性威權的兩大策略。

關鍵詞：威權韌性、徵召式參與、徵召式參涉、公共治理

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