

Proclaiming a Protectorate over Uganda: The Liberal Party and Late Victorian Empire, 1892-95*

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Abstract

This research aims to expound the Liberal Party's attitude and policy towards the establishment of the Uganda protectorate in the mid-1890s, thereby revealing the conflict and reconciliation between modern liberalism and imperialism. This study examines five points at issue: 1. Uganda and East Africa in the perspective of British imperial strategy; 2. The Uganda Question as a test of the Liberals' formulae on imperial politics, esp. Gladstonianism and Roseberianism; 3. The Uganda Question in the context of home and international politics; 4. The Uganda business under the Rosebery Government from 1894 to 1895; 5. The solution of the Uganda Question and its impacts upon "Liberal Imperialism" in practice. In general, these issues explain the way – however different from that of the Conservatives – the Liberals contributed to the expansion of the British Empire. This treatise shows that the annexation of Uganda was a cheap enterprise, and that the "New Imperialism" in the late nineteenth century was to a great extent a byproduct of European power politics based upon a sophisticated nation-state system. More often than not, therefore, prestige mattered more than "material" things in the decision-making of foreign policy, as popular politics was rapidly taking shape in the first Western democracies. A forward policy in Africa might not always be preferable for the Liberals, yet a policy of retreat was never endorsed. So, the controversies over Uganda had, after all, little effect on the advance of the British West African empire.

Keywords: Liberal Party, Uganda, Gladstone, Rosebery, IBEA, liberalism, Portal

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In September 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) was granted a royal charter to develop the territory in the British sphere in East Africa. On 14 April 1890, a mission under Frederick Jackson of the IBEAC arrived in Uganda, and induced King Mwanga to recognize the protection of the company. Soon afterwards, the Anglo-German agreement (1 July 1890) cleared up the two nations' conflicting claims and aims in East Africa; in return for the cession by England of Heligoland, the Germans gave up all rights to Uganda and abandoned their position in Witu. The territories constituting the later Uganda Protectorate thus came within the British sphere of influence. On 18 December, Sir Frederick Lugard with a British force arrived in Uganda. He concluded a new treaty with the king and attempted, not very successfully, to restore peace between the religious factions in the country. Lugard moved to the western areas in 1891 to establish posts and enlist Sudanese forces in the service of the IBEAC. But, finding Uganda too great a drain on their resources, the company proposed to the British Government in the same year to withdraw from that country.

Religious conflicts broke out again in January the next year. Lugard intervened actively and secured the victory of the Protestant party. In that year, the IBEAC devoted itself to establishing influence over the coastal regions and opening up the routes to the interior. Lugard's expedition to Lakes Albert Edward and Albert was successful inasmuch as he set up a number of forts for taking effective possession of a very considerable portion of the British sphere. At the same time, the new administrator of British East Africa, Ernest Berkeley,

succeeded in arranging with the chiefs for the opening of the river Juba, an important waterway into Somaliland.

The IBEA, however, suffered serious financial difficulties. In as early as December 1890, the company's chairman, Sir William Mackinnon, asked for government assistance in the form of a guarantee on the interest of the capital for building the Mombasa railway. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, was personally in favour of the request, but after violent Liberal opposition in the House of Commons, the vote authorizing the payment of 20,000/ was withdrawn by the Government in July 1891. The IBEA was forced to continue with the survey at its own cost, with the help of some royal engineer officers sent by the Government from India. For the company, there seemed to be no alternative to evacuation from Uganda. The IBEA announced its intention of withdrawing and was induced to stay on only through the intervention and financial support of the missionary societies.¹

On 17 May 1892, the IBEA reasserted its determination, initially announced on 20 August 1891, to withdraw from Uganda,² which Salisbury acknowledged without comment. It was unlikely that the company would be able to attract more capital for its enterprises; the interval of one year since the summer of 1891 was therefore used to persuade the Government to take over Uganda. But, the situation was aggravated by rumours of atrocities allegedly committed by Lugard and other agents of the IBEA, which aroused violent reactions in France. Salisbury defended Lugard's reputation,³ while in the last month of his ministry (July 1892) he took two vital decisions that would change the course of the event. He formally agreed to the IBEA's decision on

1 The raising of 15,000/ by public subscription – principally the work of Bishop Tucker and the missionary organization – led to a postponement of 12 months of the evacuation programme.

2 See IBEA to FO (Foreign Office), 20 August 1891, and same to same, 17 May 1892, quoted in P. L. McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA: A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1893), 333-335.

3 Lugard wrote in his diary on 17 August 1892: "Lord Salisbury, and the Press (notably *Times*) defended me grandly, quoted my previous character and insisted on believing nothing till my despatches came." Margery Perham ed., *The Diaries of Lord Lugard* (London: Faber & Faber, 1959), vol. III, 391.

evacuation, and appointed Captain Macdonald, a royal engineer officer, to report on the charges against Lugard. Lugard's return to England later in the year caused the whole question of Uganda to be discussed broadly from an imperial point of view.⁴

The classic British policy for the scramble for Africa was to secure by diplomatic means a sphere of influence and then authorize a chartered company to take up the burden, thus relieving the Government of the expense. It had been successful and there had been no declaration of a direct imperial possession in Africa since the colonial conference of Berlin in 1885, when rather reluctantly a protectorate had been proclaimed over Bechuanaland. But, here in Uganda the conventional wisdom was failing. The new government under Gladstone was hardly formed when serious differences arose among the leading Liberals in regard to the future of Uganda. The decision was important in itself, and critical in determining which school of Liberals was to prevail in the conduct of foreign affairs. The party of the so-called "liberal imperialists" led by Lord Rosebery was eager to take over Uganda so as to protect the access to the headwaters of the Nile, but the prime minister and the anti-imperialist element in the cabinet strenuously objected. The Uganda question concerned whether the British Government should take over responsibility for the assigned region from an insolvent chartered company, or whether the mother country should leave a failing imperial agent to "sink or swim". This question would have serious repercussions on party politics at home and British imperial position abroad.

I. Uganda and British East Africa: An Imperial Thinking

For all who concerned themselves with the development of the British Empire, the geographical importance of Uganda, sometimes described as the "pearl of Africa," could not be overestimated.⁵ Uganda, by far the most

4 Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate* (London: Hutchinson, 1904), vol. I, 234.

5 In *Handbook of British East Africa*, prepared by the Intelligence Division of the War Office in 1893 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), it says: "The most important of all these is

powerful and civilized state in Central Africa, was undoubtedly the best possession of the IBEA. Speaking of Uganda's importance to Britain, Rosebery said: "We, that is I, view it as a country of great possibilities, as the key perhaps of Central Africa, as commanding the Nile Basin, as a field recently of heroic enterprise."⁶ This observation was recognized and echoed by many of his colleagues. Indeed, Uganda's location on the northern shores of Lake Victoria and on the path of any practicable route from the north to the south made it of particular significance in connection with the future of the whole continent.

The Brussels Conference of 1876 on geographical exploration had envisaged an international organization to open up the entire area between Zanzibar and Congo to imperial exploitation. The integration of Uganda into East Africa in the light of economic open-door policy was inherent in the Congo-Basin Treaties of 1885 and 1890. By the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, Britain had effectively reserved for herself the territories constituting Uganda, Kenya and Zanzibar. Comprising the western part of British East Africa, which linked the Sudan to the Indian Ocean, Uganda was important to British security in Egypt, and therefore related to the question of Gladstone's avowed determination to evacuate Egypt.⁷ It was frequently argued, though

Uganda." (p. 10)

6 *The Times*, 21 Oct. 1892, 5e; see also Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (*Hansard*), 4th Series, vol. 8, "Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech," quoted by Mr. Burdett-Coutts, 6 Feb. 1893, 572. Sir Gerald Portal, who was despatched as a commissioner by the Government in late 1892 to examine the situation in Uganda, communicated the same. See Public Record Office (PRO), FO2/60/515, Gerald Portal to Rosebery, 1 November 1893. Portal's report was published and presented to Parliament. See Parliamentary Papers, 1894 LVII, Africa No. 2 [C.7303], 31. For the strategic importance of Uganda in terms of colonial geopolitics, see P. G. Okoth, "Uganda's Geopolitical Significance Since 1894," in P. G. Okoth et al. eds., *Uganda: A Century of Existence* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995), 5-8.

7 Richard Shannon, *Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865-1898* (London: The Penguin Press, 1999), 528. Soon after the British Government had declared a protectorate over Uganda, proposals were made that Uganda and the adjoining countries should eventually be administered in connection with the Nile Valley. And there were several suggestions made between 1899 and 1914 for integrating the countries under British control in East and Central Africa. See PRO,

without proof, that the relinquishment of Uganda to any one of the Great Powers would immediately imperil the safety of Egypt, as the diversion or blocking of the headwaters of the Nile could cut her water supply and starve her people.⁸ And, the British military authorities in Egypt held that if Uganda became a French possession, they would certainly push on into Equatoria and then regain a hold over the abandoned Sudan, effecting a revival of the whole Egyptian question.⁹ The retention of Uganda was thus an adjunct matter of the Egyptian question and, therefore, of the Eastern Question.

Uganda was essential to the control of the Sudan. Charles G. Gordon, the former governor of the Sudan (1877-79), had clearly stated that Uganda was the natural route by which the Sudan should be administered. In September 1892 Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, circulated without comment a memorandum by Sir P. Anderson, the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, "in the highest jingo tone" advocating the annexation of Uganda with a view to the reconquest of the Sudan via the Upper Nile.¹⁰ This suggestion was very tempting – hence dangerous in the eyes of the Little Englanders – because it was clear that the reconquest of the Sudan would not be a difficult or costly task for a European power holding Egypt and Uganda. More so, since Lugard with the help of the Egyptian Government had introduced into Uganda the Sudanese soldiery.¹¹ As most of the Liberals thought that Egypt should

FO403/209/32, Inclosure: "Memorandum on the Administration of East Africa," by Col. H. E. Colville, 8 April 1895; and D. W. Nabudere, *Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda* (London: Onyx Press, 1980), 35.

8 PRO, FO84/2258/70, Inclosure: "A Short History of Uganda from its Discovery in 1858 to 1892," by Hubert Foster, 5 Sept. 1892.

9 PRO, FO84/2257/115, "The Effect on Egypt of the Withdrawal from Uganda," by F. R. Wingate (Director of Military Intelligence, Egyptian Army), 21 August 1892; and FO84/2258/302, Memorandum on Uganda by Brigadier-General Kitchener, 18 Sept. 1892.

10 PRO, Cab37/31/22, Memorandum by H. P. Anderson, 10 Sept. 1892; and British Library (BL), Add. MSS. 44202, f. 229, William Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1892.

11 Sir E. Baring, the British Agent in Cairo, originally refused to help IBEA in enlisting Sudanese. But, owing to renewed representations from the Company, the Egyptian Government finally consented to the recruitment of 200 blacks for Uganda. During the Portal Mission, the sole organized force at the disposal of the commissioner and the military officers

resume sooner or later the control of the Upper Nile,¹² continued occupation of Uganda was confidently expected.

According to the resolution of the Berlin Conference of 1885, any power taking possessions of African coastland had prior rights to the area lying inland from the coast. The so-called "hinterland" doctrine had not been sanctioned officially or strictly defined at the conference, but it was gradually accepted as a rule since then, as all governments found that coastal occupation without control of the interior would be little more than a barren acquisition. In East Africa particularly, the value of the coast depended in a large measure on the commerce of the distant interior, a fact that explained the movement of territorial expansion by Britain and Germany there. It was the strong conviction of this fact that suggested and gave force to the hinterland doctrine so clearly recognized by both nations. So Uganda was indirectly severed from German influence by the hinterland understanding. The doctrine, of course, did not exclude private enterprise or commercial freedom, but applied solely to the acquisition of political influence and territorial dominion. Due to economic conditions, the districts between the coast and the Lake regions were comparatively valueless, but their latent resources were of great importance to colonizers, who advocated that the still more valuable hinterland should be secured to Britain. That part of the interior in which interest centered was Uganda.¹³

in Uganda consisted of the Sudanese, who formed a very serious factor in the politics of the country. (PRO, FO2/61/3, Captain Macdonald to Sir G. Portal, 13 Dec. 1892.) In 1895, there were about 12,000 Sudanese troops through the whole protectorate.

¹² BL, Add. MSS. 52521, f. 243, Campbell-Bannerman to D. H. Saunders, 24 March 1896.

¹³ And, the IBEA urged upon the British Government the necessity of reconsidering the relations between the Royal Commissioner and the Company if the retention of Uganda was decided upon, in order to co-ordinate the developing of the coast and the hinterland. PRO, FO2/57, Memorandum by IBEA, 29 Feb. 1893; and FO403/183/16, IBEA to FO, 5 July 1893. After the Uganda protectorate had been established in 1895, its connection with the coast was the priority undertaking proposed by the first Acting Commissioner, H. E. Colvile. PRO, FO 2/92/146, Memorandum on the Administration of East Africa by H. E. Colvile, 8 April 1895.

II. *The Uganda Question:*

Gladstonianism vs. Roseberianism, 1892-94

The Uganda question, like the Egyptian question, put to the test the Liberal Government's formulae on imperial politics, and seriously divided the Cabinet.¹⁴ Although more indeterminate than usual, Liberal opinion was pledged in general terms against further commitments in Africa; and Gladstone's remarks on Uganda were characteristically bewildering,¹⁵ revealing a deep cleavage within the ruling party. The Uganda crisis, which was to exacerbate great difficulties in Liberal platform for more than two years, marked the rise of "liberal imperialism" and the waning of "Gladstonianism".

The Uganda question was an intractable problem the Gladstone Government had inherited from the Salisbury's. The Conservative Government's policy towards Uganda was suspiciously ambiguous. Without making any attempt to save the bankrupt IEBA in Uganda, the Government claimed, soon before stepping down, that the withdrawal of the company's officers from Uganda, due by the end of 1892, by no means implied the abandonment of the country.¹⁶ The Conservatives were very active in implementing the Mombasa

14 For more discussion, see Richard Shannon, *Gladstone: Heroic Minister, 1865-1898* (London: The Penguin Press, 1999), 528-529; and W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 124. When the Liberal Party took office in August 1892, foreign policy came to the front in the first week of the new cabinet, and one of its leading members remarked that it was the most exciting week of his life. John Morley, *Recollections* (London: Macmillan, 1917), vol. II, 78.

15 Gladstone's pronouncement in the House of Commons (3 March 1892) on the Mombasa Railway survey, which was essential to Uganda's development, was particularly ambiguous. He said: "I wish to state, in the most expressive terms that I can command, that I am determined for one to exempt myself by the declaration of tonight, from every jot or title of responsibility connected with the undertaking; and yet, at the same time, I do not go so far as to deliver a final judgement." *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 1, "Supply - Civil Services and Revenue Departments, 1891-92," Gladstone, 3 March 1892, 1872. Gladstone and Harcourt increased the dubiety about the official Liberal position by abstaining in the following division.

16 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 5, "Disturbances in Uganda," 16 June 1892, A. J. Balfour (the Conservative leader in the House of Commons and First Lord of the Treasury), p. 1279. Just

railway project, but were not decidedly positive about keeping Uganda under British control. Actually, no paper of importance between the Government and the IBEA had been presented to Parliament except on the subject of the railway, not to mention a statement of taking over the country. And, there was no discussion of the Uganda question during the general election, owing to its special delicacy.¹⁷ Soon after the new Liberal ministry was formed, William Harcourt (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) warned Rosebery, whose policy was one of proclaimed “continuity” with Salisbury’s, that one of the most material points on which the cabinet knew nothing was the view of the former government on the Uganda question.¹⁸ Gladstone also said to his Foreign Secretary: “I take it for granted – though it is not mentioned – that the late Government were parties to the decision and order to withdraw.... I cannot see any new facts to want or recommend the reopening of the question decided by the late Government.”¹⁹ While doubtful whether any responsibility in this matter should be laid on the last government,²⁰ Rosebery retorted that

before leaving office, Salisbury warned that the Government must hesitate before addressing themselves to the vast expense of “pacification” to which the IBEA was inviting them. See Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), vol. 4, 343.

17 As Bishop Tucker, the missionary spokesman for annexation, observed, while Salisbury was in favour of the retention of Uganda, he was hardly in a position to pledge himself to any particular line of action, because the general election was impending and because it was extremely doubtful what the result of an appeal to the country would be. A. R. Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa* (London: Edward Arnold, 1908), vol. I, 147. For similar viewpoints see *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, “Address in Answer to HM’s Most Gracious Speech,” G. J. Goschen, 3 Feb. 1893, 198-199.

18 Harcourt to Rosebery, 23 Sept. 1892, quoted in A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt* (London: Constable, 1923), vol. II, 193-34.

19 Gladstone to Rosebery, 17 Sept. 1892, in H. C. G. Matthew ed., *The Gladstone Diaries* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1994), vol. XIII, 79. See also BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.209, f.212 and 214, same to same, 23 Sept. 1892; and Add. MSS. 44202, f.232, Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 Sept. 1892. In a memorandum presented to the cabinet Gladstone wrote: “The Government accepted the evacuation as a to-be-accomplished fact.” PRO, Cab37/31/29, Memorandum on Uganda by Gladstone, 24 Sept. 1892.

20 Such was what Rosebery said to the deputation of the Church Missionary Society on 23 September 1892. See *The Times*, 24 Sept. 1892, 12a. Rosebery saw that a forward policy in

the view entertained by the Gladstonians that the Conservative Government had prosecuted a policy of evacuation was "arguable but not correct."²¹ Although the Conservatives' policy had not been clear, their decision to enforce the Mombasa Railway project convinced him of their resolution to maintain British position in Uganda.²² And, taking a step forward, Rosebery envisioned a protectorate over the country, as he could not see a middle path between occupation and evacuation.²³ On the other hand, the Prime Minister and his followers determined not to take into account the railway plan (arguing that Salisbury intended evacuation until the railway was built), and refrained from interfering with the evacuation of the IBEA on 1 January 1893.

Indeed, the Conservatives' policy towards Uganda was subject to interpretation, and the difference of opinion among the Liberals about it was indicative of their own conflicting ideas regarding imperial enterprise. In fact, Gladstone and Harcourt understood that Salisbury did not intend to abandon Uganda, though he had made no provision for the time between the abandonment and the completion of the railway, to which he was committed.²⁴ And, they acknowledged his "design of founding a new and complete policy for that region on the construction of a railway and a subsequent renewal of

Uganda could not be fully justified by reference to the former government's viewpoints, so he turned down Harcourt's suggestion of publishing the Salisbury correspondence relating to the evacuation of Uganda. See BL, Add. MSS. 44202, f. 261, Harcourt to Gladstone, 12 Oct. 1892.

21 BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f. 227, Rosebery to Gladstone, 25 Sept. 1892.

22 Ibid.; also BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.233, Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Sept. 1892. Rosebery wrote on 20 September: "It cannot be doubted that [the Conservatives] would have held on to Uganda had they held on to office, but uncertain of their tenure, they, not unnaturally but very fairly in view of the shortness of time, preferred to leave this embarrassing question to their successors." BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.199, Rosebery to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1892; see also R. R. James, *Rosebery: A Biography of Arhibald Philip, Fifth Earl of Rosebery* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), 262.

23 BL, Add. MSS. 43516, f.57, Rosebery to Lord Ripon, 17 Oct. 1892.

24 Algernon West (secretary to Gladstone) diary, 11 Nov. 1892, in H. G. Hutchinson ed., *Private Diaries of Sir Algernon West* (London: John Murray, 1922), 77. See also *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Uganda," Gladstone, 20 March 1893, 553.

occupation.”²⁵ Nevertheless, they held the former government’s Uganda policy to be one of retreat – even though denied emphatically by the Conservatives themselves²⁶ – just because they desired such a policy. After leaving office, the Conservatives began to advocate openly the retention of the country, attempting to strengthen Rosebery’s cause.²⁷ But, this did not help the Liberals to quit arguing and clarify their policy.

To strengthen his stance, Rosebery repeatedly emphasized, above other things, the grave consequences of the withdrawal of the British force from Uganda, particularly the massacre of the native Christians and foreign missionaries.²⁸ A general war and immediate anarchy in the country was predicted also by Sir Gerald Portal, the British special commissioner to Uganda (1892-93), and Bishop Tucker, the most prominent missionary representative on the spot. As commercial interest in the region was of no great significance up to then, moral and political considerations were the main argument in favour of its annexation. To the anti-imperial minds especially, the danger which the missionaries faced was a political, not a religious one, for they had got into trouble by involving themselves in a militant annexationist policy. Gladstone and Harcourt apparently did not share Rosebery’s sympathy and apprehensions for the missionaries in trouble,²⁹ seeing that the

25 PRO, Cab41/22/11, Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 29 Sept. 1892; also cf. BL, Add. MSS. 44648, f.4, Cabinet Minute by Gladstone, 29 Sept. 1892.

26 See *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, “Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech,” 3 Feb. 1893, A. J. Balfour, 49. The Conservative spokesman reviewed their policy: “Our desire with regard to Uganda was that it should be administered by the Company... And we desired to see the railway constructed.... Our policy, at all events, was the railway and the Company.”

27 In reply to an inquiry about the Conservatives’ policy towards Uganda when in office, Salisbury made it known to the public that “the late Government had not determined on the evacuation of Uganda, but, on the contrary, always contemplated retaining it.” R. T. Gunton to H. G. Snowden, 20 Oct. 1892, in *The Times*, 28, Oct. 1892, 6a. For Rosebery’s public acknowledgement of this information, see *The Times*, 3 Nov. 1892, 11f.

28 PRO, Cab37/31/23, Rosebery’s Memorandum, 16 Sept. 1892; BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.195, Rosebery to Gladstone, 19 Sept. 1892; and *ibid.*, f.236, same to same, 29 Sept. 1892.

29 Gladstone once cried to the French ambassador: “These missionaries are always causing trouble.” (Waddington to Ribot, 2 Nov. 1892, quoted in R. E. Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* [London: Macmillan, 1981], 316.)

Foreign Office was playing the missionary card with political aims. Nor did the Gladstone party agree with Rosebery on occupying Uganda for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade: they did not feel obliged to take up the moral duty, and they did not find it effective.³⁰ To them, the anti-slavery movement was another cloak for annexationist ambitions. In fact, Sir G. Portal's expedition had a large number of slaves in its ranks, and the whole territory of the IBEA was swarming with slaves.

The Uganda issue gave rise to the question whether a government was liable for the acts of officials of a chartered company within a sphere of influence. Pressure had been put on the Salisbury ministry to explicate what was the exact nature of the relations between a chartered company and a government. No satisfactory answer had been given because, as Rosebery considered, the case did not admit of one.³¹ However, it thereafter became a new question, to be settled by the Liberal government. All factions within the cabinet showed little sympathy with the IBEA and disclaimed such responsibilities as cast by the company on the Government.³² But, Rosebery

And, he complained to Cecil Rhodes: "We have too much of the world, and now these wretched missionaries are dragging me into Uganda." (C. Rhodes's speech on 25 Oct. 1898, quoted in [editor unknown] *The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery: Two Chapters in Recent Politics, 1886 and 1892-95* [London: Arthur L. Humphreys, 1901], 33.) Harcourt so abhorred the missions in Uganda as to say: "The Catholics and Protestants are occupied in nothing but cutting each other's throats, with their bishops at their head." (Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1892, quoted in A. G. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, 192.)

30 BL, Add. MSS. 44516, f.53, H. H. Asquith to Gladstone, 22 Sept. 1892; and PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's Memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.

31 PRO, FO403/173/89, Rosebery to Lord Dufferin, 21 Oct. 1892. Whether the Government was responsible for a chartered company's acts overseas was a moot point, to which the legal authorities gave no definite answer. See PRO, FO84/2275/106, Memorandum by Lord Chancellor, 5 Nov. 1892; FO403/173/218, Memorandum by Lord Chancellor, 23 Nov. 1892; and FO403/194/196, Memorandum on the Right of HMG to Revoke the IBEA's Charter by H. P. Anderson, 25 May 1894 (draft on 27 April 1894, FO83/1311).

32 See PRO, Cab37/31/23, Rosebery's Memorandum, 16 Sept. 1892; BL, Add. MSS. 44202, f.229, Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1892; BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.209, Gladstone to Rosebery, 23 Sept. 1892; PRO, Cab37/31/27, Lord Ripon's Memorandum, 25 Sept. 1892; PRO, FO403/173/113, Rosebery to Dufferin, 26 Oct. 1892; and BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.133,

was concerned that public opinion would attach the responsibility to the Government. In his instructions to Portal of 10 December, the Foreign Secretary referred to the fact that 83 treaties with native chiefs made by the IBEA had been approved by the Foreign Office,³³ pointing out that to evacuate Uganda without making any endeavour to implement them might have a prejudicial effect on the British name.³⁴ As legal advice could not determine whether obligations or rights under these treaties would accrue to the Government, the varied opinions of cabinet members revealed again their different attitudes towards imperial expansion.

The most revealing point that differentiated Gladstonians from Roseberians in the debate on Uganda was how that country contributed to the safety of the British position in Egypt. As mentioned above, Uganda was the western part of the British East Africa, which linked the Sudan to the Indian Ocean, and therefore was related to the question of British security in Egypt. The Uganda question was thus connected with the avowed policy since 1882 of the Liberal party to evacuate Egypt. The quarrels over Uganda actually corresponded with the quarrels over Egypt, or the Uganda question was the Egyptian question writ large. As Harcourt noticed, Rosebery's forward policy in Uganda was "to carry the Egyptian policy to an extravagance."³⁵ Gladstone had deliberately abandoned the policy of occupying the Sudan from the north, and now the case was put forward by Rosebery for advancing upon it from the south, Uganda being the base of such an operation. Gladstone and many radicals strongly opposed the occupation of Uganda with a view to securing for Britain, or preventing the other powers (notably France and Belgium) from securing, control of the headwaters of the Nile.³⁶ It was clear that if Britain took Uganda, pressures for the appropriation of the Sudan would increase, making British occupation of Egypt permanent. As Henry du Pré Labouchere, a supporter of Gladstone and an anti-imperialist, protested in the House of

Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Sept. 1892.

33 For these treaties see PRO, FO2/140/1-84.

34 *Parliamentary Papers*, 1893-94 LXII, Africa No. 1 [C.6847], Rosebery to Portal, 10 Dec. 1892, 50-51.

35 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's Memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.

36 BL, Add. MSS. 44516, f.53, H. H. Asquith to Gladstone, 22 Sept. 1892.

Commons: "Our being in Egypt was used as an argument in favour of taking Uganda, just as, when they have taken Uganda, that would be used as an argument...to remain in Egypt for ever."³⁷

Although most of the cabinet rejected Rosebery's case for taking over Uganda, the Foreign Secretary had a large following in his nation and he was even more ardent than Salisbury for a British protectorate to be erected in East Africa. "If we abandon Uganda, we lose at once...the control of the Nile," Rosebery argued exaggeratedly, revealing severe intensity of the cabinet struggle.³⁸ Harcourt, in turn, warned Rosebery of the danger of creating "another India in Africa;"³⁹ and Gladstone proposed the use of moral influence – and money if necessary – for peace in Uganda after evacuation.⁴⁰ But, to Rosebery, Uganda was a question of imperial policy, not to be dealt with purely as a part of the IBEA's territory. His argument was simple and firm.

Uganda was about three months journey from the coast, which meant that if British agents were to be retained there some decision had to be made by the end of September 1892, as the IBEA was to withdraw by the end of that year. Gladstone's fourth ministry started on 15 August 1892, leaving only six weeks of breathing space. So, the Uganda matter was very pressing, and would not be able to stand over for the regular autumn cabinet meetings. Parliament met in August to turn Salisbury out of office; and it then adjourned

37 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Uganda," 20 March 1893, Labouchere, 545.

38 PRO, Cab37/31/23, Rosebery's Memorandum, 16 Sept. 1892. In answer to Harcourt's call on 24 September for "a full report from some impartial and capable person on the spot," Rosebery replied: "If I wish to remain [in Uganda] without sufficient information, you wish to evacuate without sufficient information." Quoted in R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 264.

39 Harcourt to Rosebery, 27 Sept. 1892. Quoted in A. G. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, 196.

40 "If the Company say they have no money even for moral influence, I cannot but think that point might be met," Gladstone continued. See BL, Add. MSS. 22489, f.220, Gladstone to Rosebery, 24 Sept. 1892. Also cf. Add. MSS. 44202, f.232, Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 Sept. 1892. Gladstone cast a reflection on Rosebery's insistence about the matter in his memoirs, saying: "[Rosebery] showed himself in the Uganda business to be rather seriously imbued with...territorial greed, which constitutes for us one of the grave dangers of the time." Add. MSS. 44791, f.42, "Recorded Errors – Appointments of 1892."

until January 1893. Therefore, it was not possible to launch a parliamentary campaign, and Uganda was a matter for the cabinet's decision solely. This augured ill for the newly established government; more so because Rosebery had held that he alone must have the conduct of foreign policy, a condition for his assumption of membership to the cabinet. The Uganda crisis offered him a grand opportunity for imposing his will upon his colleagues and exposing his insistence on being free from interference in policy-making.⁴¹

On 24 August, the Foreign Secretary instructed Sir Percy Anderson, the Under-Secretary, to prepare a memorandum on Uganda in the light of annexationism.⁴² It was circulated to the cabinet on 13 September as a Rosebery manifesto, causing an immediate storm. The Prime Minister and the Indian Secretary (Lord Kimberley) complained that they were totally in the dark as to the most important facts of the case, and Harcourt soon circulated at the cabinet a strong remonstrance against it.⁴³ On 24 September, Gladstone told his Foreign Secretary that most of his colleagues were against moving to occupy Uganda. (Lord Ripon [Colonial Secretary], Lord Asquith [Home Secretary], John Morley [Irish Secretary], Lord Spencer [First Lord of the Admiralty], Henry Campbell-Bannerman [War Secretary], and Farrer Herschell [Lord Chancellor] all admitted to considerable misgivings about

41 On 27 Sept. Rosebery wrote to the Prime Minister: "I, as Foreign Secretary, and holding a very strong view on the subject, shall not be placed in the position of simply acquiescing, without inquiry, in an evacuation which under circumstances of such precipitation, must in my opinion be inevitably so disastrous." BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.233, Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Sept. 1892.

42 PRO, FO84/2258/144, Rosebery's Note, 24 Aug. 1892. For Anderson's Memorandum (10 Sept. 1892), see Cab37/31/22; for its draft and revisions see FO84/2258/151 & 162.

43 Gladstone said: "It is like gathering a history from broken Assyrian tablets." BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.183, Memorandum on Uganda, 20 Sept. 1892. For Kimberley's views see his memorandum on 21 Sept. 1892, in John Powell ed., *Liberal by Principle: The Politics of John Wodehouse First Earl of Kimberley, 1843-1902* (London: The Historians' Press, 1996), 203. For Harcourt's lengthy counter-memorandum see PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892. Gladstone wrote to Harcourt on 23 September: "You have been exercised about Uganda, and so have I. It has occupied eyes and hand for some hours almost every day for the last week, and ruined outside of them." BL, Add. MSS. 44202, f.232, Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 Sept. 1892.

retaining Uganda.)⁴⁴ Rosebery replied by pressing again for a cabinet meeting,⁴⁵ to which Gladstone reluctantly consented. "It is the first time," Gladstone wrote to Rosebery, "during a cabinet experience of 22 or 23 years, that I have known that Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister [are] to go before a cabinet on a present question with diverging views."⁴⁶

In the cabinet meeting of 28 September Rosebery and Gladstone were involved in a furious row, and no progress was made.⁴⁷ A ministerial crisis was brewing when Rosebery suggested resignation. The situation was critical for Rosebery's estrangement at this very early period of Gladstone's administration would be extremely damaging. Through the mediation of Algernon E. West,⁴⁸ Gladstone's private secretary, the two parties reached a compromise

44 The Foreign Secretary had Kimberley's sympathy, but there was no real agreement between them. Lord Crewe, *Lord Rosebery* (London: John Murray, 1931), vol. II, 446. John Morley's criticism of Rosebery's policy was mild, for Morley was on the warmest terms with Rosebery at the time, and the friction between him and Harcourt was acute. R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 268. According to Edward Hamilton, Gladstone's secretary, Morley was ready to accept the Uganda Railway Bill. Hamilton Diary, 23 June 1894, in David Brooks ed., *The Destruction of Lord Rosebery: From the Diary of Sir Edward Hamilton 1894-1895* (London: The Historians' Press, 1986), 150. In Morley's *Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (London: Macmillan, 1903) and *Recollections* (London: Macmillan, 1917), he did not even touch the Uganda issue. But, before the cabinet meeting on 28 September 1892, Morley had told Harcourt that he was at one with the Gladstone party. So, Rosebery was really alone in the cabinet. BL, Add. MSS. 44204, f.250, Harcourt to Gladstone, 26 Sept. 1892; and Add. MSS. 48612B, f.19, Rosebery to Hamilton, 8 Jan. 1894.

45 Just 2 days before H. H. Asquith, the Home Secretary, had seconded Rosebery's demand for a cabinet meeting on Uganda. BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.199, Rosebery to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1892; and Add. MSS. 44516, f.53, Asquith to Gladstone, 22 Sept. 1892.

46 BL, Add. MSS. 44289, f.222, Gladstone to Rosebery, 25 Sept. 1892. In his letter Gladstone told Rosebery that he had approved the request for a cabinet meeting on the Uganda affair "with pain, though with no hesitation." In reply, Rosebery showed to Gladstone his firm position in regard of Uganda by talking about ministerial responsibility. Add. MSS. 44289, f.225, Rosebery to Gladstone, 25 Sept. 1892.

47 With only Henry Fowler, the President of the Local Government Board, and A. J. Mundella, the President of the Board of Trade, in support, Rosebery defied the Prime Minister and the majority.

48 See A. E. West diary, 28 & 29 Sept. 1892, in H. G. Hutchinson ed., *Private Diaries of Sir*

on the next day – a delay of three months in evacuation. According to the settlement, the Government would pay for the cost of the prolongation of the IBEA's stay up to March 1893, but it rejected any of the liabilities incurred by the company in respect of Uganda.⁴⁹ These elaborate reservations did not really amount to much: in reserving to itself absolute freedom of action in regard to future measures, the Government actually claimed all the responsibilities that might present themselves. Rosebery was satisfied with this "compromise" (in his own words) because he considered that the postponement gave time to "elicit the real feeling of the country," which he and many believed was against evacuation.⁵⁰ Truly, when the Government's decision was made public through the press, there was a general agreement of opinion as to the meaning of the proposal. And, Gladstone confided to Harcourt: "I think the [cabinet] minute already adopted as the basis of a temporary proceeding leaves but very little choice to us as a government."⁵¹ Rosebery had won in the opening round of the Uganda crisis, and he began to take a tough line with opponents.

In October 1892 the suggestion was propounded of solving the Uganda difficulty by surrendering the country to the protected Sultan of Zanzibar, who was to receive a subsidy from the British Government. It was not clear from

Algernon West (London: John Murray, 1922), 61-62; and D. W. R. Bahlman ed., *The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1885-1906* (Hull: The University of Hull Press, 1993), 176.

49 PRO, Cab41/22/13, Minute Embodying the Decision of the Cabinet, 30 Sept. 1892. Also cf. BL, Add. MSS. 44648, f.4, Cabinet Minute by Gladstone, 29 Sept. 1892; and PRO, FO403/172/324, FO to IBEA, 30 Sept. 1892. When the Government's decision was announced on 30 September, it took the Directors of the Company by surprise, until its meaning was revealed through its form. See P. L. McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA*, 205.

50 Rosebery to Queen Victoria, 29 Sept. 1892, in G. E. Buckle ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 3rd S., vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1931), 159; PRO, FO2/61/3, Captain Macdonald to Sir G. Portal, 13 Dec. 1892; and *The Times*, 1 Oct. 1892, 9b. Rosebery's under-secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was not so pleased with the compromise as his master was. Grey to Dorothy, Oct. 1892, quoted in G. M. Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937), 60.

51 Gladstone to Harcourt, 8 Oct. 1892, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 105.

whom the original idea came,⁵² but all parties seemed to be favourable to this proposition. Rosebery regarded it to be the best policy because it, for all legal difficulties involved, was a cheap (for Britain), natural (for Zanzibar), and peacemaking (for Uganda) arrangement.⁵³ In his eye, this measure would practically procure for Britain a protectorate over the whole of the IBEA's territory. Preferring native government to direct control, Gladstone approved of the suggestion from a different point of view. However, it was later agreed to send a commissioner out to Uganda to advise on what course should be pursued, and with this arrangement the troublesome question was postponed for a season.

In early November, Rosebery proposed to send a commissioner to Uganda to superintend the IBEA's evacuation and to make arrangements for an organized government.⁵⁴ On 7 November, the cabinet nearly broke up over Uganda when it was decided to send a commissioner to examine the situation. The point of argument was the scope of the commissioner's empowerment, with Rosebery contending that as the commissioner required defence, his residence in Uganda would partake of the character of an occupation. On the other hand, the cabinet (under threat of Rosebery's resignation) agreed to send Sir Gerald Portal, the British Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar, as they thought that Portal's mission was to be based upon the recent communication from him which advocated that Uganda should be brought into union with Zanzibar.⁵⁵ Gladstone, Harcourt and Morley (the "Triumvirate" in Rosebery's

52 The IBEA, Salisbury, Harcourt, and even Rosebery were among the names that had been given in expounding this proposition. See PRO, Cab37/32/38, Rosebery's memorandum, 3 Nov. 1892; Edward W. Hamilton Diary, 26 Oct. 1892, in D. W. R. Bahlman, *op. cit.*, 176; P. L. McDermott, *op. cit.*, 276; W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 123; A. G. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, 198; and H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 118n.

53 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.25, Rosebery to Gladstone, 20 Oct. 1892; and *ibid.*, f.30, same to same, 28, Oct. 1892.

54 PRO, Cab37/32/38, Rosebery's memorandum, 3 Nov. 1892. Rosebery's wish for a commissioner was first expressed in the cabinet meeting of 4 September. See BL, Add. MSS. 44648, f.19, Cabinet minute by Gladstone, 4 Sept. 1892.

55 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.62, Gladstone to Rosebery, 9 Dec. 1892.

phrase) insisted that Portal be sent out to inquire and report, not to administer.⁵⁶ In fact, Portal was not very agreeable to the call for uniting Uganda and Zanzibar.⁵⁷ Furthermore, he was supposed to arrive in Uganda at the end of March 1893, which was precisely the moment when the extension of IBEA's stay came to an end. While he was "inquiring" he would presumably take some sort of temporary action in respect to public order. This would unmistakably involve imperial responsibilities. Therefore, to the retentionists, the mission and occupation were, by the logic of events, identical terms.⁵⁸ In the end it was agreed to dispatch a commissioner with the view generally expressed in the words of the Prime Minister, but the Foreign Secretary was able to override the cabinet and press ahead with his own policy.⁵⁹

Portal's appointment was a victory scored by Rosebery over his rivals.⁶⁰ Described by Lord Cromer (the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt) as "born to be an Oriental diplomatist and administrator,"⁶¹ Portal had publicly pledged himself against evacuation. A letter dated 14 September

56 Gladstone took care to strike out of the draft instructions to Portal the references to "administering" Uganda, which the Foreign Office had inserted. R. E. Robinson and John Gallagher, *op. cit.*, 319.

57 See PRO, Cab37/32/42, Portal to Rosebery, 3 Nov. 1892.

58 *The Times*, 7 Feb. 1893, Labouchere's letter, 11c.

59 Portal went out with the fullest powers: he had a staff with him expressly to make provisions for the administration of Uganda pending the consideration of his report. "It was certainly not in the contemplation of the cabinet that he should go as a mere reporter," Rosebery wrote to Gladstone on 4 February 1893 (BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.104). And, Rosebery held that Portal should remain in Uganda until the Government had decided on the final policy, and that he would then take the necessary measures to practice it with effect. BL, Add. MSS. 44203, f.4, Harcourt to Gladstone, 5 Jan. 1893. As Labouchere observed, the Portal mission might be one of inquiry, but under Rosebery's instructions, it necessarily invited an assumption of imperial responsibilities; and this would prejudice the case of complete withdrawal when it had to be considered. *The Times*, 23 Mar. 1893, Labouchere's letter, 8c.

60 At first sight, it appeared that the choice of a commissioner could hardly fall upon anyone else than Captain Lugard; but since the Government avowed to maintain strictly the attitude of waiting for his examination and report, Lugard's appointment would indicate that the policy of continued occupation had been predetermined.

61 Gerald Portal, *The British Mission to Uganda in 1893* (London: Edward Arnold, 1894), "Introduction" by Lord Cromer, xvi.

1892 from Portal to Rosebery was published in *The Times* on 1 December, seriously embarrassing the Government and breaching all official rules. And he, with impunity, even remarked before he departed that he could as well write his report at once in Zanzibar as he could in Uganda, for the essential facts had been exhausted.⁶² To consolidate Portal's position, Rosebery in a series of private letters instructed Portal to report against evacuation.⁶³ Such being the commissioner's instructions, "it may almost be said that the verdict was a foregone conclusion," Sir Harry Johnston, the special commissioner to the Uganda protectorate, remembered.⁶⁴ The Portal mission was much canvassed, and Rosebery's colleagues gradually committed themselves thereby to his views.⁶⁵ Ministerial conflicts subsided since the end of 1892,

⁶² But, an immediate report was precisely what was not wanted. J. W. Gregory, *The Foundation of British East Africa* (London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1901), 201.

⁶³ See Margery Perham ed., *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, 431; Anthony Low, "British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question: October - December 1892," *The Uganda Journal*, vol. 18, No. 2 (1954, Kampala), 98; and R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 274.

⁶⁴ Harry Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, vol. I, 234. Lord Lugard also had such views. See F. D. Lugard, *The Rise of Our East African Empire* (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1893), vol. II, 565. Also cf. R. B. Brett (Viscount Esher) journals, 6 Dec. 1892, in M. V. Brett ed., *Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher* (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1934), vol. I, 166.

⁶⁵ In November, Portal suggested, through Rosebery, throwing over the IBEA and undertaking the settlement of Uganda from Zanzibar for half the price of the company (i.e., buying up the IBEA at half its face value). Both Gladstone and Harcourt welcomed the communication. A. E. West put in his diary: "If it had been made in October, they would both have gone out of their senses with rage. What a healer Time is! And Rosebery will get his way." West diary, 21 Nov. 1892, in H. G. Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, 82. In January 1893, Harcourt complained to Campbell-Bannerman that they were "actually in the condition of a householder whose weekly bills were at the mercy of a French chef, over whom he had no control." Quoted in J. A. Spender, *The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, G.C.B.* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923), vol. I, 138. Also cf. BL, Add. MSS. 41219, f.23, Harcourt to Campbell-Bannerman, 21 Sept. 1892. In February 1893 Gladstone refused to circulate a memorandum Rosebery had prepared on Portal's mission. The Foreign Secretary fought back in his speech on 1 March at the Royal Colonial Institute, saying: "There is another ground on which the extension of our Empire is greatly attacked, and the attack comes from a quarter nearer home." Quoted in R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 284. On 21 March, when Sir E. Grey vigorously

with the Uganda question becoming one of administrative technicalities.

Portal reached Uganda on 17 March 1893. On 1 April, he hoisted the British flag there, and had the IBEA's flag hauled down,⁶⁶ making the organization of an effective administration a matter of pressing importance. He also enlisted 450 Sudanese, without alluding to the terms of service. Indeed, during his short sojourn (2 months) in Uganda – apparently insufficient to enable him to acquire an adequate knowledge of the complicated questions with which he had to deal – Portal laid the foundations of a permanent government. To forestall the other Powers, he reached a provisional agreement with King Mwanga on 29 May, with the object of securing British protection.⁶⁷ Convinced of the need of this protectorate, Portal had taken with him a staff large enough to enable him to leave some of its members behind to assume the political control over Uganda before the creation of a proper administration. When Portal started on his return journey, he left Captain J. R. L. McDonald – a retentionist without doubt – temporarily

defended Rosebery's Uganda policy in the House of Commons, the Government bench uttered murmurs, helplessly. Rosebery obviously had his way over Uganda since 1893.

66 Acutely aware of symbolic significance, Mwanga and his followers requested to fly their own flag. Viera Pawliková-Vilhanová, *History of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Protest in the Kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro, 1890-1899* (Prague: The Oriental Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1988), 145. Also cf. BL, Add. MSS. 60345, Journal of W. H. Williams, 3 Feb. 1892.

67 See PRO, FO2/60/468, Provisional Agreement between King Mwanga of Uganda and Sir Gerald Portal, 29 May 1893. Also Edward Hertslet ed., *The Map of Africa by Treaty* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909), vol. I, 393-395; and J. R. L. MacDonald, "Uganda: Three Lectures," in R. F. Edwards ed., *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineer* (London: The Royal Engineers Institute, 1897), 45. In this agreement it was recorded that the IBEA had definitely withdrawn from Uganda, and that, pending the decision of the British Government on the whole question of Uganda, Mwanga had bound himself to certain specified conditions, and entered into certain engagements; one of the engagements was that he would make no treaties or agreements of any kind with any European without the consent and approval of Britain. It is argued that Portal, without much enthusiasm, advised against the abandonment of Uganda in view of treaty obligation. See H. M. Thomas, "More Early Treaties in Uganda, 1891-96," *The Uganda Journal*, vol. 13, no. 2 (Sept. 1949, Kampala), 173.

in charge.⁶⁸ Back in London, Portal condemned in his final report in sweeping terms the actions generally of the IBEA and its officers,⁶⁹ and recommended a British sphere of influence in Uganda. Having only a limited acquaintance with the local situations, he asserted that a declaration of protectorate would be "the simplest course." Portal did not, indeed, venture to propose the immediate declaration of a protectorate, but he indicated no advantage in delay.

Portal's draft report arrived at the Foreign Office at the end of August, but Rosebery did not bring it to the cabinet until the end of the year, perhaps for the purpose of avoiding immediate excitement. And, its publication was deferred until after Portal's death in January 1894, making it even easier to defend the doctrine of annexation.⁷⁰ In fact, Rosebery's colleagues made no difficulty about the report, and the Prime Minister accepted it resignedly, only noting that the IBEA's demands for compensation would be a great trouble. The Uganda event was an instructive example of Gladstone's last ministry: for all that he commanded a majority on the issue, Gladstone was not able to make his will prevail. Ultimately Gladstone acknowledged that the fatal element in the appointment of Rosebery to the Foreign Office in 1892 was "his total gross misconception of the relative position of the two offices [they] respectively held and...his really outrageous assumption of power apart from

68 J. R. L. McDonald was an Indian railway officer, who had been sent to East Africa in 1892 to survey the projected Uganda railway.

69 For the IBEA's defence see PRO, FO2/57/239, IBEA to FO, 4 May 1893.

70 Portal died as a result of a disease contracted on his mission. For Portal's final report see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1894 LVII, Africa No. 2 [C.7303], Portal to Rosebery, 1 Nov. 1893, 29-55; also PRO, FO2/60/515 and FO403/184/161. Much speculation arose as to whether Rosebery himself had rewritten the report. See F. D. Lugard, *The Story of the Uganda Protectorate* (London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1900), 133; *The Quarterly Review*, vol. 194, no. 387, "Negro Nileland and Uganda" (July 1901, London), 26; R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 285-86; and E. R. Vere-Hodge, *Imperial British East Africa Company* (London: Macmillan, 1960), 81-82. To clear his name, Rosebery wrote to Gladstone in December 1893: "I have considered myself bound in honour not to look at [Portal's report] while it was circulated to the Cabinet, and, consequently, I have only a very secret acquaintance with it." BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.218, Rosebery to Gladstone, 27 Dec. 1893.

the First Minister and from the Cabinet.”⁷¹ After having exhausted his influence over foreign policy, Gladstone resigned and retired in March 1894. And, he failed to make Victoria act on his advice as to the head of government: quite to the contrary, the Queen sent for his opponent. Rosebery succeeded Gladstone as Prime Minister on 4 March 1894, and Kimberley became Foreign Secretary. The Uganda issue had since become a question of timing for establishing a protectorate.

III. The Uganda Question in the Context of National Politics

In the audience Victoria granted to Gladstone after the Liberals' victory in the general election of 1892, the Queen demanded the new premier to “maintain and promote the honour and welfare of her Great Empire.”⁷² And she especially expressed the wish that Rosebery would take charge of foreign affairs.⁷³ Soon after Rosebery took office as Foreign Secretary, Victoria anxiously requested him to nullify all the call for the abandonment of Uganda.⁷⁴ This Rosebery did without the slightest hesitation because he himself desired this. Admittedly, Victoria's imperial thinking was not influential in Gladstone's foreign policy, but it was usually effective in one way or another, as it was very informative as long as the public opinion was concerned. Victoria's strong intention to interfere with Gladstone's foreign policy always brought home to the Liberals' difficulties with imperial politics, home and abroad.

The pacification of the Uganda crisis was not possible until Parliament

71 John Brooke and Mary Sorensen eds., *The Prime Ministers' Papers: W. E. Gladstone*, vol. I: *Autobiographica* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), 135.

72 Victoria to Gladstone, 12 Aug. 1892, in Philip Guedalla ed., *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1933), vol. II, 437.

73 Prince of Wales to Rosebery, 14 Aug. 1892, quoted in Lord Crewe, *op. cit.*, 401.

74 Victoria to Rosebery, 28 Sept. 1892, in G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, 158. After his audience with the Queen on 9 October, Harcourt reported to Gladstone: “She is not really at all keen for African conquest or annexation but not unnaturally dislikes the idea of a retrograde movement of her flag.” BL, Add. MSS. 44202, f.257, Harcourt to Gladstone, 9 Oct. 1892.

and the directors of the IBEA had dealt with the problem of the transfer of authority from the company to the state. A parliamentary campaign was initially unlikely, because, as mentioned above, the Houses adjourned from August 1892 till January 1893 after having witnessed the resignation of the Conservative Government. Since the cabinet could not settle the question themselves, an approach to the wider public presented itself as a tenable solution. Harcourt, who devised the three months' compromise,⁷⁵ was glad that, owing to the delay in evacuation until 31 March 1893, the Uganda question could be brought before Parliament. However, by the simple appointment of a commissioner, whose report could not reach London before the end of August, the Government effectively removed Uganda from the field of parliamentary discussion in the session of 1893. A premature discussion in the debate on the Queen's Address was thus avoided, since the Government could give no decision on the issue before the autumn sittings, as Sir Edward Grey, the F.O. Under-Secretary, had pronounced.

Nonetheless, escape from the parliamentary arena was never easy for the rulers. When the Government's Uganda policy was first discussed in January 1893, most inquiries were made about to what extent was Portal empowered (or what was he actually instructed to do in Uganda), and what was the Government to do with Uganda during the interval between the IBEA's evacuation and the production of Portal's report. Those questions, which were connected mutually, were delicate and difficult in that the arrival of Portal in Uganda could only take place on the eve of the withdrawal of the company. These were matters that bore on what the Government was to do after the Portal mission; they were questions to which the ministers could barely answer or answer consistently. Joseph Chamberlain, the leader of the Liberal Unionists, denounced the Government's "policy of inquiry" as a "policy of postponement," rightly understanding that Portal was to administer Uganda in the meantime.⁷⁶ Overlooking the fact that Portal as commissioner was in possession of powers that would enable him officially to exercise legitimate

⁷⁵ See Harcourt to his son, 3 Oct. 1892, quoted in A. G. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, 197.

⁷⁶ *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Uganda," 20 March 1893, Joseph Chamberlain, 596. Chamberlain joined the Conservative Government in 1895 as Colonial Secretary.

influence, Gladstone was terribly embarrassed when he said that Portal would perform his task “unofficially.” For this he apologized later.⁷⁷ It was only after a lively debate, a night’s reflection and consultation with Rosebery, that Gladstone made a grudging and guarded admission that Portal would have to fill, on 1 April 1893, the administrative vacancy created by the withdrawal of the IBEA.⁷⁸ Giving publicity to the Uganda issue evidently helped to promote Rosebery’s case, an outcome that he had expected and the Radicals had not.

It was an open secret that Rosebery was at variance with his cabinet colleagues so far as foreign affairs were concerned. A publicity campaign, by any party, for foreign policy in Parliament only exacerbated the difficulties in their teamwork. During the 1893 sessions, speakers on both sides of the Houses insisted in different tones upon the obvious fact that Rosebery was allowed to carry out a policy which none of his colleagues acknowledged or defended, while no attempt was made on the part of the Government to explain or minimize the anomaly. Rosebery often made replies in which he appeared to separate himself from the decision of his colleagues, for in one sentence he spoke of “I” and in another of “we”: he seemed to suggest that some agitation should take place in order that the decision of the Government could be altered. In fact, the Foreign Secretary was from time to time accused of having used utterances in and out of Parliament for the purpose of putting pressure on reluctant colleagues to fall in with his scheme.

Shrewd politicians had quickly detected that a forward policy in Uganda was already on its way. A. J. Balfour, the leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, said on 31 January 1893: “I have nothing but congratulations to offer [the Government] on the policy which I understand they have adopted.”⁷⁹ By this he demonstrated that the Government, by the very fact of

⁷⁷ *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, “Uganda,” 6 Feb. 1893, W. E. Gladstone, 556.

⁷⁸ See BL, Add. MSS. 44290, f.104, Rosebery to Gladstone, 4 Feb. 1893; *ibid.*, f.110, Answer to Chamberlain’s Question: Draft by Rosebery, 5 Feb. 1893; and *The Times*, 1 June 1893, “Sir Gerald Portal in Uganda,” 9d. Harcourt had previously persuaded Gladstone to settle with Rosebery for replying to Chamberlain. See BL, Add. MSS. 44203, f.4, Harcourt to Gladstone, 5 Jan. 1893.

⁷⁹ *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, “Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech,” 1 Jan. 1893, A. J. Balfour, 90.

sending out Portal, had committed themselves to a policy of retaining control over Uganda. That the Government desired information was to many observers a mere subterfuge, for there was no particular need for information to decide the question whether Britain was to organize Uganda or not. The precise details of organization no doubt demanded local knowledge, but it was the British agents on the spot rather than the Government at home who needed to attain and apply such knowledge. To sharpen this impression, Grey stated in Parliament that the instructions to Portal gave him considerable latitude, and were open to interpretation.⁸⁰ And so, no answer was given by the ruling bench to the question whether Portal had a right to hoist the British flag in Uganda. It was even assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the majority of the cabinet were infected with a jingoistic sentiment.

The position of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons was weak. It had a majority of 40 only and many internal divisions. A vocal group of Radicals, led by Henry Labouchere, attacked vehemently the policy of their own government in Uganda.⁸¹ But, their protests were frequently ignored and their questions often only partially answered. Labouchere condemned Rosebery for "playing the part Palmerston formerly played with the help of Tories against his own party."⁸² Leaving out the problem of motive, Rosebery did win the support of the Conservatives to enforce his plan in Uganda. Kimberley, an imperialist sympathizer, observed in September 1892: "How shall we fare in the House of Commons, where we propose a vote for Uganda? Shall we not be abandoned by a considerable number of our own party, and carry the vote only by the help of the Tories?"⁸³ Under such circumstances, Rosebery actually felt more in agreement with Chamberlain (a Liberal defector to the Conservative Party in 1895) on the subject of Uganda than any other member

80 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 12, "Sir Gerald Portal's Mission," 1 June 1893, Edward Grey, 1733.

81 For further discussion see R. J. Hind, *Henry Labouchere and the Empire, 1880-1905* (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 15-19. Labouchere had divided the House of Commons at least 50 times against providing money for the Sudanese expeditions.

82 W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries* (London: Martin Secker, 1919), Part I: The Scramble for Africa, 81 (26 Oct. 1892).

83 Kimberley's memorandum (India Office), 21 Sept. 1892, in John Powell ed., *Liberal by Principle: The Politics of John Wodehouse First Earl of Kimberley, 1843-1902*, 204.

of his own party.⁸⁴

On the other hand, the Conservatives were ready to offer their co-operation along Rosebery's line on Uganda. This was conspicuously evidenced by the fact that soon after Rosebery had assumed the premiership Balfour suggested to Harcourt an "arrangement between the two front benches" on Uganda's finance.⁸⁵ Having found that parliamentary debates on the Uganda question actually enhanced Rosebery's position, Harcourt, before long, deeply regretted bringing the case to the Houses,⁸⁶ made possible by his proposal of three months' delay in the withdrawal of the IBEA. There had not been any papers or despatches communicated to either House of Parliament with regard to the proceedings in Uganda since the departure of Portal from that country until May 1895. But, the Opposition did not press for them, either: they were really content to see Rosebery have his own way. In fact, the Conservatives, as a political strategy, were exceedingly reserved and careful in bringing the Uganda issue for discussion before the Houses from 1893 to 1895. "I do not remember any matter of similar importance which has been treated with so much reserve," Salisbury remarked in 1895.⁸⁷ Undoubtedly, the Conservatives' support of Rosebery in the form of parliamentary maneuver would only increase the difficulties his colleagues were raising for him on foreign affairs. And, indeed, for the Conservatives' well-disposed reticence in Parliament, Rosebery was always grateful.

The Uganda issue gave rise to another political question concerning the legal and moral relationship between the Government and the chartered companies. It was fairly argued that engagements taken by a chartered com-

84 Rosebery remarked so to Edward Hamilton on 31 March 1893. R. R. James, *op. cit.*, 284. He wrote to the Queen a week earlier: "The discussion on Uganda went off very well on Monday and was distinguished chiefly by the powerful and eloquent speech of Mr. Chamberlain." Rosebery to Victoria, 22 March 1893, in Buckle, *op. cit.*, 242.

85 BL, Add. MSS. 49696, f.213, Balfour to Harcourt, 12 March 1894.

86 On as early as 22 March 1893, Harcourt said in the House of Commons: "I will not enter further into these matters. I do not think there would be any advantage in having a third Uganda debate." *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Bill," 22 March 1893, William Harcourt, 779.

87 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 34, "Uganda," 24 May 1895, Lord Salisbury, 217.

pany – acting as an imperial and official instrument – towards native rulers and peoples were binding on the national honour.⁸⁸ The Foreign Office, under Rosebery, held that the position of the IBEA was that of an administering body in the dominions of a sovereign bound by treaty engagements; particularly so because the nature of the mission of the IBEA, unlike that of the other chartered companies in Africa, was essentially political.⁸⁹ On the part of the IBEA, it continued the territorial occupation in Uganda mainly on account of the Government's railway policy. The company had shown much "public spirit" in the task they undertook, as *The Times* recognized.⁹⁰ It carried out the policy of treaty-making, followed by effective occupation, with the knowledge and sanction of the Government. And, all the treaties contracted had been submitted to the Foreign Office, drawing the Government into larger and wider responsibilities. Thus, for all practical purposes, the work of the IBEA was thought to be identified with national policy. Hence the claim that Britain was to hold Uganda after the retirement of the IBEA.

Although both Britain and Germany recognised the importance of Uganda as a potential trade centre, but its commercial prospects were difficult to judge.⁹¹ The country had been ravaged by war, pestilence and famine for such a long time that it was impossible to expect any revival of trade until matters had become settled. Edward Grey was actually justifying the "Victorian" taste or need for imperial acquisition when he argued: "We do not

88 George Taubman-Goldie, "Sphere of Influence," *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 32, no. 190 (Dec. 1892, London), 984. This was to say that the chartered flag involved the imperial flag.

89 PRO, FO2/74/261, FO to IBEA, 4 Aug. 1894; FO2/75/147, same to same; and FO2/97/115, Report of Proceedings of Special Meeting of the Shareholders of the IBEA, 27 March 1895. The company had gone to Uganda for its own purpose, but political exigencies arose out of imperial considerations, which made territorial control the only interest that had been served. For the political necessity which led to the company's occupation of Uganda and the steps taken for evacuation, see FO2/58/5, Appendix A: "The Company's Position in Uganda," 18 May 1893.

90 *The Times*, 17 March 1893, "Uganda," 9e.

91 The exponents of commercial interests in Uganda are the Chambers of Commerce and the Company on the East Coast of Africa, which would gain a direct advantage on the increase of custom dues at the coast if Uganda was retained. However, the question of the commercial value of Uganda had not been fairly tested yet, nor had it received adequate attention.

know what the commercial value of Uganda may be in the future. It may not be much now, but the question is as to the future."⁹² As a matter of fact, political, rather than commercial, considerations underlay the call – made by politicians as well as capitalists – for the retention of Uganda.⁹³

Missionaries also helped to strengthen the annexationist argument. For 15 years Christian missionaries had been at work in Uganda, and their success was exceptional. Missionary interference with politics in Uganda was powerful: the missionaries on both sides, Catholic and Protestant, were the veritable political leaders of their respective factions.⁹⁴ Already Bishop Tucker of Uganda and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) had taken action in 1891 to delay the IBEA's withdrawal for one year. And, the public campaign made by the missionary organizations in Britain to induce the Government to take over from the company responsibility for Uganda aroused great enthusiasm throughout the country.⁹⁵ Even the Archbishop of Canterbury himself ap-

92 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Civil Services and Revenue Departments, 1892-1893 (Supplementary Estimates)," 21 March 1893, Edward Grey, 728.

93 Before a special general meeting of the London Chamber of Commerce, held on 5 November 1892, Captain F. D. Lugard delivered an address on "Uganda: Its Abandonment or Retention Considered from the Commercial Point of View." In the speech, Lugard said: "I think that in holding this country advantage runs parallel with duty." And, he emphasized the question of duty in his conclusion. See *The Times*, 7 Nov. 1892, "The Commercial Importance of Uganda," 12a.

94 Several grave charges against the CMS of interference in the conduct of public affairs had been made by the British agents on the spot. See PRO, FO2/60/309, W. H. Williams to G. Portal, 25 March 1893; PRO, FO2/60/439, Portal to Rosebery, 24 May 1893; and BL, Add. MSS. 54564, f.52, Portal to W. H. Williams, 2 April 1893. For further discussion on missionaries' involvement in Ugandan politics see H. B. Thomas, "The Mission to Uganda in 1893 – in Memory," *The Uganda Journal*, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1953, Kampala), 6; and H. B. Hansen, *Mission, Church and State in a Colonial Setting: Uganda 1890-1925* (London: Heinemann, 1984), 59.

95 C. P. Groves, "Missionary and Humanitarian Aspects of Imperialism from 1870 to 1914," in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan eds., *Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, vol. I: *The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 474. There was an assiduous Christian missionary interest lobbying for a continued British presence in Uganda. For the numerous resolutions presented publicly by the missionary societies see PRO, FO84/2192. On 6 October 1892 Kimberley wrote to Harcourt: "The British

pealed for aid to enable the IBEA to remain. That the lives of the British missionaries would be placed in great danger in case Uganda was abandoned and given up to disorder was a pervasive worry. Yet, different interpretations of the original cause of the danger in consequence of British abandonment distinguished the retentionists from the evacuationists. On 23 September 1892, a deputation of the CMS visited the Foreign Office and gained a promise from Rosebery to lay their views before the cabinet. Rosebery's reply to them was somewhat ambiguous, but very revealing in the context of cabinet struggle. Here again, religious considerations were inextricably intertwined with political interests; and the danger involved herein was, as Harcourt observed, more political than religious.⁹⁶

The moral cause for keeping Uganda was abolishing the slave trade in the country, believed to be the most important single factor in persuading British public opinion to insist on the retention of Uganda.⁹⁷ Uganda had been

public is easily stirred by the cry of extension of the Gospel of peace to the blacks with its attendant blessing of firewater and bellicose missionaries. Throw in the Anti-Slavery crusaders and the 'Empire' Jingoese, and you have a formidable body of agitation." Kimberley to Harcourt, 6 Oct. 1892, in John Powell, *op. cit.*, 204. And Portal in his final report said that British direct administration of Uganda was the solution that would recommend itself most strongly to the missionaries. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1894 LVII, Africa No. 2 [C.7303], Portal to Rosebery, 1 Nov. 1893, 32.

96 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892. For instance, the Catholic missionaries had never been opposed to an enlightened British protectorate, as had been pretended, without shadow of proof or probability. See Catholic Union of Great Britain, *Memorandum on the War in Uganda, 1892* (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1894), 24.

97 Anthony Low, *op. cit.*, 96. Salisbury once said to Lord Cromer that the British people were quite indifferent to the question of imperial control, unless some startling question appealing to their humanity arose. Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring), *Modern Egypt* (London: Macmillan, 1908), vol. I, 387n. The objects of the founders of the IBEA were believed to be humanitarian, though it was hoped that it might pay its way. But, Harcourt pointed out that philanthropic enterprises overseas usually caused far greater evils than they cured. PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892. The British Government's attitude towards the slave trade in Africa was not always consistent, particularly after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. During the late 1880s and early 1890s the Government refrained from publishing the reports of the British ministers and consuls in foreign countries relating to the slave trade, which for three quarters of a century had been issued annually by the Foreign Office. PRO, FO83/1239,

a great centre of the slave trade before the IBEA's occupation.⁹⁸ And, it was believed that massacre and war would follow British evacuation, and caused vast numbers to be sold into slavery again. Hence, the retreat of the British meant to the philanthropists (and the imperialists) the withdrawal of civilization, which would inevitably result in the slave trade, presently extinct in Uganda, assuming its old dimensions. Salisbury practically made the best use of this moral justification to uphold Rosebery's forward policy towards Uganda. He said: "We have never before such a chance of crushing the slave trade in its home, and we never shall have it again. If we keep the line of the Nile, and make the railway, the slave trade must die out."⁹⁹ And Rosebery was actually encouraging the Anti-Slavery Society to agitate for retention when he said to the representatives of the CMS on 23 September 1892 that the references to slavery would be a great element in the deputation's case. On 20 October Rosebery met a deputation organized by the Anti-Slavery Society at his office, and gave them a much more thrilling reply (a strong expression of

British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Rosebery, 17 April 1893.

98 See C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, *Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1882), vol. I, 186. The slaves worked for the IBEA for wages with which they could redeem themselves; between January 1890 and August 1893, some 223 slaves bought their freedom in this way. See M. D. E. Nwulia, *Britain and Slavery in East Africa* (Washington D. C.: Three Continents Press, 1975), 173-174.

99 Salisbury to Mr. Bosworth Smith, 7 Nov. 1892, published in *The Times*, 15 Nov. 1892, 5e. There were many (inc. Salisbury) who believed that in Uganda the British had obligations to fulfil imposed upon them by the Brussels Act of 1890 (esp. Ch. I, Art. I & III), which provided that it was necessary to construct railways and administer the country, and to act on parallel lines with other countries in the endeavour to suppress the slave trade. See the Resolution of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society Meeting of 3 June 1892, published in *The Times*, 24 Oct. 1892, 13f; PRO, FO83/1240, British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Rosebery, 6 June 1893; and BL, Add. MSS. 43915, f.131, Lugard to C. W. Dilke, 1 Dec. 1893. The slave trade could not be suppressed in East Africa so long as caravan trading continued, a fact that explained the necessity of a railway for revolutionizing the existing evil system. See F. D. Lugard, *British East Africa and Uganda* (London: Chapman & Hill, 1892), 47. For the connection between the abolition of the slave trade and the construction of the Mombasa railway, see PRO, FO83/1240, Report on Mombasa Victoria Lake Railway Survey, 1893, esp. Ch. 8, 98-101; and FO83/1378, C. L. Hill's Memorandum Respecting an Uganda Railway in Regard to Slave Trade, Expense, and Control, 13 May 1895.

concurrence) than the one he gave less than a month before to the CMS. On the other hand, all the talk about the abolition of slavery appeared insincere and hypocritical to those in favour of British evacuation of Uganda, who noted that British Zanzibar was just the seat of slavery; and they saw that the projected Mombasa railway – allegedly the best means to get rid of slavery and the slave trade – must be built by slaves, since free labour was not available, let alone expensive.¹⁰⁰

In a sense, the Uganda business was only a symbol of how the English people were enthusiastic for imperial greatness in the late Victorian age. As *The Times* commented in October 1892, "It is rather curious to observe how little [about the actual physical conditions of the British occupation of Uganda] are understood or investigated by many of those who eagerly take sides in the controversy."¹⁰¹ Evidently, the mass of British public opinion in 1892 was either indifferent or, at least, undecided; and there was not much support in each camp, as politicians were unaware whether the electorate would agree to abandoning Uganda to foreign rivals or spending more money to keep it.¹⁰² However, the differences of opinion on the question were less serious than they looked at first sight, for no party had really formulated a policy of unconditional evacuation. Indeed, both the former and the present governments were *believed* to be committed to a certain extent in the opposite direction, the difference of opinion being on the time and manner of making British occupation effective, rather than on the question of occupation pure

100 J. G. Rogers, "Shall Uganda be Retained?," *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 33, no. 192 (Feb. 1893, London), 233.

101 *The Times*, 18 Oct. 1892, 7a. Therefore the audiences Lugard addressed did not usually give him full scope, as he had to deal merely with geographical or commercial questions.

102 Anthony Low, *op. cit.*, 82; and Frederick Madden and David Fieldhouse eds., *Select Documents on the Constitutional History of the British Empire and Commonwealth*, Vol. V: *The Dependent Empire and Ireland, 1840-1900* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 620n. *The Times* reported on 30 September 1892: "At the present moment, the Question of Uganda suffers, in common with most others, from the political apathy following a general election." *The Times*, 30 Sept. 1892, "The Affairs of Uganda," 7b. By this time the press had taken up the question, but it only began to attract some attention in mid-October. *The Times*, 18 Oct. 1892, "Uganda," 7b.

and simple. Thus, when the cabinet decided in September to delay the IBEA's withdrawal until the end of March 1893, Rosebery was optimistic that the public opinion against evacuation would come to light in time. And so Kimberley believed.¹⁰³

On his return to Britain in early October 1892, Lugard published a long defence in *The Times* of his acts in Uganda and of the whole policy of annexation.¹⁰⁴ He then made a tour of England and Scotland to speak to enthusiastic audiences, and was zealously supported by the press as a whole. Meanwhile, after arriving at London at the end of October, Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, immediately offered the Foreign Office to administer Uganda for 25,000/ a year.¹⁰⁵ Many Liberals welcomed it heartily, but the Foreign Secretary was not convinced.¹⁰⁶ Rhodes's offer was finally refused, and the public was frantically stirred by the cry for annexation. The proposal for the absorption of Uganda into the protectorate of Zanzibar aroused further controversy without result.¹⁰⁷ The retreat from the Sudan and the tragic death of General Gordon in 1885 had taught the British nation a lesson, skillfully played upon by the anti-evacuationists, which dictated that the Government had to stay in Uganda, one way or another.

The agitation for annexing Uganda grew daily and reached its height in November 1892. On 7 November *The Times* reported: "Evidence of the true

103 Kimberley wrote to Harcourt: "I am afraid we shall find it extremely difficult to get out of Uganda, when the three months expire." Kimberley to Harcourt, 6 Oct. 1892, in Powell, *op. cit.* 204. Blunt put in his diary on 26 October: "Gladstone weakly consented to [Rosebery's] putting in the clause granting a three months' respite, and at once got up an agitation in the press." W. S. Blunt, *op. cit.*, 81.

104 *The Times*, 8 Oct. 1892, 9e-f.

105 See PRO, Cab37/31/34, Cecil Rhodes to Rosebery, Oct. 1892. Rhodes intended at his own expense to extend a telegraph line from Salisbury through Nyasaland and up to a point in Uganda. (PRO, FO83/1244, Cecil Rhodes to Commissioner Johnston, 30 April 1893.) This was all part of his great objective of linking up the Sudan and Egypt.

106 PRO, Cab37/32/38, Rosebery's memorandum, 3 Nov. 1892.

107 It was feared that extending the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Zanzibar over Uganda would place the country under the operation of Mohammedan law and promote slavery in East Africa. BL, Add. MSS. 43915, f.131, Lugard to C. W. Dilke, 1 Dec. 1893. Also cf. *The Annual Register*, 1893 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1893), 449.

sentiment of the nation upon the question of Uganda is accumulating with satisfactory rapidity."¹⁰⁸ When the official announcement of the appointment of a commissioner for Uganda was declared on 23 November, the British people satisfied themselves that the Government had made up its mind to hold the country. After this Uganda quickly got out of the coverage of the newspaper, and almost disappeared in the journalism of 1894-95.¹⁰⁹ When Rosebery assumed the premiership and took steps to annex Uganda, it was widely deemed by the press natural and logical.¹¹⁰ Whether the decided expression of public opinion had much influence on the cabinet was not clear, but it certainly enabled Rosebery to prosecute his policy energetically.

IV. The Uganda Business *under the Rosebery Government, 1894-95*

When Rosebery became Prime Minister he interested himself primarily in foreign affairs as before, and ministers went their own way as well.¹¹¹ Harcourt, the main spokesman of the Liberal Government in the House of Commons since Gladstone's resignation, remained insistent in his opposition to Roseberianism.¹¹² The announcement of a protectorate over Uganda was

108 *The Times*, 7 Nov. 1892, "The Uganda Question," 9c. For public resolutions in favour of the retention of Uganda, see PRO, FO84/2192.

109 Lugard published *The Rise of Our East African Empire* (2 vols.) in 1893 as an effort to enhance annexationism. Under the auspices of the Catholic Union of Great Britain, *Notes on Uganda and Memorandum on the War in Uganda, 1892* were issued before the publication of Portal's report to strengthen the retentionist cause. And by the end of the year the IBEA's apologia *British East Africa or IBEA*, compiled by its secretary P. L. McDermott, appeared.

110 For an outspoken illustration see *The Punch* (London), 21 April 1894, "The Black Baby".

111 For further see Jeffrey Butler, *The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968), 26.

112 Kimberley, the new Foreign Secretary, once complained to Lord Dufferin, the ambassador to France: "Harcourt insists, very naturally, in having his finger in the pie. It is not the same as it was when Rosebery was at the Foreign Office. He is very difficult to get on with." Kimberley to Dufferin, 3 July 1894, quoted in C. J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign*

now viewed as a bomb that would blow up the cabinet. Rosebery seemed to be worried about a ministerial crisis, but not hesitant about carrying out his plan. On 17 June 1894 the Prime Minister drafted a memorandum declaring "the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile," and he was fully prepared (and more devoted than his Foreign Secretary was) to exact a recognition of this principle by the Great Powers. A closer union of Uganda with the British Empire was clearly suggested herein. While on the other hand, Harcourt began to show a defeatist attitude on the subject of Uganda, expecting the triumph for Rosebery to come to end the entire quarrel.¹¹³

In the Rosebery Government, Harcourt was considerably isolated and ill-informed in regard of foreign policy. On 22 April 1894, Harcourt registered a protest, accusing the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of transacting foreign affairs in the House of Lords and of guarding against his intervention in them.¹¹⁴ He complained particularly that he was kept ignorant of the views of the Foreign Office upon the Uganda question. Kimberley was forced to admit that a clear understanding of the cabinet as to the Uganda policy was wanting and could not possibly be achieved.¹¹⁵ As no one now talked about clearing out of Uganda, Harcourt was naturally left in the dark when technical details were discussed between Kimberley and Rosebery for taking the country under British protection. After all, Harcourt acquiesced without making much difficulty, comforting himself that he might be allowed to

Policy 1878-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), vol. I, 184-185.

113 Harcourt was quoted as saying: "I hope to God it will be so; and then there will be an end to the whole thing." Hamilton diary, 7 April 1894, in David Brooks, *op. cit.*, 131. Also cf. Rosebery to Victoria, 7 April 1894, in G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, 389. With Harcourt giving in, Rosebery was able to happily record in early 1895 an improvement in his relationship with the leader of the radicals. See BL, Add. MSS. 48612B, f.34, Rosebery to E. Hamilton, 22 March 1895.

114 A complication arose in March 1894 over the proposal to transfer to King Leopold II of Belgium (and Congo) British sphere of influence of the Upper Nile on a long lease. Rosebery at first did not desire to inform Harcourt of these negotiations, but was later persuaded by Kimberley of the necessity of doing so. Lord Crewe, *op. cit.*, 447-448. A similar situation developed a year later when it was proposed to appoint a committee of experts to consider the Uganda railway. Kimberley to Rosebery, 31 March 1895, in John Powell, *op. cit.*, 230.

115 Kimberley to Rosebery, 15 May 1894, in Powell, *op. cit.*, 221.

proceed with his domestic reforms.

On 4 February 1894, Major Douglas Owen, sent out to counteract Belgian expeditions along the Nile, reached the river from Uganda and raised the British flag at Wadelai. Three weeks later, Rosebery demanded a protectorate over Uganda for the first time in his memorandum of 25 February. On 22 March, the retention of Uganda was formally determined by the cabinet. On 10 April – a month after Rosebery had become Prime Minister – the Portal Report was presented to Parliament, and two days later Rosebery announced that the Government had decided on annexation.¹¹⁶ The declaration was agreed upon without difficulty, and the protectorate was, so to speak, ratified. The Government formally proclaimed a protectorate over Uganda on 18 June, under and by virtue of the agreement between Portal and King Mwanga on 29 May 1893.¹¹⁷ A year later, on 15 June 1895, the Government established another protectorate covering all the territories in East Africa under the influence of Britain, lying between Uganda and the coast, and between the River Juba and the northern frontier of the German sphere.¹¹⁸

Although Portal laid down in express terms the importance of making a railway to Uganda, the subject remained one of great complexity from many points of view. The failure of the Government to follow up a policy of railway construction in Uganda was the reason why the IBEA was unable to continue

116 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 23, "Uganda," 12 April 1894, Lord Rosebery (House of Lords), 181. The same announcement was made by Harcourt, much embarrassed, at the same time in the House of Commons. *Ibid.*, 223.

117 See *The London Gazette*, 19 June 1894; *The Dublin Gazette*, 22 June 1894; or *The Times*, 20 June 1894, 13d. This protectorate comprised the territory known as Uganda proper, bounded by the territories known as Usoga, Unyoro, Ankoli and Koki. E. J. L. Berkeley was appointed British Commissioner and Consul General for the protectorate of Uganda and the adjoining territories. The charter and concessions of the IBEA were to form the subject of future discussion, as between the Government and the company, and between the company and the Sultan of Zanzibar, respectively; but they would be dealt with as a whole. See *Parliamentary Papers*, 1895 LXXI, Africa No. 4 [C.7647], "Correspondence Respecting the Retirement of the IBEA," presented to Parliament in April 1895.

118 See *British and Foreign State Papers, 1894-1895*, vol. 87 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1900), "Notification of the Establishment of a British Protectorate over Certain Territories in East Africa," 15 June 1895, 1036.

to hold the country. This was one of the few IBEA's complaints that had been justified by both the Liberal and Conservative governments.¹¹⁹ But, in Rosebery's opinion, the Uganda railway was not a work of primary necessity as a matter of imperial policy; and, perhaps in order to placate the anti-annexationists, he was pledged in 1892 against the immediate commencement of the railway if the Government decided to retain Uganda.¹²⁰ Rosebery also thought that the cost for the railway was too great, and that for Britain's purpose a road from the coast and/or a line of telegraph would be sufficient for the time being. But, he generally recognized the importance of the projected Mombasa railway in imperial terms, and was ready to be forced by public opinion to build the "political railway."¹²¹ When the cabinet determined on the retention of Uganda on 22 March 1894, they left the question of the railway in abeyance. Rosebery did not press this point apparently in view of financial difficulties and, more importantly, some of his colleagues' opposition. And, he withheld that subject in his official announcement of the Uganda protectorate on 12 April. However, the Prime Minister became more decided with time to construct the line, as he began to leave out the problem of finance involved. In early 1895, Rosebery explained himself by saying that the railway project was suspended not because the Treasury objected to it, but because the Government had to "weigh wisely the pros and cons of this transition period of the Protectorate of Uganda before constructing the railway."¹²² In the following months, more acute differences manifested themselves as regards the Uganda railway, but Rosebery was more determined than before to push ahead with the project. The cabinet on 28 May almost unanimously (with one resignation threatened) agreed to declare

119 PRO, FO2/96/14, Report of the Court of Directors to the Shareholders, IBEA, 11 Jan. 1895. It was agreed that had the measures contemplated by the Salisbury Government been adhered to, the railway guarantee alone would have been required from Parliament, as the company could thereon have raised funds as necessary.

120 PRO, Cab37/31//23, Rosebery's memorandum, 16 Sept. 1892; and FO403/173/188, Rosebery's memorandum, 17 Nov. 1892. Also cf. FO403/193/116, Rosebery's memorandum, 12 Feb. 1894.

121 W. S. Churchill, *My African Journal* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1908), 6.

122 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 30, "Uganda," 14 Feb. 1895, Rosebery, 705.

forthwith the commencement of the railway work. The "Little Englanders" had finally been overruled.

The dominance of Rosebery led not only to the annexation of Uganda but to the proclamation of British hegemony over the Sudan. On 28 March 1895 Edward Grey made a speech in the House of Commons on the whole question of the Nile Valley without Harcourt's presence and previous knowledge. Grey announced that the British Government could lay claim to the whole of the Nile waterway, and suggested that the current French expedition on the way to the Upper Nile was regarded by Britain as "an unfriendly act." Harcourt immediately protested to Kimberley over his Under-Secretary's declaration,¹²³ while at the same time Rosebery called the Queen's attention to Grey's "admirable statement." When Harcourt was fighting for his right to speak on behalf of the Government on foreign affairs, Rosebery told Victoria that "though there was some grumbling in the usual quarters, there was no attempt to disavow Sir E. Grey's position."¹²⁴ Up to this point, the victory of Roseberianism was all but nominal.

V. Conclusion: Uganda and Liberal Imperialism in Practice

The vigorous opposition of the leading Liberals to the Uganda Railway

¹²³ Harcourt to Kimberley, 29 March 1895, in A. G. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, 335. Harcourt wrote: "These declarations appear to me not consistent with the conclusions arrived at by the Cabinet in more than one discussion on the subject.... You will remember that the Cabinet struck out of one of the despatches words to the effect that the English Government would regard the advance of the French on the Nile as a 'very grave matter.'" And he wrote to Kimberley two days later to express his strong feeling: "I will also in future undertake to make, on behalf of the Cabinet, all important statements in debate on foreign affairs. It is in this manner alone that the position of the Leader of the House of Commons can be reconciled with that of a Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords." *Ibid.*, same to same, 1 April 1895, 336. To this demand Kimberley agreed, and Harcourt put in a memorandum the terms of the understanding. Kimberley to Harcourt, 13 April 1895, in John Powell, *op. cit.*, 237. But Harcourt's complaints about his being kept ill-informed on foreign affairs continued to develop afterwards.

¹²⁴ Rosebery to Victoria, 29 March 1895, quoted in Lord Crewe, *op. cit.*, 503-504.

Survey Vote in March 1892 did not make their responsibility more agreeable after their victory in the general election. Nor were the complaints that they were called upon to decide in a situation that they had not created effectual for relieving the Liberal Government of their responsibility. Amidst the fear before the election that if Gladstone became premier the foreign policy pursued by the Conservative Government during the last six years would be reversed, Rosebery, the prospective Liberal Foreign Secretary, declared publicly his intention to continue Salisbury's policy.¹²⁵ And, he began his term of office by informing the ambassadors of the Triple Alliance, hence the whole of Europe, that he meant to carry on the policy of Salisbury.¹²⁶ So, he did unfailingly in 1892-1895. "I do not think," Rosebery said in the House of Lords in 1895, "that as regards our imperial responsibilities abroad there is any great margin of difference of opinion between [Lord Salisbury] and myself."¹²⁷ And, the consistency in Rosebery's foreign policy was surprisingly firm: the aims he set and the tone he held were alike in his speeches to his countryfolk and in his communications with foreign powers. As a result, during his last ministry, Gladstone's foreign policy was assuredly that of his

¹²⁵ Rosebery's speech at St. George's-in-the-East, 23 June 1892, in Lord Rosebery, *The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery: Two Chapters in Recent Politics, 1886 and 1892-5*, 74. Rosebery continued to support Salisbury after he resigned as Prime Minister and became the leader of the Opposition. See BL, Add. MSS. 41226, f.226, Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 7 Dec. 1895.

¹²⁶ This policy involved an attitude so benevolent towards the Triple Alliance that the French press sometimes wrote about the "Quadruple Alliance." Edward Grey to E. Goschen, 1910, quoted in G. M. Trevelyan, *op. cit.*, 63-64. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, the London's leading evening paper, wrote in October: "Continental statesmen have already realized that to all practical intents and purposes the foreign policy of England remains unchanged by the fact that a Conservative Foreign Minister has been succeeded by a Liberal." *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 Oct. 1892, "Permanency of Policy." Also cf. Deym to Kalnoky, 28 June 1893, in Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson eds., *Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 475; and PRO, FO343/3, Rosebery to Sir E. Malet, 3 Jan. 1894. Salisbury also found himself largely and substantially in agreement with Rosebery's policy. See Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian Titan* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 592.

¹²⁷ *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 30, "Uganda," 14 Feb. 1895, Rosebery, 702.

Foreign Secretary, devoid of liberal conscience.¹²⁸ The Gladstonian tradition of making foreign policy a major division between the parties was finally broken down, with the continuity of British imperial policy greatly reinforced.¹²⁹ The Rosebery administration made it sound anachronistic to recall what Harcourt had written about Uganda in 1892: "The policy of the occupation of Uganda is not the policy of the Liberal party, nor...will it have their support. If the thing is to be done, it ought to be done not by us, but by our opponents."¹³⁰

Rosebery was essential to the maintenance of the Liberal Government, for, as it was well known and well expected at the time, Rosebery's imperial thinking acted as a counterbalance to and redress for Gladstone's radical liberalism. Rosebery obviously had exploited the delicate balance of domestic politics to win a free hand in foreign affairs.¹³¹ The Radical spokesman Labouchere put it plainly: "We do wrong abroad in order that we may remain in office and do good at home."¹³² To the Gladstonians, the annexation of Uganda was, after all, the price that they had to pay for the domestic reforms contemplated in England and Ireland. And, Rosebery knew it well. Much of the tension between the right wing and the Radicals in the Liberal Party was marked when Harcourt said to Rosebery in 1892: "Without you, the new government would be ridiculous: with you it is only impossible."¹³³ Not

128 *The Quarterly Review*, vol. 189, no. 377, "Democracy and Foreign Affairs" (Jan. 1899, London), 244.

129 Rosebery said in a public speech in 1895: "If there is one thing in my life I should like to live after me, it is that, when I first went to the Foreign Office as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I argued for and maintained the principle of continuity in foreign administration." Rosebery's speech at the Albert Hall, 5 June 1895, in Lord Rosebery, *op. cit.*, 74.

130 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.

131 For details see R. E. Robinsdon and John Gallagher, *op. cit.*, 320-322.

132 *The Times*, 7 Feb. 1893, Labouchere's letter, 11c. Rosebery also understood such circumstances well. See BL, Add. MSS. 41226, f.226, Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 7 Dec. 1895.

133 Quoted in J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, *Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith* (London: Hutchinson, 1932), vol. 77. See also A. D. Elliot, *The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen 1831-1907* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), vol. II, 200.

surprisingly, Roseberianism had become the original sin to the Liberal Party in the high age of imperialism.

The fact that Uganda was full of large tracts of uncultivated or unclaimed land always prevented settlers from taking much interest in the country.¹³⁴ Political rather than economic considerations accounted for the conflict of opinion on Uganda. Besides, by the mid-1890s the geographical mysteries had been almost solved, and the scramble for possession was approaching completion. Under such circumstances, no Powers could afford to stand idle over the spoils or adopt a let-it-be policy in their spheres of influence. Organization and promotion – from sphere of influence to protectorate, and then to colony – were the rule of the day. The hastiness in the process of colonization during this period was reflected in the fact that the British Blue Books (Parliamentary Papers) of 1892-95 contained a large number of African Agreements, all “laid on the table” (i.e. presented to Parliament) without correspondence.¹³⁵ The craving for African territory had cooled when the Uganda question arose. The first excitement of emulation might be over, but Britain was keen to maintain a strong position in East Africa none the less, as she saw the other nations pushing forward quickly. Therefore, the Uganda business was recognized in Parliament to be outside the sphere of party politics and not to be dealt with on party lines. Paradoxically, Gladstone always spoke strongly against the proposed retention of Uganda, but he never voted against it. And, as has been mentioned above, the Liberal Party had never been pledged to unconditional retreat.

The “New Imperialism” in the late nineteenth century was to a great extent the byproduct of European power politics, which was based upon a sophisticated nation-state system. More often than not, prestige mattered more than “material” things in the decision-making of foreign policy, as popular politics was rapidly taking shape in the first Western democracies. Joseph Chamberlain had come to this point when he pointed out that Uganda was the point of no return: “Our honour is pledged.... Whatever you may think about

134 For further see J. B. Purvis, *Handbook to British East Africa and Uganda* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1900), 41.

135 Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, *A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 402-403.

the matter, it is too late to go back," he said in the House of Commons.¹³⁶ The national reputation – or, in the Radicals' view, the spirit of international jealousy – dictated to the imperial government a policy of forestalling and excluding. As Edward Grey said, since Uganda was within British sphere of influence, the Government certainly had the responsibility to "keep other people (in this case the French and the Germans) out."¹³⁷ Pushed into the race for dividing the African continent, Britain, in "a somewhat rough and ready spirit," marched into Uganda without all the finished apparatus of constitution and administration.

Imperialism was often more related to the future than to the present. Regarded as "a country of great possibilities," Uganda was very important to Rosebery and his followers in view of British territorial expansion and commercial development.¹³⁸ Explaining his position on the subject of Uganda, Rosebery said to his audience at the Royal Colonial Institute in 1893: "We are

136 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 10, "Uganda," 20 March 1893, Joseph Chamberlain, 596. Rosebery also held such a view. He said: "My belief is that having put our hands to the plough in that great enterprise [in Uganda], we shall not be able, even if we were willing, to look back." *The Times*, 21 Oct. 1892, 5e.

137 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, "Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech," 6 Feb. 1893, Edward Grey, 588. If Britain evacuated Uganda, France might step into the vacant place (although France had promised otherwise, see PRO, FO403/173/44, Rosebery to Dufferin, 8 Oct. 1892), for an agreement as to a sphere of influence between two Powers was not binding on a third Power who was not a contracting party to it. Even Germany might treat the evacuation by the British as entitling her to disregard her engagements under the Anglo-German agreement of July 1890. But to the anti-imperial minds, it was meaningless to talk about the "retention of Uganda," because Uganda was by common sense within the British spheres, where the interests of France, as represented by her missionaries, were respected as a rule. See *The Edinburgh Review*, vol. 179, no. 368, "African Exploration" (April 1894, London), 296, and 300.

138 In Parliament, Grey defended the establishment of a protectorate in Uganda with all Portal's arguments, embellished with high hopes of commercial gains, which Portal's report had flatly denied. R. E. Robinson and John Gallagher, *op. cit.*, 329. In fact, Grey's expectation was fairly realized later. In the early twentieth century, cotton and coffee were introduced into Uganda, and these two crops accounted for over 80% of her exports by independence, much to the interest of Britain, of course. See Mahmood Mamdani, *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda* (London: Heinemann, 1983), 6-7.

engaged in “pegging out claims” for the future. We have to consider, not what we want now, but what we shall want in the future.”¹³⁹ Being imperialistic was being looking to the future. The Uganda question was as to the future. Indeed, it was only treated as a necessary part of a far-reaching policy that the retention of Uganda could excite enthusiasm.

And the annexation of Uganda was a cheap enterprise, too. In any case there was actually no need and no question of sending a British force to Uganda, as there was no risk of a conflict of claims in regard of Uganda with any other Power. The material difficulties as regards the occupation of the country were not great: it was estimated that a small force of about 1,200 men would be able to meet all the opposition that might arise, and that about 10,000*l* a year ought to meet all the requirements of the maintenance of the necessary force.¹⁴⁰ Since the start of 1893, Britain carried on the administration of Uganda at a cost of some 40,000*l* a year, in an anomalous and undefined manner. This expense was considerably greater than the estimate of Portal for a protectorate. It appeared to Rosebery that the British position was that of maintaining the government of Uganda with the same liability and responsibility as a protectorate, only at a greater cost.¹⁴¹ To legitimize Britain’s position there was, therefore, to save money.

Under the Berlin Act of 1885 and the subsequent interpretation of its clauses, Britain’s rights to Uganda could only be substantiated by “effective occupation.” Likewise, the occupation of Uganda would be a firm and just

139 *The Times*, 2 March 1893, 6a.

140 PRO, FO2/71/105, Kimberley’s Note, 4 July 1894; and FO84/2258/302, Memorandum on Uganda by Brigadier-General Kitchener, 18 Sept. 1892. And material for such a force could be found in the portion of Emin Pasha’s regiments which he had joined Captain Lugard earlier.

141 PRO, FO403/193/116, Rosebery’s memorandum, 12 Feb. 1894. For various estimates of the total annual expenditure for ruling Uganda, see FO83/1311, Committee Report on Administration of East Africa, 17 April 1894; FO403/194/237, A. Hardinge to Kimberley, 4 June 1894; FO2/75/53, H. P. Anderson’s memorandum, 4 Oct. 1894; and FO403/208/15, The Treasury to FO, 9 Jan. 1895. The average number was about 49,000*l*. Harcourt certainly did not see the grounds for anticipating moderate expenditure in the gigantic enterprise of occupying Uganda and Upper Nile, which would entail the construction of a railway. See Cab37/31/24, Harcourt’s memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892.

claim to render valid British influence over the Nile basin beyond. That is to say, with the evacuation of Uganda Britain must cede all claim to any exclusive influence in the Upper Nile valley at least. Due to intensifying international competition, there was a limit of time beyond which theoretical rights could not run without effective occupation, even though in the Act of Berlin the condition as to effective occupation was carefully limited to the coasts of Africa. Furthermore, Uganda as a British sphere of influence was the product of a mere arrangement with Germany and Italy, which had no force as against other nations. Against them, effective occupation was the only powerful barrier. And, to the annexationists, even as regards Germany and Italy, Britain could not count on eternal possession of a territory she did not develop or administer.¹⁴² Since the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, the claim of Britain to the East African sphere had been a matter of general notoriety; it was only by occupying Uganda that the integrity of the British sphere there could be secured.

The announcement in mid-1894 of the Uganda protectorate was received with satisfaction by the Houses,¹⁴³ and met a general approval throughout the country. In 1892 Harcourt estimated that the policy of occupying Uganda would not command half a dozen votes in the Liberal Party. Yet, in 1894, according to Sir Charles W. Dilke, a leading Radical, only half a dozen or a dozen Liberals opposed this policy.¹⁴⁴ Still, there was a general opinion that

142 In response to Lord Ripon's suggestion for territorial exchange as a solution to the Uganda question, Rosebery said: "I am afraid your idea of exchanging Uganda for Damaraland does not smile on me.... If [the Germans] wish to have Uganda, and we wish to evacuate it, they can get it without any exchange at all. The fact of its being within our sphere of influence would not be an impediment." BL, Add. MSS. 43516, f.57, Rosebery to Ripon, 17 Oct. 1892. Also cf. FO403/168/69, Rosebery to E. Monson, 16 Dec. 1892.

143 It was not until 1 June 1894 that the scheme of the Government was fully discussed in Parliament. The whole question was then raised on the vote for 81,000*l* – the estimated cost for the first year of giving effect to the ministerial proposals. 50,000*l* was required to carry out the agreement so tardily arrived at with the IBEA, while the remaining 30,000*l* was for the coasts of administration in the territory it evacuated. After a long debate the vote was passed by a majority of 218 to 52.

144 PRO, Cab37/31/24, Harcourt's memorandum, 22 Sept. 1892; and *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 25, "Civil Services and Revenue Departments Estimates, 1894-95," 1 June 1894, C. W. Dilke,

the action taken by the Government was not sufficient. Two statements provoked strong criticism. The first was the proposal to confine the protectorate to Uganda proper,¹⁴⁵ the other the suspension of the Mombasa railway project. However, since the territories in question remained a British sphere of influence, the British protectorate would in a very short time be obliged to increase immensely its boundaries, as Portal had foreshadowed in his report. This was done just a year later,¹⁴⁶ when the commencement of the Uganda railway was declared on the other hand. Unlike some of the protectorates Britain had lately established, the Uganda protectorate was much more than a name: it involved very grave responsibilities, amounting to actual possession and direction.

Indeed, Uganda was a characteristic sign of the "sensible" and successful adjustments made both by Britain as a nation and the Liberal Party as a political organ to the heightened imperial struggle in Africa since the Berlin Conference of 1885. Debating on Uganda in 1894, Salisbury depicted in the House of Lords a new phase in imperial history:

In what would be philosophically called the diplomatic evolution of recent years, sundry new ideas of modified and limited possession have come into general use. We talk now not only of "protectorate," but also of "sphere of influence." It is a very odd metaphor... The whole doctrine of paper annexation is in a very fluid and uncertain condition. We do not admit that mere claim without any attempt to

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¹⁴⁵ Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro were all outside the limits of Uganda proper, yet, they were as much bound up with it as though they were actually parts of it. In regard of the "Uganda group," Kimberley was of the opinion that the arrangements should not go beyond such agreements with the chiefs as might be necessary for the maintenance of friendly relations between them and the Uganda protectorate, the suppression of slave trade, and facilities for trade. PRO, FO403/194/178*, Kimberley's minute, 18 May 1894; and FO2/70/21, Kimberley to Col. H. E. Colvile, 23 Nov. 1894. For further discussion see A. S. White, "The Partition of Africa," *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 36, no. 204 (July 1894, London), 26; and A. R. Dunbar, "The British and Bunyoro-Kitara, 1891 to 1899," *The Uganda Journal*, vol. 24, no. 2 (Sept. 1960, Kampala), 231.

¹⁴⁶ Official notification by the Foreign Office, 15 June 1895, in *The Dublin Gazette*, 21 June 1895.

assert our position will confer permanent sovereignty.¹⁴⁷

In the scramble for Africa, Britain had no alternative but to shake off her reliance on indirect control for imperial title, and to take a forward policy to meet the challenge from the other Powers. Rosebery continued Salisbury's practice of running Uganda directly from the Foreign Office rather than through the Colonial Office, for British relations with Uganda were mainly of a diplomatic rather than administrative character. Thus, under the direct control of the Imperial Government, Uganda promptly settled down to its work of serving British purposes.¹⁴⁸

The quarrels among the Liberals over Uganda reflected literally their differences over Egypt; and the triumph of Rosebery over Uganda meant the prevalence of the call for annexing Egypt and the Nile valley. On the Uganda question, Gladstonianism was actually doomed from the start, because the British agents on the spot had already taken the first steps for formal colonization. The aggressive policy, for instance, carried out by the British officers in Central Africa was not approved by the home government, but no efficient check was possible, partly owing to the slowness of communications with Uganda, partly owing to the popularity of imperialist policies at home.¹⁴⁹ A forward policy in Africa might not always be preferable, yet a policy of retreat was never endorsed. So, the hesitation and controversy over Uganda had little effect on the advance of the West African empire.¹⁵⁰

147 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 25, "Uganda," 1 June 1894, Lord Salisbury, 150.

148 After the proclamation of the protectorate in Uganda, a tranquil state of affairs followed, and the English culture began to develop in a peaceful atmosphere. For further discussion see D. W. Cohen, *Towards a Reconstructed Past: Historical Texts from Busoga, Uganda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 173; J. C. Ssekamwa, *History and Development of Education in Uganda* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997), 37; and Mwambutsya Ndebesa, "Kingship and Political Developments in Uganda, 1900-1994," in P. G. Okoth et al. eds., *Uganda: A Century of Existence*, 46.

149 The Government mildly rebuked Colvile's forward policy, but the message did not arrive until he had left for England in December 1893.

150 J. D. Hargreaves, "Western Africa, 1886-1905," in Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson eds., *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. VI: 1870-1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 272.

In 1885 Rosebery was already described by political observers as a “Liberal Imperialist,” a term upon which he prided himself much.¹⁵¹ Thus called again a decade later, he justified himself by defining the term. “Liberal Imperialism implies,” Rosebery explained, “first, the maintenance of the Empire; secondly, the opening of new areas for our surplus population; thirdly, the suppression of the slave-trade; fourthly, the development of missionary enterprise; and fifthly, the development of our commerce.”¹⁵² As such, “Liberal Imperialism” was not different at all from “Conservative Liberalism” or imperialism of any kind. The victory of Rosebery signified the beginning of the end of the Liberal Party as an official opposition to the Conservatives. When Rosebery was forced to resign in 1895 in consequence of the split in the Liberal Party, he became the leader of the Liberal Imperialist division of the party, and the continuity of British foreign policy was now assured. On 1 July 1895, soon after Salisbury had taken office and the IBEA had dissolved, the British Government reorganized its spheres of influence in East Africa as the East Africa Protectorate.

（責任編輯：張志惠 校對：周如怡）

151 Rosebery's speech in Sheffield, 20 Oct. 1885, in Lord Rosebery, *op. cit.*, 75.

152 Rosebery's speech at the Albert Hall, 5 July 1895, in Lord Rosebery, *op. cit.*, 75.

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烏干達問題 與英國自由派帝國主義的發展，1892~95

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提 要

本論文探討的主題為英國自由黨對於1892至1895年間有關烏干達保護地設置問題的政策立場，以及由此所反映的自由主義與帝國主義理念之調和與衝突。烏干達問題的出現及難處，在於英國取得當地治權的容易以及經營當地的耗費過鉅，在無嚴重的列強威脅與土著挑戰之下，烏干達問題更能彰顯英國帝國主義的原始性與特殊性，而這個問題對於自由黨的「保守主義化」或「帝國主義化」，也引發根本的反省與巨大的影響。據此，本研究重點包括：一、烏干達在大英帝國的東非擴張計畫中所具有的地位與重要性，以及烏干達問題作為埃及問題延伸的表現；二、烏干達問題爭議所導致的英國自由黨意識形態與政策路線之分裂，此即是有關格蘭斯敦主義（Gladstonianism）與羅斯柏理主義（Roseberianism）的交替問題；三、烏干達問題在十九世紀末期英國政黨政治與列強帝國衝突情勢中，所呈現的特質與所造成的衝擊；四、羅斯柏理執政下，烏干達問題的解決方案及其對於自由主義新取向的影響；五、烏干達問題所表現的「自由派帝國主義」在理念與實踐之間的落差。這個研究探討「新帝國主義」（The New Imperialism, 1871-1914）追求國家榮耀而不計現實經濟利害的精神性意涵，以此顯示一般左派學者討論帝國擴張或殖民主義的「盲點」，並說明近代自由主義因應複雜而密切的人際與國際關係時，所做的調整及其成敗得失。

關鍵詞：自由黨 烏干達 格蘭斯敦 羅斯柏理 埃及 英屬東非公司 波特

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