

METAPHORIZED MOTION IN ENGLISH*

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ABSTRACT

Physical motion is frequently metaphorized to express abstract concepts or states of affairs. This article aims to explore the phenomena of metaphorized motion in English. Example sentences drawn from English dictionaries are furnished to attest and examine the workings of metaphorized motion in various non-physical fields. One interesting finding is that two contrasting metaphorical vehicles - namely the moving entity and the stationary bounded space - apply to a variety of non-spatial fields. The two recurring contradictory vehicles suggest that there are limits to the systematicity and coherence of conventional metaphors of motion in English.

1. INTRODUCTION

Languages systematically and extensively designate abstract entities and states of affairs with constructions whose basic reference is to physical movement (Jackendoff 1997, Talmy 1996). In English, sentences of motion and spatial location convey a wide range of non-spatial meanings through metaphorical extension. The purpose of this paper is to explore the metaphorical extensions from physical motion to non-spatial fields in the English language. Sentences of metaphorized motion, those depicting motion with no physical occurrences, will be provided to attest and illustrate various systematic metaphorical extensions of spatial movement, of which many show the dualism of a moving entity and a bounded space (i.e., the same thing

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may be presented in terms of a moving entity on the one hand and stationary bounded space on the other).

In English, verbs of motion and spatial prepositions are used for the encoding of metaphorized motion. A verb of motion is a verb that takes an argument in the subject or object position denoting something in motion. The motion coded by a verb of motion in conjunction with its argument(s) may be spontaneous or self-propelled, as in *Spring has rolled around*, in which *spring* is in motion. Caused motion is often designated by a two-argument verb, as in *We should place our differences aside*, in which *our differences* are moved or set in motion. Caused motion may also be coded by a verb of motion plus a preposition phrase representing the source, path, or goal of the motion, as in *Joe hit the ball across the field* (literal movement) and *The bombing attack struck fear into their hearts* (metaphorized motion), in which *fear* is set in motion. It is generally agreed that many English prepositions have a basic spatial sense, which is systematically employed in shaping the expressions of non-spatial concepts through metaphorical extension (Lindstromberg 2001, O'Keefe 1996, Quirk et al. 1985:685 ff.). Like verbs of motion, spatial prepositions (e.g., *from*, *through*, *to*, and *into*) play an important role in linguistic representations of metaphorized motion.

In this paper all the example sentences except three come from a corpus of 1,502 sentences of metaphorized motion I have collected from the following six English dictionaries: *A Dictionary of English Collocations* (1990), *Cambridge Dictionaries Online* (2003), *Cambridge Learner's Dictionary* (2001), *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* (1987), *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* (1995), and *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (1992). In each of the dictionaries 113 entries of verbs of motion (see Appendix) have been surveyed. And efforts have been made to draw from the dictionary entries all the example sentences of metaphorized motion. The reason why the 113 verbs have been selected is that they are the most frequent verbs of motion. According to the frequency list of verbs in the whole British National Corpus (a sample of some 100 million words of present-day spoken and written English; cf. Leech, Rayson, and Wilson 2001), the 113 verbs are all the verbs that not only have 12 or more occurrences per million words but also conform to the definition of motion verbs laid down in this paper.

This paper takes a topic-vehicle approach to describing metaphorical

extension. As far as its underlying conceptual structure is concerned, metaphor is a way of conceiving or presenting one thing or one state of affairs in terms of another (cf. Black 1962, Ortony 1993, Richards 1936, Shie 2001, Shie 2003). In the remainder of this article I shall refer to the former as ‘theme’ and the latter as ‘vehicle’ for convenience. Thus a theme is viewed or presented in terms of a vehicle in the metaphorical thought. Every metaphorical expression involves a metaphorical theme and vehicle. Specifically, the theme is the purport or thought representing the subject of a metaphor, and the vehicle is an image that embodies the theme. Between the theme and the vehicle there exists an analogy. In virtue of the analogy, the vehicle highlights certain aspects of the theme while downplaying less contextually pertinent features. The theme and the vehicle may be, but need not be, a whole conceptual domain or general field, as is the case in which one metaphorizes human beings as plants. The theme and vehicle may also be something specific, as in *My girlfriend is a red rose*.

2. METAPHORIZED MOTION

This section deals with six common themes conceived or presented via metaphorized motion, including categorization, topography and routes, possessional transfer, change of state, change of amount, and causation. Although motion is a dynamic phenomenon, it is not always used to conceptualize or depict dynamic states of affairs like change of state. Representations of categorization, topography, or routes do not entail any overt change or physical occurrence, as we shall see below.

2.1 Categorization as Motion

Verbs of motion and spatial prepositions are often used for categorization, as exemplified in:

- (1) Gestures *fall* into six main categories.
- (2) This verb *enters* into the first category.
- (3) That book clearly *comes* under the category of autobiography.
- (4) The authorities have *placed* the drug in Class A.
- (5) The single most important factor that *separates* ordinary photographs from good photographs is the lighting.

- (6) Although it can't be *put* in the same category as a Rolls Royce, this is still a luxury car.

In these sentences, the verbs in italics take an argument referring to an entity in motion, be it in a subject or object position. The verbs' senses of physical movement serve as a vehicle that presents the mental act of categorization. When something moves or is moved from one place to another, it does not undergo any change in itself. Correspondingly, an act of categorization does not bring about any change in the categorized things either.

It is noticeable that some of these verbs (such as *come* in (3)) code a self-propelled motion, while others (such as *place* in (4)) involve a metaphorized motion caused by the person who categorizes. This reflects a duality of thought. That is, things may come in natural kinds without artificial arrangement, as in (1)-(3). On the other hand, categorization can be presented as if it were an action initiated by an agent. Specifically, things are classified as if they were moved to bounded spaces representing categories, as in (4)-(6). In both of these two types of motion metaphors, categories are compared to bounded spaces and category members to entities in motion. Thus a category member can be seen as falling into, being placed in, or coming under a category.

Concepts and linguistic representations of categorization are based on the general behavior of categorizing. When people categorize things, they tend to put things with certain shared properties in the same bounded space. For example, in a supermarket, goods of the same type are placed in the same bounded space, such as the dairy, meat, or vegetable section. Categories are concepts, but we tend to attribute a real physical existence to them.

2.2 Topography and Routes as Motion

Topography and routes are often viewed as spatial movement, evidenced in the following sentences:

- (7) On the other side of the hill, the land *falls* away sharply.
(8) You can see the Alps *rising* in the distance.
(9) At the foot of the mountain the city *spreads* out to the bay.
(10) The land *swept* away to the east.
(11) The railway *crosses* a bare, empty plain for 200 miles.

- (12) Turn left where the lane *meets* the main road.

The surface features of a spatially extended entity (land, sea, mountains, rivers, etc.) are often described in terms of spatial movement. The same can be said of routes (roads, highways, paths, alleys, etc.). As a vehicle presenting terrain or a route, such motion is not a physical occurrence. To put it differently, such fictive motion as described in (7)-(12) refers to instances of factive stationariness. The direction of the fictive motion can be manifested by a preposition phrase. Thus we can talk about a plain reaching far *to the sea* or about a shore sweeping *to the south* for miles. In fact, many verbs of such fictive motion bear the meaning of upward or downward orientation, such as *climb*, *rise*, *descend*, and *plunge*. Granted that in this type of dead metaphor, the vehicle (i.e., motion) and the theme (i.e., static topographical continuum) both belong to the semantic field of space, they are remarkably different in another respect: the vehicle is an event or activity while the theme is an entity. Therefore, such uses of verbs in (7)-(12) manifest a certain degree of metaphorical analogy, through which a metaphor identifies one thing with another basically different thing. Metaphorical analogy highlights the similarities (say, between a stationary railway and a path of motion) and suppresses the differences between the theme and the vehicle.

2.3 Possessional Transfer as Motion

Spatial movement is extended to possessional transfer. For example:

- (13) The title *passed* to the older heir.
(14) The gold watch *went* to the highest bidder.
(15) The money has *fallen* to him.
(16) It *drifted* into the hands of the rich.
(17) The land was *conveyed* to his brother.
(18) She *transferred* the house to her daughter before she died.

These sentences illustrate the cross-field parallel between movement and change of possession. The old possessor corresponds to the source of movement and the new possessor to the goal. As Jackendoff (2002:357) puts it, “changing possession does not necessarily entail changing location: the sale of a house or of stocks does not involve motion at all.”

In (13) the title is an abstract entity and, as such, transfer of a title does not entail spatial motion either. It follows that motion and possession are two separate semantic fields. Even in cases where change of possession involves physical motion, as in (14)-(16), the literal sense of the verb designates self-propelled motion, which is patently false in the context. Although the self-propelled motion cannot be taken literally in the context of possessional transfer, such metaphors have been conventionalized and English speakers are by and large unconscious of the metaphorized motion.

In English, change of location can be extended metaphorically to other types of change, such as change of possession, change of schedule (e.g., to move a class from Monday to Tuesday), and change of state. We will examine change of state in the following discussion.

2.4 Change of State as Motion

Change of state may be described in terms of motion. Here are some examples:

- (19) Wax *passes* from solid to liquid when you heat it.
- (20) Most farmers had *turned* from crops to cattle.
- (21) Life has improved and *returned* to normal.
- (22) The light *went* from red to green.
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002:233)
- (23) They have *arisen* from poverty to affluence.
- (24) He *swings* constantly from optimism to pessimism and back.

The state-as-location metaphor is pervasive in English and well-documented (cf. Goldberg 1998, Kovecses 2002, Lakoff 1993, Taub 1996). Derived from the state-as-location metaphor is the change-as-motion metaphor. As shown in (19)-(24), verbs of motion can be used to designate aspects of change of state. Change from one state to another is often metaphorized as movement from one place to another. Note that the change of state coded by a verb of motion may be gradual or instantaneous. For instance, a light may go from red to yellow without any perceptible transitional stage in between the source state and the target state. The two states are temporally connected with each other. The metaphorical vehicle is a movement from one location to another adjoining location. On the other hand, a physical movement can also be

made from one location to another separate location, with a continuum of space or other locations between the two. This type of movement can serve as a vehicle for gradual change of state, as is the case where heated wax passes from solid to liquid gradually, with an intermediate stage in which the wax becomes semi-solid or semi-liquid. The two locations representing the source and target states are connected by some locations (representing intermediate states) that form a path. Thus change of state is described as a motion to the end point of the path.

2.5 Change of Amount as Motion

Change of amount is understood to be spatial movement, as in the following:

- (25) The sales *reached* a peak just one year after launch.
- (26) The stock market *sank* to a new low yesterday.
- (27) The FA Cup Final's audience *climbed* to 12.3 million.
- (28) His debts *mounted* up to millions of dollars.
- (29) The total amount raised is *approaching* \$10,000.
- (30) Inflation has *jumped* to more than twenty percent.

The spatial orientations of 'up' and 'down' are recurring metaphorical constructs in the English language (Aitchison 2000:125, Bonvillian 2000:66, Goatly 1997:41, Lakoff 1996). Where the concept of amount is concerned, 'up' correlates with increases and 'down' with decreases, as in (25)-(30). The analogy between spatial movement and change of amount is based on perceptual experience: accumulation of substance or objects causes the physical level of the pile to go up. In the literature (e.g., Jackendoff 1997:556, Lakoff and Johnson 1980:15-17), the linear opposites 'up' and 'down' are usually characterized as varying along a one-dimensional range of values. But as I see it, the upward or downward movement as a metaphorical vehicle for change of amount is not a motion along a vertical scale. Change always involves speed and time, and so does spatial motion. It is more accurate to say that spatialized metaphor for change of amount is a two-dimensional construct, oriented by a vertical axis of amount and a horizontal axis of time. When one says that a figure rises, it goes up, so to speak, a slope, whether slight (gradual change) or steep (quick change), rather than moves up vertically. Thus change of amount may be presented in terms

of virtually horizontal movement as well. Sales review is a case in point. A sales manager may say that sales *reached* a peak just one year after launch, and then *leveled off* the following two years at around 60,000 units, and finally *fell* to 45,000 units last year.

2.6 Causation as Motion

Non-physical causation may be conceived of as using physical force to move something or to make a physical impact, as illustrated below:

- (31) He *pressed* her into service as his servant and companion.
- (32) The TV production *took* the book to the top of the best seller list.
- (33) Family and friends helped to *pull* me out of my depression.
- (34) The day's events completely *drained* me of all strength.
- (35) The tax increases are expected to *hit* low-earners as well as people on high incomes.
- (36) I made you. I can *break* you.

As these sentences show, movement or physical impact is phrased as bringing about change of state. And yet nothing actually moves from one place to another and no physical impact takes place. Movement or impact of this sort is in fact a conventional vehicle presenting causation.

Some verbs (e.g., *break* and *hit*) are inherently causative. The meaning of causation is part of the semantics of the verb. When we break an object, the structure or wholeness of the object is affected, and we make it undergo a change from intact to damaged. If we break a person, what is damaged is not his/her body but his/her fame, social status, mood, and the like, depending on the context.

Some other verbs (e.g., *take* and *pull*) entail something in motion. As noted previously, change of state may be described in terms of motion, and states may be viewed as locations or bounded spaces. The subjects of these verbs (e.g., *the TV production* in (32)) is seen as an agent that initiates an action of moving something with volition, while the object (e.g., *the book* in (32)) has the semantic role of patient, undergoing some change in state as a result of the motion. The target state corresponds to the end point of the motion, usually represented by a preposition phrase that serves as the direct object complement (e.g., *to the top of the best seller list* in (32)). In fact, the verb in an English caused-motion construction (e.g., *He hit the ball across the field*; cf. Goldberg 1995)

takes an argument of causer or agent that directly causes the accusative theme to move to a new position. Thus the causation-as-motion metaphor can effect a change in the semantic role of the accusative noun phrase from theme to patient, as in (31)-(33).

3. CONTRASTING VEHICLES OF METAPHORIZED MOTION

Up to this point we have discussed six common types of metaphorized motion. In this section we take up the issue of duality of metaphorized motion. The phenomena of duality is that in some instances of metaphorized motion the vehicle is an entity in motion, while in other instances the vehicle is a bounded space where the motion takes place. The themes that are presented through such contrasting vehicles include time, visual percepts, feelings, thoughts, memories, hearts, minds, words, events, actions, formal discussion, interlocutors, and experiencers. Let us begin with the spatialized metaphor of time.

3.1 Time

Times are often conceptualized as entities in motion, as can be seen in the following sentences:

- (37) What are your plans for the year to *come*?
- (38) The time has *arrived* for you to study.
- (39) The missing child's parents became more and more distraught as the hours *passed*.
- (40) In the days that *followed*, Keith and his mates could talk of nothing else.
- (41) The long day is *drawing* to an end.
- (42) As holiday *progressed*, we became increasingly annoyed with each other.

On the other hand, times may be spoken of as bounded spaces. The following examples illustrate this:

- (43) I *entered* my second year at university.
- (44) That piece of music really *took* me back to my schooldays.
- (45) Time travel is the theoretical process of *traveling* into the past or

the future.

- (46) Do you think the play will *run* to Christmas?
- (47) The tradition *descends* from colonial days.
- (48) They have enough grain to *carry* them through a few weeks.

It is generally agreed that the terms used to talk about time are frequently derived from spatial terms (Aitchison 2000:125, Hiraga 1994:16, Jackson and Michon 1991, Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Turner 1989:44-6). Many verbs of motion and spatial prepositions are employed in shaping temporal expressions, as in (37)-(48). When both a verb of motion and a spatial preposition are used in a sentence, as in (45)-(48), it frequently projects an image of path. In Saeed's (1997:311) words, "since a person traversing a path takes time to do so, points on the path are readily associated with temporal sequence." Thus the further a person is along the path, the more time has elapsed. Specifically, *to Christmas* in (46) is the end point of the path, *from colonial days* in (47) is the starting point, and *through a few weeks* in (48) the length of the path.

Cognitive linguists have put forward two versions of spatialized metaphor of time (Lakoff 1993, Lakoff 1995, Kovecses 2002:33-34). The first version treats the passing of time as motion of an object. The observer of time is stationary, and times are entities moving with respect to the observer. The second version qualifies the passing of time as an observer's motion on a landscape. Times are fixed locations, and the observer is moving with respect to time, which accounts for expressions like *He passed the time happily*. Always located at the present time, the observer moves toward scheduled future events, as in *We are coming up on our 20th wedding anniversary*. Both versions involve the following structural mappings. First, times are things. Second, the passing of time is motion. Third, future times are in front of the observer and past times are behind the observer. Finally, one thing is moving, the other is stationary, and the stationary thing is the deictic center. However, here I do not intend to incorporate the factor of 'observer' into the analogical structure of spatialized metaphor of time for two reasons. First, in some cases neither time nor the observer can be characterized as stationary, as in *He is racing against/with time*, where both the observer and time are moving. Second, the observer does not necessarily face or move toward the future. He/she may as well move toward or into the past, as shown in (44) and (45) and suggested in the title of the science fiction movie *Back to the Future*. Therefore, it is sufficient and perhaps more tenable to

account for the contrasting vehicles of spatialized time metaphors only in the light of time as entities in motion and times as bounded spaces.

3.2 Visual Percepts

Visual percepts, whether moving or not, are often described as entities in motion, evidenced in the following sentences:

- (49) He *caught* sight of a rare bird.
- (50) As they reached the top of the hill, the sea *came* into sight.
- (51) A sudden movement of the clouds *brought* the airfield into view.
- (52) Clouds came down and the hill tops *passed* from our view.
- (53) Where have my keys *gone*? I always seem to be losing them.
- (54) A group of tiny brick houses is *tucked* away behind the factory.

On the other hand, a visual percept may be considered to be a bounded space or the starting point or end point of a movement. Examples are:

- (55) Let's *go* through the entire list.
- (56) Her gaze *fell* on a small box at the back of the shop.
- (57) His eyes *traveled* about the field.
- (58) His eyes kept *wandering* to the picture.
- (59) She *cast* a glance at her watch.
- (60) The Monsignor *turned* his gaze from the flames to meet the Colonel's.

The underlined expressions in (49)-(60) refer to visual percepts, or entities in one's field of vision. All these sentences are linguistic instances depicting fictive motion without physical occurrence. As shown in (49)-(51), visual percepts, whether they are in factive motion or not, are depicted as moving into the experiencer's field of vision. This can be stated negatively: visual percepts move away from the experiencer's field of vision if he/she cannot perceive the entity from a certain location, as (52)-(54) suggest.

On the other hand, visual percepts are depicted as a space or location in (55)-(60). As these sentences indicate, viewing is analogous to spatial movement in a bounded space or toward an end point that represents a visual percept. The sense of visual movement is based on a projected

path, characterized by spatial prepositions, as in *She peeped at you from behind the curtain*.

The dual pattern, however, does not apply to the field of non-visual perception. Auditory and olfactory percepts can be depicted as spatial motion as well. Thus we have sentences like *The sound reached to the back of the hall* and *There was a smell proceeding from this person*. But non-visual percepts are not understood to be bounded spaces or the starting point or the end point of a projected path. The fact that non-visual percepts are not conceptualized as occupying a location on the path of the directional movement should be attributed to the inherent differences between visual and non-visual percepts. Since a bounded space can be filled with a sound or smell, sounds or smells can be perceived from all directions at once. But visual perception is directed along a projected path from the perceiver to the visual percepts. In addition, sounds and smells exist independently from their perception, while sights do not (Newmeyer 1998:213). Thus we may ask where a sound or smell is coming from, but we never ask where a sight is coming from.

3.3 Feelings, Thoughts, and Memories

Feelings, thoughts, and memories may be presented as concrete entities in motion, such as the following:

- (61) My thoughts started to *wander*.
- (62) I'm sorry I forgot your birthday - it just *slipped* my mind.
- (63) A good idea *flashed* into my mind.
- (64) All our dreams have *fled*.
- (65) A feeling of shame *came* over Philip.
- (66) The rise in industrial production helped *chase* away lingering fear that the economy was slipping into a new recession.

On the other hand, feelings, thoughts, and memories may be expressed in terms of bounded spaces. For example:

- (67) Her constant complaints *drove* him to desperation.
- (68) She has *slid* into a depression.
- (69) He is young enough to *bounce* back from this disappointment.
- (70) He *plunged* deep into thought.

- (71) Nothing *came* to my memory.
(72) I was *released* from all my guilty thoughts.

As shown in (61)-(72), the vehicle of spatial movement is also active in the fields of affection and mentation. Feelings, whether physical or emotional, are states of consciousness. It is hardly surprising that feelings can be metaphorized as bounded spaces, as in (67)-(69), since, as we have noted previously, states are often conceptualized as locations. What is remarkable is that feelings may be analogized as entities in motion as well, as in (65) and (66). In addition, thoughts and memories, be they mental acts or mental products, can be coded as if they were concrete entities in motion on the one hand and bounded spaces on the other. These are two contrasting versions of metaphors of affection or cognition presented via imaginative projection from the vehicle of concrete movement. When emotion or mentation is presented as a moving entity, the experiencer or the experiencer's mind is usually understood to be a bounded space, which is the starting point or end point of the metaphorized motion. By contrast, when emotion or mentation is viewed as a bounded space, the experiencer can often be interpreted as moving to or away from that bounded space.

3.4 Hearts, Minds, and Heads

Hearts, minds, or heads may be thought of as moving entities, as exemplified in:

- (73) It was selfish to let my mind *run* on my own distress so much.
(74) Already her mind was *racing* ahead to the hundred and one things she had to do.
(75) Our hearts *go* out to those poor children orphaned by war.
(76) The woman has *captured* your heart.
(77) *Follow* your mind, not your heart.
(78) All those figures make my head *spin*.

On the other hand, hearts, minds, or heads can be regarded as bounded spaces. Here are some examples:

- (79) I've had that tune *running* in my head all day.
(80) A sense of disillusionment and fear began to *creep* slowly into their

hearts.

- (81) Dreadful doubts began to *enter* my mind.
- (82) The matter *escaped* from my mind.
- (83) That has *lifted* a load from my heart.
- (84) The idea *floated* through my mind that it would be nice to have a weekend in the country.

Physical entities and spatial movement form the basis of expressions about the mind and the heart. Minds, heads, or hearts are often treated as physical entities. A mind can be narrow, a head can be swollen, and a heart can be broken. The identification of the mind with an entity in motion is a signal that the word *mind* designates the faculty of thinking and the motion represents activation or operation of that faculty, as in (73) and (74). And the identification of the heart with a moving entity entails the orientation of a feeling, as in (75)-(77). Granted that the word *head* may be synonymous with *mind*, *head* is not metaphorized as a moving entity as frequently as *mind*. A person who says his/her head spins or swims may mean that he/she feels confused or excited, as in (78). Interestingly enough, the mind or heart can be disembodied and separate from the person, as (75)-(77) indicate. This is in contrast to the view of the mind or heart as part of a person, reflected by expressions like *His heart sinks within him* and *He is a man of feeble mind*.

On the other hand, the mind, head, or heart can be portrayed as a bounded space, representing the seat of consciousness or emotion, as in (79)-(84). Occurrence of a thought or feeling is a movement through or into the bounded space (i.e., the mind or heart), and disappearance or oblivion of a thought or feeling is a movement away from the bounded space. In point of fact, such expressions are instances of 'complex figures,' a figurative expression in which two figures, such as metaphor and metonymy, are activated simultaneously (cf. Shie 2002a). In these complex figures, a thought or feeling is metaphorized as an entity in motion and there is a metonymy based on the spatial association of a mental activity or event with its venue (i.e., the mind, head, or heart).

3.5 Words

Words may be represented in terms of entities in motion, as can be seen in the following sentences:

- (85) Rumors had been *flying* around the workrooms all morning.
- (86) He *carried* the news to his wife.
- (87) They are *flinging* bitter accusations at each other.
- (88) The words *spilled* out in a rush.
- (89) I'm sorry. I didn't quite *catch* what you said.
- (90) They were asked to *set down* a summary of their views.

On the other hand, words may be interpreted as bounded spaces, as in the following:

- (91) I've *got* a lot out of the text.
- (92) He has difficulty *putting* his feelings into words.
- (93) I can't *convey* my feelings in words.
- (94) He tends to *cast* his ideas in long sentences.
- (95) Harry always *fills* his paragraphs with meaning. (Reddy 1979)
- (96) The thought is there, although I grant that it's *sunk* pretty deep in paradoxical language. (Reddy 1979)

In a seminal paper, Reddy (1979) suggests that English has a major or preferred framework for conceptualizing communication, known as 'the conduit metaphor.' Expressions which embody the conduit metaphor follow a definable logic. First, language functions like a conduit, conveying meanings (including thoughts and feelings) from one person to another. Second, speakers/writers put meanings into words. Third, meanings are transferred through a conduit to hearers/readers. Finally, hearers/readers extract the meanings from the words (see also Eubanks 2001, Vanparys 1995).

Sentences (85)-(90) are evidence for the conceptualization of words as moving or movable entities. However, they do not reveal a clear conduit image. The movement that words portray in (85)-(87) follows a trajectory or projected path. Although (88) treats words as a liquid, it flows over the edge of a container rather than through a pipe. These sentences collectively suggest that words, in which meanings are conveyed, are seen by English speakers as entities moving along various paths in the ambient space between interlocutors. Images of meaning conveyance are not confined to the liquid movement through a conduit.

Sentences (91)-(96) describe a part of the act of communication: the process of encoding or decoding. Note that it is meanings (including thoughts and feelings), not words, that are set in motion. In the case of

encoding, meanings are transferred from the mind to words. When it comes to decoding, meanings come from words and enter the mind. Both the source and goal of the movement can be viewed as a bounded space wherein meanings can reside.

3.6 Events and Actions

Events or actions may be phrased as entities in motion, evidenced in the following sentences:

- (97) The fire *advanced* steadily through the forest.
- (98) The earthquake was *preceded* by a loud roar and lasted for 20 seconds.
- (99) An angry muttering *ran* through the crowd.
- (100) The police has *launched* an investigation into the incident.
- (101) Can you *drop* what you're doing and help me with this report?
- (102) A cry *sprang* from her lips.

On the other hand, events or actions could be taken to be bounded spaces, as illustrated below:

- (103) This *sent* us all into fits of laughter.
- (104) Do you realize we are *racing* toward complete economic collapse?
- (105) We should not *rush* into the armed struggle.
- (106) More and more people are *moving* toward buying products that don't harm the environment.
- (107) His rivals are trying to *push* him out of the running.
- (108) Rachel *sailed* through the exam with distinction in all the papers.

Events and actions are dynamic states of affairs. Their commencement (as in (100)), development (as in (97)), and termination (as in (101)) can be expressed by a verb of motion, which takes an argument understood to be an entity in motion. Furthermore, temporal sequence of events or actions is usually expressed in terms of spatial sequence or arrangement of entities, as in (98).

The preposition phrases in (103)-(108), in conjunction with a verb of motion in the same predicate, designate an event or action as a literal bounded space. It is the participants in the states of affairs, not the events

or actions themselves, that make metaphorical movements.

3.7 Formal Discourses

Formal discourses are often considered to be entities in motion, such as the following:

- (109) The talk *drifted* aimlessly from one subject to another.
- (110) The talks *proceeded* in a friendly atmosphere.
- (111) The negotiation *dragged* on for hours.
- (112) I'd like you to *hurry up* your report, please.
- (113) I'd like to *steer* our discussion back to our original topic.
- (114) The latest talks appear to be *heading* for deadlock.

On the other hand, formal discourses may also be conceived of as a bounded space. Examples are:

- (115) Marsha *withdrew* from the argument.
- (116) He gleefully *tossed* irrelevancies into their serious discussion.
- (117) He *got* into an argument with his brother.
- (118) From there we *progressed* to a discussion on politics.
- (119) Can we *move* on to the next item for discussion, please?
- (120) We all argued about it for hours and eventually *arrived* at a decision.

These sentences reveal the dual nature of metaphorized motion in the field of formal discourses. Discussion or argument can be taken to be an entity that moves in a fictive space, as in (109)-(114). Manners of motions are transferred to manners of discourses, as in (109). Speed of motions is extended to pace of discourses, as in (111) and (112). And directions of motions correspond to directions of discourses, as in (113) and (114).

On the other hand, formal discourses like discussion and argument are analogous to a bounded space where interlocutors make movements, as in (115)-(120). The bounded space representing a formal discourse can be divided into sections (e.g., items on an agenda, as in (119)), viewed as smaller spaces representing parts of discussion or argument. In fact, interlocutors can also be characterized as moving entities on the one hand and locations on the other, which will be discussed in the following

subsection.

3.8 Interlocutors and Experiencers

Interlocutors or experiencers can be expressed as moving entities. For example:

- (121) Now let me *return* to the question of inflation.
- (122) I'd like to *depart* from the main subject for a few moments.
- (123) What *led* you to that conclusion?
- (124) That piece of music really *took* me back to my schooldays.
- (125) He *plunged* deep into thought.
- (126) Death at last *released* her from her pain.

On the other hand, interlocutors or experiencers may also be referred to as bounded spaces, such as:

- (127) We have to *get* the message over to the young that smoking isn't good.
- (128) The ambassador personally *conveyed* the president's message to the premier.
- (129) She found it difficult to *open* out to people.
- (130) A good idea just *came* to me.
- (131) The deadly fear *swept* over him.
- (132) It was only after I turned 60 that old age began to *creep* up on me.

There are two fundamental perspectives of discourse. From one perspective, interlocutors move from one subject to another, as in (121) and (122). From the other perspective, words as meaning carrier move from one interlocutor to another, as in (127) and (128). Therefore, interlocutors are presented via the vehicle of not only moving entities but of locations as well.

Experiencers are those who experience emotion, cognition, or perception. The underlined expressions in (124)-(126) and (130)-(132) are assigned the experiencer role. Experiencers also display the metaphorical duality in question. As in (124)-(126), experiencers move in various conventionally metaphorized spaces: time as space, thought as space, feeling as space, and the like. Nevertheless, experiencers may be

spoken of as a bounded space as well, as in (130)-(132). Many studies on conceptual metaphor (e.g., Johnson 1987, Kovecses 2002, Lakoff 1987) deal with the human body as a container, as in *He was filled with resentment*. And yet experiencers associated with metaphorized motion can often be taken to be other types of bounded spaces than containers, as in (130)-(132), in which case an idea or feeling moves to, over, or up on the experiencer rather than within the experiencer. Therefore, the spatial vehicle for the experiencer has been dubbed 'bounded spaces' instead of 'containers' here.

3.9 Further Discussion

In a metaphor the vehicle is used to conceive or present the theme. The metaphorical vehicle offers a perspective on the theme. Since a thing or state of affair has different dimensions, different vehicles may be used to conceive or present different aspects of the same theme. Thus life can be conceived as a journey, war, a dream, a play, or a game, and love may be presented as fire, light, magic, war, or a journey (cf. Shie 2002b).

It is not accidental that the contrasting vehicles of moving entities and bounded spaces are applicable to so many metaphorical themes. The contrasting vehicles are opposite perspectives on the same theme. The metaphorical duality is based on our perception of something in motion. Spatial perception is usually relative to a perspective. Concepts such as front, back, and movement are determined by the perceiver's perspective. A passenger on a running train, for example, usually perceives the scenery outside the window rushing past the train, while the train car does not move forward in the passenger's sight. But anyone in the scenery outside the window perceives the train rushing past. The train may be viewed as a moving entity or a bounded space, and so may the scenery, depending on the perspective. The key to a perspective on a motion event is a bounded space functioning as the reference point with respect to which the entity moves. Admitted that the time-as-space metaphor (as in (37)-(48)) lends pervasive underlying perspectives to time, it is still possible to reverse the perspectives, namely to speak of the spatial continuum in terms of the temporal, as when we use the term *light-year* in astronomy and the phrase *ten minutes' walk* in everyday conversation.

In a metaphorical expression, there exists more or less analogy between the theme and the vehicle. Take, for instance, Sentence (132): *It*

was only after I turned 60 that old age began to creep up on me. The analogy lies in, among other things, a parallel between the slow and quiet movement of creeping and the gradual and unconscious effects of aging. The manner of the motion is analogous to the manner of perceiving the effects of aging. In fact, anything can be metaphorized as anything else as long as an analogy between the two can be found. At least this is the case with novel or creative metaphors. Given the tremendous possibilities of metaphorical thoughts, it is natural that many metaphorical expressions are found to cluster together and fall into structured sets. And yet the topic-vehicle approach adopted here in this paper does not particularly emphasize the network-like relationships between structured sets of metaphorical expressions, treating them as natural outcomes of the multiplicity of metaphorical thoughts.

The currently prevailing theory of conceptual metaphor, constructed by George Lakoff and his colleagues, characterized metaphors as sets of domain mappings. A conceptual metaphor consists of a source domain (e.g., war), a target domain (e.g., argument), and a set of mappings between them (e.g., debaters are opponents, etc.). And there are generalizations over inferences across different conceptual domains (cf. Lakoff 1993, Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Thus conceptual metaphors are organized coherently and form larger metaphor systems (cf. Kovecses 2002).

The theory of conceptual metaphor qualifies metaphor as conceptual. Lakoff and his colleagues have identified a large number of English expressions that are conventionally metaphorical. These metaphorical expressions cluster together around one underlying conceptual metaphor or another, such as the oft-cited 'ARGUMENT IS WAR.' However, conceptual metaphors such as 'ARGUMENT IS WAR' often emerge from a field of interrelated and overlapping concepts (cf. Ritchie 2003). In fact, war is not necessary the primary conceptual metaphor for contentious argument. Many of the metaphorical expressions organized around 'ARGUMENT IS WAR' also correspond to elements of concepts of various competitive games like chess and baseball. For example, argument is sometimes used as a metaphor for war, and games are often used as a metaphor for both argument and war (ibid.). Given that we have far less direct experience of war than experience of competitive games, it is questionable to treat war as the primary metaphor for argument. Thus the overlapping continuum of prototypical experiences may reduce the systematicity of conceptual metaphors.

The contrasting vehicles of moving entities and bounded spaces presented in this paper have posed a problem for the theory of conceptual metaphor. Marked by conceptual systematicity and structural coherence, the theory of conceptual metaphor cannot deal with instances of contradictory conceptual mappings as special cases (as in Lakoff 1993). The structure of the same conceptual metaphor with the source domain of space may show that the same thing in the target domain corresponds to not only a moving entity but also a bounded space in the source domain. Unless the theory of conceptual metaphor can equate a moving entity with a stationary bounded space in the conceptual domain, the systematicity and coherence of cross-domain mapping will be greatly undermined.

A possible solution to the above-mentioned problem is that all the examples cited in Section 3 may be taken to be instances of metaphorical extension that involves conception or representation of abstract entities as physical ones. Since physical entities are movable and take up space, they can certainly provide conceptual basis for both moving entity and bounded space. But this treatment would overgeneralize the metaphorical themes. The metaphorical themes dealt with in Section 3 include events, actions, formal discourses, interlocutors, and experiencers. I am not sure whether it is reasonable or plausible to view events, actions, and discourses as entities - in the literal sense of the word - instead of activities or states of affairs that entities participate in. Furthermore, interlocutors and experiencers are obviously physical entities already, granted that they have various kinds of innate mental ability. Even if we agree that all these themes are abstract entities metaphorized via a physical entity, conceptual metaphor theorists have yet to account for why the same theme can be represented at the linguistic level as being a 'moving' entity on the one hand and a 'stationary' space on the other.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Physical motion is a basic vehicle extending meanings into a range of more abstract semantic fields. English constructions involving motion verbs and spatial prepositions have non-random patterns of participation in metaphorical extension. There are analogical relationships between the literal senses of constructions of motion and their metaphorical

aspects. However, the systematicity and coherence of metaphORIZED motion (and probably many other metaphorical vehicles) should not be overgeneralized. We have seen that many sets of metaphorical extensions from physical motion are relative in nature. The same theme can be conceptualized or presented in terms of a moving entity or bounded space. By exercising a choice between the contrasting vehicles, a speaker or writer offers a particular perspective on the theme. Since it is contradictory to equate a moving entity with a stationary bounded space, both of which are common vehicles, there are limits to the systematicity and coherence of metaphORIZED motion.

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Shie, Jian-shiung

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APPENDIX: VERBS OF METAPHORIZED MOTION

- | | | |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| 1. advance | 3. arise | 5. bounce |
| 2. approach | 4. arrive | 6. break |

Metaphorized Motion in English

7. bring	46. head	85. shut
8. burst	47. hit	86. sink
9. capture	48. hurry	87. slide
10. carry	49. launch	88. slip
11. cast	50. jump	89. spill
12. catch	51. lead	90. spin
13. chase	52. leap	91. spread
14. climb	53. leave	92. spring
15. close	54. lift	93. steer
16. come	55. meet	94. step
17. convey	56. mount	95. stir
18. creep	57. move	96. stretch
19. cross	58. open	97. stride
20. crush	59. pass	98. strike
21. deliver	60. pick	99. strip
22. depart	61. place	100. sweep
23. descend	62. plunge	101. swim
24. divide	63. pour	102. swing
25. drag	64. precede	103. take
26. drain	65. press	104. tear
27. draw	66. proceed	105. throw
28. drift	67. progress	106. toss
29. drive	68. pull	107. transfer
30. drop	69. push	108. travel
31. enter	70. put	109. tuck
32. escape	71. race	110. turn
33. extend	72. raise	111. walk
34. fall	73. reach	112. wander
35. fill	74. release	113. withdraw
36. flash	75. remove	
37. flee	76. return	
38. fling	77. rise	
39. float	78. roll	
40. flow	79. run	
41. fly	80. rush	
42. follow	81. sail	
43. get	82. send	
44. go	83. separate	
45. guide	84. set	

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英語中隱喻化之運動

謝健雄

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隱喻化之實體運動常用來表達抽象的概念或事態。本文旨在探討英語中隱喻化運動之現象。筆者引用英文字典中的例句來佐證並檢視英文中隱喻化運動在各種抽象領域中之運作。結果發現兩相對比之喻依（即「移動之實體」與「有限之空間」）適用於多種非空間領域之語言中。這種兩相對比不斷使用之喻依顯示英語中習用的運動隱喻辭之系統性與一致性是有限的。